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Chapter 1
Introduction
Post-trade processing is not a glamorous topic. For most people, clearing
and settlement is not of much interest. As a result, the post-trade industry
is widely unknown except for the professionals who use and provide post-
trade services. On the academic side, comprehensive literature can be found
on asset pricing, trade volume, and trading arrangements. Only few work,
however, is done on the industrial organization of post-trade activities. Con-
sidering the large amounts of economic resources that are consumed by post-
trade clearing and settlement processing, the area is under-researched. This
thesis is a contribution to the academic literature regarding post-trade ac-
tivities in the foreign exchange market. The international foreign exchange
market is the largest market in the world. Its volume is six times the trading
volume of the second largest market, the U.S. Treasury securities market.
Since there are always two parties to each foreign exchange transaction, the
volume to be settled is even twice the trading volume. In foreign exchange
trading, it is not uncommon for two banks to owe each other 2 billion US
Dollar overnight because settlement has not yet been completed. The fig-
ures make clear that reliability and resilience of the settlement processes are
essential. Interruptions or delays may have disastrous consequences for the
financial industry. During the past years, financial authorities have started
to realize the system’s vulnerability and increasingly paid attention to post-
trade activities in general and to settlement practices of foreign exchange in
particular. In the nineties, several publications have highlighted that most
banks had tremendous overnight credit risk exposures due to current set-
tlement and reconciliation practices at that time. Regulators called on the
financial industry to take appropriate action to measure and reduce the set-
tlement risks in the foreign exchange market. Since then, the international
financial industry has heavily invested in operations and technology to com-
ply with regulators’ requests. The most important result from these common
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industry efforts is the implementation of the Continuous Linked Settlement
(CLS) system. Briefly, CLS is specifically designed to eliminate credit risk on
foreign exchange transactions that it settles. A payment-versus-payment set-
tlement mechanism combined with a number of risk management provisions
eliminates credit risk exposures. The elimination of credit risk, however,
brought a number of other changes to the market. This thesis deals with the
most important aspects of the CLS system in general and its implications for
the market.
1.1 Scope
The scope of this thesis is to describe and analyze the characteristics of the
CLS system. Brief documentations regarding the system’s functionality can
be found in several public articles. This thesis, however, provides not only
an in depth description of its functionality but also documents the history of
its implementation in detail and looks insight its transaction structure. The
goal of this thesis can thus be split in four parts: (1) Provide a description of
CLS’ history, (2) deliver an in depth description of its functionality, (3) assess
CLS’s achievement in reducing credit risk, and (4) analyze the evolvement
of its transactions structure and pick up some liquidity issues. These four
parts together form a comprehensive overview of the CLS system. It must
be mentioned that this thesis does not explicitly focus on operational risks
or corporate governance issues nor on systemic risk aspects. They may be a
component part of the thesis but are not addressed separately.
1.2 Design
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the reader with the
basic knowledge that is necessary to understand the subsequent chapters. It
explains the term settlement and introduces the main operational features
inherent to settlement systems. It sets the theoretical basis of net- versus
gross settlement and shows their interrelation. It then narrows its focus
to the specialties regarding the settlement of foreign exchange transactions
and introduces the domestic settlement systems that are of interest to CLS.
Equipped with the basics of settlement, the reader gets acquainted with the
general environment of CLS. Chapter 3 starts off with an overview of the
global foreign exchange market, its products and its post-trade processing.
The publications of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the de-
scription of several market disruptions show the emergence of public interest
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regarding foreign exchange settlement processes. Public interest and regula-
tory pressure are identified as the main drivers for the industry’s motivation
to lower settlement risks and improve systemic resilience. These incidences
are important in the context of this thesis as they represent the prerequisites
for the creation of the CLS system. Based on original minutes and protocols,
chapter 4 reproduces the history of the CLS system. The project started
with the so called group of twenty banks (G20) that established a number of
working groups to confirm the viability of such a system. In 1997 a company,
CLS Services Ltd., was incorporated to fund and build the CLS system. The
chapter reveals the chronological development of the system by taking up
the key milestones and major difficulties that were encountered. Chapter 4
ends with the system going live in September 2002 and the renegotiation of
the service agreement. Chapter 5 describes the design of the CLS system
in detail. Besides the corporate governance and the membership structure,
it explains the funding and settlement processes as well as CLS’ risk- and
liquidity management framework. Chapter 6 is dedicated to the question of
how successful CLS has accomplished its main goal, the elimination of credit
risk. It must be mentioned that the chapter suffers from a lack of data, as
only a few figures are publicly available. Although chapter 6 does not provide
a detailed empirical analysis, it clearly conveys CLS’ success. Chapter 2 to 6
together offer a comprehensive evaluation of CLS and represent the first three
parts of this thesis’ goals. The fourth goal, the analysis of CLS’ transaction
structure is met in chapter 7 and 8. These chapters apply a real world net-
work model approach to a set of empirical transaction data provided by CLS.
Chapter 7 allows insights into the development of the relationships between
CLS’ participants. Chapter 8 suggests some findings regarding the liquidity
dynamics within the system. Chapter 9 offers a critical conclusion of the
thesis and addresses further research areas.

Chapter 2
Basics of Settlement
Chapter 2 provides a general introduction to clearing and settlement with a
focus on the settlement of foreign exchange contracts. It presents the main
definitions and theoretical concepts to prepare the reader for the following
chapters.
2.1 Scope of Clearing and Settlement
Clearing and settlement are post-trade processes to perform contractual de-
livery obligations such as securities or payments. Clearing refers to the pro-
cess of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming payment or-
ders or security transfer instructions prior to settlement. It may also include
the netting of instructions, the establishment of final positions for settlement,
and the modification of contractual obligations (CPSS 2003). Settlement rep-
resents the actual discharge of the obligations of buyer and seller through the
transfer of funds and securities (Perold 1995). While in a security transac-
tion securities are exchanged against payment, a foreign exchange transaction
involves two payments and no securities. A foreign exchange transaction is
therefore said to have two cash legs. As settlement of securities is not subject
of the subsequent chapters, it is not addressed any further. The following
sections focus on the settlement of payments between banks only. Regard-
ing the functionality of settlement systems, it is distinguished between two
main technologies, real-time gross settlement (RTGS) and net settlement
systems. Before presenting a detailed description of these two mechanisms it
is looked at four operational and structural features that concern both types
of systems. It is this: (1) the attribute of settlement finality, (2) the charac-
teristics of a payment versus payment (PvP) mechanism, (3) the provision
of performance guarantee, and (4) settlement risk aspects.
6 Chapter 2. Basics of Settlement
2.1.1 Settlement Finality
Since the 1970ies central banks have been concerned with systemic risks
of financial markets (see 3.3). Settlement finality is an important aspect
regarding systemic stability in payment systems. It ensures that at some
point the transfer of payments is complete and cannot be reversed under
any circumstances such as failure or bankruptcy of the involved parties. Set-
tlement is said to be unconditional and irrevocable. It assures that also in
times of a financial system crisis, transactions are settled with finality (Page`
& Humphrey 2005). In absence of settlement finality an already processed
transaction might be reversed, for instance in case of bankruptcy of one of
the counterparties. The reversion would cause an unwinding of all inter-
related transactions and some of the affected counterparties might have to
repay funds. This, in turn, could lead to a liquidity crisis that threatens
the stability of the whole system. Whether settlement finality is ensured in a
particular system depends on the legal validity and enforceability of transfers
in a specific country, together with the rules of the settlement system itself
(Perold 1995).
2.1.2 Payment versus Payment
Under a payment versus payment (PvP) settlement standard, funds of two
counterparties are transferred simultaneously and one transfer is only consid-
ered final if the counter-transfer is final as well. PvP thereby eliminates the
most important settlement risk, where one counterparty transfers the owed
funds without receiving the counter-payment. This type of settlement risk
is often called principal risk (see 3.1.4). Principal risk may exist in any set-
tlement procedure when the two transaction legs are treated asymmetrically
(Perold 1995). Foreign exchange transactions in particular show an inherent
asymmetry due to the fact that the involved payment systems are often lo-
cated in different time zones and therefore have different opening hours. To
achieve a PvP mechanism the opening hours of the involved payment sys-
tems must be overlapping (see 2.4.3). In securities settlement the analogue
concept is called delivery versus payment (DvP).
2.1.3 Provision of Performance Guarantee
A settlement institution that provides clearing and guarantees the execution
of a transaction is called a central counterparty (CCP). It substitutes itself
as a buyer to the seller and as a seller to the buyer (Perold 1995). The
original contractual relationship between the two counterparties are replaced
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by respective contracts with the CCP. This contract substitution is called
novation. It results in a homogenization of all payments or contracts. Con-
tract novation does not remove counterparty credit risk from a market, but
it reallocates risks in that participants’ bilateral risk exposure is replaced by
a standard credit risk to the CCP. As it guarantees post-trade anonymity,
central counterparty clearing is most common in derivative markets and in-
creasingly also in equities markets (Ripatti 2004).
2.1.4 Settlement Risk
Generally speaking settlement risks stem from payment system participants’
failures to fulfill their obligations on time and lasts from the time of the trade
up to final settlement. It must be noted that a number of varying definitions
and names for settlement risk and its corresponding phases can be found in
literature. The following brief outline adheres to the doctrine represented by
Geiger (2007) and identifies 3 different types of risks that occur during the
settlement process. For a more detailed description of these phases refer to
section 3.1.4, notably to figure 3.2 on p. 33. During the settlement process
different kinds of risks arise with different stages of failure. A settlement
system participant is exposed to (1) liquidity risk due to the possibility that
its counterparties may fail to meet their obligations in a timely manner.
This would change the participant’s expected liquidity position as the owed
funds would not be received on time. The delay may force the participant
to cover its cash flow shortage by funding from other sources which may
result in higher cost (BIS 1997). The possibility that the counterparties do
not fulfill their obligations at all generates (2) credit risk for that settlement
system participant. Credit risk is also called principal risk or Herstatt risk
and denotes the risk of losing the full value of the contract. Credit risk
can be eliminated by a PvP mechanism. Both, late or non-fulfillment of
obligations forces the participant that expected the payments, to replace the
missing funds. This creates (3) market risk. The more time elapses between
trading and settlement the longer the exposure of a participant to market
risk. Besides these three types of settlement risks, credit risk, liquidity risk,
and market risk, also operational risks and legal risks may arise. These kind
of risks are not discussed any further. As mentioned earlier, a more detailed
description and illustration of the emerging risks during the settlement of
foreign exchange contracts can be found in 3.1.4. The extent to which a
participant is exposed to settlement risk depends on the time lag between
the trade and final completion, the principal amount of the contract to be
settled, and the probability of failure occurrence. As the incidence rate for
failure in settlement is very small but the damage in case of occurrence high,
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settlement risk can be compared to natural hazards. Especially in foreign
exchange trading where the face values of the contracts may be higher than
the counterparties capital, controlling settlement risk is critical. Common
risk measures such as value-at-risk models do not adequately replicate reality.
A great deal of research has been done on how to measure and reduce or
eliminate settlement risk. An interrelated and also extensively discussed
topic is systemic stability. To analyze these topics, models and simulations
are usually applied to either one or both different types of systems: real-time
gross or net settlement systems.
2.2 RTGS versus Net Settlement
The following description of the two basic technologies for settlement, real-
time gross settlement and net settlement, is based on Riedl (2002). Both
types settle payment obligations among their participants but use a different
calculation mode. Payments may be represented in an N × N matrix with
N being the number of system participants. A payment from a sending bank
i to a receiving bank j at time t is denoted wij,t with (i 6= j). A particular
system participant is represented by k.
2.2.1 Real-Time Gross Settlement
Systems operating under a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) mode contin-
uously settle the entered payment instructions by transferring reserve funds
from the paying bank to the receiving bank during the day. Hence, under
RTGS each payment wij,k is settled separately. If a participant exchanges
payments with all other participants in the system at any possible time t
with t = 1, 2, . . . , T , the maximum number of payments to be settled for
that particular participant k is described as T (N − 1). As this is true for
each participant, the maximum number of settlement positions is NT (N−1).
Total gross settlement volume SV g per business day is calculated as:
SV g =
∑
ij
T∑
i=1
wij,t ∀ i, j = 1, . . . , N ; i 6= j (2.1)
To settle payment instructions, the system simultaneously debits and credits
the sending and receiving bank’s central bank transaction accounts. For im-
mediate and final execution of a payment instruction received from a sender
bank, sufficient funds must be available on the relevant sender bank’s account.
If this is not the case, the RTGS system may either reject the instruction or
2.2 RTGS versus Net Settlement 9
put it into a queue until the end of the business day. The queued instructions
get settled as soon as sufficient funds are available on the sender bank’s trans-
action account. The necessary liquidity is provided by incoming payments
or by the sender bank depositing additional funds to its transaction account.
The minimum net liquidity demand Lg of a particular bank k participating
in an RTGS system with a queue facility is therefore the difference between
its total payment obligations and its total payment receipts:
Lgk =
∣∣∣∣∣ min
{
0;
(∑
i
T∑
t=1
wik,t −
∑
j
T∑
i=t
wkj,t
)}∣∣∣∣∣
∀ i, j = 1, . . . , N ; i 6= j (2.2)
An RTGS system without a queue facility tends to request more liquidity to
settle instructions upon receipt as at any point in time during the day the
cumulated payments received must be greater than the cumulated payment
obligations, otherwise additional liquidity must be deposited. The amount
of additional liquidity that is needed compared to an RTGS system with a
queue facility depends on the value of the incoming and outgoing payments
and their order.
2.2.2 Net Settlement
The second type of settlement system operates under net settlement rules.
During the day participating banks transmit their payment instructions ei-
ther directly to the settlement agent (i.e. the institution that manages the
settlement process) or to a clearinghouse for processing and subsequent set-
tlement. At specified points in time, usually the end of the business day, the
system calculates the net value of all payments due to and due from each
participant in the system. Banks with net debit positions transfer funds to
the system which in turn books these reserve funds to the accounts of the net
creditor banks (Kahn & Roberds 1998). Hence, in contrast to the mechanism
of an RTGS system, netting systems only settle at a determined number of
settlement periods, often only once a day. Settlement becomes final during
these settlement periods. During the pre-settlement period when the sys-
tem performs matching and netting calculation, instructions are revocable
and thus not yet final. If the netting system does not provide performance
guarantee, participants are exposed to settlement risk during this phase.
Provided formal netting contracts and a sound legal basis, it is only the net
position that is at risk (BCBS 2000). For that reason netting arrangements
are said to reduce pre-settlement risk. In addition, netting systems organized
as CCP’s and thus providing performance guarantee exhibit a characteristic
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called post-trade anonymity which is an important feature in securities set-
tlement. It assures that the buyer of a security does not know its seller. For
the settlement of foreign exchange contracts this is not a relevant feature. In
general it is distinguished between bilateral netting and multilateral netting.
Bilateral Netting
In a bilateral netting system, payment instructions are netted for each pair of
participants. The maximum number of payment obligations for a particular
participant k is (N − 1). The sum of the bilateral net positions NP nb for
participant k that need to be settled at the end of the business day T is
represented by:
NP nbk =
∑
ij
(
T∑
t=1
wik,t −
T∑
t=1
wkj,t
)
=
∑
i
T∑
t=1
wik,t −
∑
j
T∑
t=1
wjk,t
∀ i, j, k = 1, . . . , N ; i = j 6= k (2.3)
Accordingly, the net liquidity requirement Lnb for participant k at the end
of the business day T under bilateral netting amounts to:
Lnbk =
∑
ij
∣∣∣∣∣ min
{
0;
( T∑
t=1
wik,t −
T∑
t=1
wkj,t
)}∣∣∣∣∣
∀ i, j, k = 1, . . . , N ; i = j 6= k (2.4)
On system level the total number of transactions that has to be settled at
the end of the business day T amounts to 1
2
N(N − 1). Total bilateral net
settlement volume SV nb per business day in the system is calculated as:
SV nb =
1
2
∑
k
∑
ij
∣∣∣∣∣
(
T∑
t=1
wik,t −
T∑
t=1
wkj,t
)∣∣∣∣∣ ∀ i, j, k = 1, . . . , N ; i = j 6= k
(2.5)
Multilateral Netting
In a multilateral netting system payment instructions are netted among all
participants. For each participant it results in a single payment obligation
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at the end of the business day T . This multilateral net position NP nm to be
settled for a participant k is represented by:
NP nmk =
∑
i
T∑
t=1
wik,t −
∑
j
T∑
t=1
wkj,t ∀ i, j = 1, . . . , N ; i, j 6= k (2.6)
Looking at equation 2.3 makes clear that the multilateral net position rep-
resented in equation 2.6 is the sum of all bilateral net positions. The net
liquidity needs Lnm for participant k at the end of the business day T under
multilateral netting is then represented as:
Lnmk =
∣∣∣∣∣ min
{
0;
(∑
i
T∑
t=1
wik,t −
∑
j
T∑
t=1
wkj,t
)}∣∣∣∣∣
∀ i, j = 1, . . . , N ; i, j 6= k (2.7)
The liquidity needs for a participant of a multilateral netting system as dis-
played in equation 2.7 is equivalent to the liquidity need of a participant of an
RTGS system in which all transactions are queued and settled at the end of
the business day T (see equation 2.2). The difference is that the multilateral
netting system settles the net positions with a single payment for each par-
ticipant while the RTGS system processes each instruction sequentially and
infinitely close to T . For the participants, however, the resulting liquidity
requirements are equal. This shows that the settlement delay, meaning the
time between a payment instruction is entered to a system until it is settled
with finality, is the crucial element that relates RTGS and netting systems.
Interrelation of RTGS and Net Settlement
It is clear from the previous sections that the number of transactions, the
total transaction volume, and the liquidity need for a participant as well as
for the system as a whole decreases from RTGS to bilateral and multilateral
netting systems. One of the most important advantages of netting systems
compared to RTGS systems noted in literature is the reduction of liquidity
requirements. It reduces liquidity and transaction costs due to the aggrega-
tion of transaction and time discrete settlement. If cost savings were the only
effect it would be reasonable to delay settlement to infinity. The financial
industry, however, is pursuing to shorten settlement delay. In a netting sys-
tem, payment instructions are not settled with finality until the end of the
business day T . Depending on the time when an instruction is transmitted
to the netting system it takes several hours until final settlement is com-
pleted. During this time period events may occur that frustrate successful
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settlement. Hence, while saving liquidity and transaction costs, netting sys-
tems prolong the time period during which participants bear settlement risk.
For a detailed discussion regarding the trade off between risk and liquidity
cost see Angelini & Giannini (1993). In practice the tendency to shorten
settlement delay may be explained by technological innovations, decreasing
transaction costs and increasing competition between settlement institutions.
Most large-value transfer systems today are operated as RTGS systems. Set-
tlement delay is approaching zero and thereby reducing settlement risk. A
trade off between settlement risk and the need for intra-day liquidity can still
be noticed. Today most central banks provide intra-day liquidity in terms of
overdraft facilities subject to interest and backed by collateral. Liquidity is
therefore not for free but costs interest and generates opportunity costs.
2.2.3 System Stability Aspects
Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one participant to meet its re-
quired obligations when due may cause other participants to fail to meet their
obligations when due. In extreme cases a chain reaction may be triggered
threatening the entire system. Systemic risk arises from intra-day failure or
delayed payments of settlement system participants. As liquidity is costly,
participants try to keep liquidity as low as possible. As incoming payments
are the source for liquidity at the lowest cost, participants may have incen-
tives to settle their obligations only after they have received the necessary
liquidity from incoming payments (Bech & Soramki 2001). This may lead to
participants temporarily holding less liquidity than needed and thus, in some
cases to payment delays. The participant is then not able to fulfill its obliga-
tion on time and with that retards the fulfillment of the obligation of other
participants. In net settlement systems all instructions from the failing mem-
ber must be deleted and the net debit positions of all members recalculated.
This process is called unwinding. It may occur that due to the recalculation
other members as well face a liquidity shortage as their net positions have
changed significantly. The unwinding process is repeated until the remaining
participants are able to fulfill their obligations. In RTGS systems it may oc-
cur that due to one instruction that does not get settled because of missing
funds of that participant, the settlement of a number of other instructions in
the queue is frustrated as well. The RTGS system is said to become illiquid
and the corresponding state is called a gridlock. The Bank for International
Settlements defines a gridlock as a ”situation that can arise in a funds or secu-
rities transfer system in which the failure of some transfer instructions to be
executed (because the necessary funds or securities balances are unavailable)
prevents a substantial number of other instructions from other participants
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from being executed” (BIS 1993). This is mostly caused by some kind of
liquidity shortage of one or more participants. Thereby, it might not only be
the participants lacking liquidity management that causes the shortage but
also an adverse allocation of the liquidity in the system. An unequal distri-
bution of debits and credits, meaning that some participants have to bring
up much more liquidity to fulfill their payments than others, may cause one
or more participants to miss their payment obligations. Also the sequence of
the payments in the queue determines the participants’ liquidity needs. To
minimize the risk for a gridlock the provision of intra-day liquidity by central
banks is crucial. A number of historical gridlock situations is described in
section 3.2.
2.3 Settlement Problems in Foreign Exchange
Settlement of foreign exchange contracts exhibits a number of particularities
that are presented in the following. Most issues are based on Perold (1995).
The basic problem of settling foreign exchange contracts is caused by the
very nature of such a contract usually involving two currencies from two
different countries that settle therefore in two different local payment sys-
tems that might be located in two different time zones. The two legs of the
transaction can then not settle simultaneously because due to the time lag
not both relevant payment systems are open. Without overlapping opening
hours simultaneous settlement is impossible and credit risk is created. In the
context of foreign exchange this kind of credit risk is often called Herstatt
risk, named after the ”Bankhaus Herstatt” (see 3.2.1). It is best explained
by assuming a Yen/US Dollar transaction. If a Japanese bank sells Japanese
Yen (JPY) and buys US Dollar (USD) from a US bank, it transfers the Yen
via the local Japanese payment system to the US bank’s correspondent in
Japan. This must happen during the opening hours of the Japanese pay-
ment system. However, the US bank can only transfer the owed Dollars
during the opening hours of the local US payment system. While fulfilling
its Yen obligation, the Japanese bank will not know whether the US bank
will accomplish the owed Dollar payment. The Japanese bank is exposed to
Herstatt risk to the full amount of the contract.
2.4 Potential Solutions
A number of potential solutions was proposed in literature to solve the prob-
lem of Herstatt exposure. According to Perold (1995), three basic approaches
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are presented in the following: money market fund shares, contracts for dif-
ferences, and extension of RTGS systems’ opening hours.
2.4.1 Money Market Fund Shares
One approach that was brought up in the nineties was the idea of money
market fund shares (Perold 1995). The proposal was based on a system
of money market funds for each currency. Participants willing to enter a
currency exchange would buy shares of the respective money market fund.
At a mutually agreed point in time, the parties would exchange their shares of
the relevant funds. The new owners of the shares could subsequently redeem
the shares or use them for future currency exchanges. As an example, assume
trader A who needs to pay 1 million US Dollars to trader B which in turn owes
100 million Yen to A. In such a system, trader A would purchase shares worth
1 million US Dollars in the US Dollar money market fund during the opening
of the US payment system. Trader B would buy shares of the Yen money
market fund worth 100 million Yen during the Japanese payment system
operating hours. Once both traders have completed their purchase, they
can exchange the shares at any time without consideration of the payment
systems’ operating hours. This solution effectively eliminates Herstatt risk
as the transactions in the local payment systems as well as the exchange of
shares can be accomplished through a DvP mechanism.
2.4.2 Contracts for Differences
An alternative idea was to settle foreign exchange transactions through so
called contracts for differences (CFDs) (Perold 1995). These derivative prod-
ucts allow traders to settle their foreign exchange transactions without prin-
cipal payments. Only the net gain or loss due to changes in the currency
rates is transferred. An example of such a CFD is the rolling spot currency
futures contract available at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) or the
deferred spot forex futures contract at the Singapore International Monetary
Exchange (SIMEX). These contracts are designed to deliver exactly the same
payoff as would be obtained by holding an overnight spot currency position.
To understand this mechanism some background regarding overnight rolling
of spot currency positions is necessary and best explained using an example.
Suppose, trader A buys US Dollars for Euros (EUR). To do so, trader A bor-
rows the necessary Euros and subsequently lends out the bought US Dollars
on a rolling overnight basis which means that the positions are closed and
reopened at the end of each business day. The contract is finally closed out
by selling the US Dollars and repaying the Euro loan. The overnight rolling
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of the position generates a daily cash outflow in Euros from the repayment of
the Euros borrowed, and a daily cash inflow in US Dollars from the US Dollars
lent. Additionally, the US Dollars and the Euros get re-lent and re-borrowed
on a daily basis respectively. This results in four cash flows: one pair of in-
and outflows for each of the two currencies. These flows are achieved using
so called overnight foreign exchange swaps (i.e. a spot transaction combined
with an opposite one day forward transaction, see 3.1.1). The net daily pay-
off of this process is the amount by which the currency moves in excess of
the lending/borrowing rate differential which can be interpreted as the op-
portunity cost of holding the position overnight (often called cost-of-carry or
finance charge). For better understanding the example is reconsidered on a
numerical basis.
Overnight rolling of a spot currency position
A trader buys 1’000’000 US Dollars at a bid rate of EUR/USD = 0.7800.
To do so the trader borrows EUR 780’000 and subsequently lends out the
bought USD 1’000’000. It is further assumed that the trade day’s closing
rate is EUR/USD = 0.7822, and that the position is closed out the next day
at an ask rate of EUR/USD = 0.7830. The annual borrowing rate for Euros
shall be 3 percent and the deposit rate for US Dollars 2.5 percent. These
transactions trigger the following net cash flows:
Overnight interest rate differential
Daily interest payment on borrowed Euros:
780’000 EUR * 3% / 360 days = 65.00 EUR
Daily interest receipt on lent US Dollars:
1’000’000 USD * 2.5% / 360 days = 69.44 USD = 54.17 EUR
Total interest rate differential:
54.17 EUR - 65 EUR = -10.83 EUR
The trader’s account is debited with 10.83 EUR for holding this position
overnight.
Currency movement
As the closing rate for the rolling over equals EUR/USD = 0.7822, the trading
profit for that day amounts to:
(0.7822 - 0.7800) * 780’000 EUR = 1’716.00 EUR
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Closing out
The position is closed out the next day at a rate of EUR/USD = 0.7830
yielding a trading profit of:
(0.7830 - 0.7822) * 780’000 EUR = 624 EUR
Trade Summary
The net gain of this position is thus:
1716.00 EUR + 624.00 EUR - 10.83 EUR = 2’329.17 EUR
The same result is obtained if the interest rate differential as well as the
currency movement are calculated directly:
Interest rate differential = (2.5% - 3%) * 780’000 EUR/360 days = -10.83 EUR
Currency movement = (0.7830 - 0.7800) * 780’000 EUR = 2’340.00 EUR
Which results in the same net gain of 2’329.17 EUR.
Derivative products like the rolling spot currency futures contract exactly
replicate the net gain or loss of positions like the one described in the ex-
ample. Instead of transferring the principal amounts for buying and selling,
the currency traders only pay the price of the contract. The contract then
requires the parties to settle daily on the overnight interest rate differential.
Because this is done separately, the price of the contract itself only varies with
movements in the currencies. These two elements together equal exactly the
net payoff of the overnight spot currency position explained above. The dif-
ference between the rolling spot contract and the overnight spot currency
position as explained in the example is that in the rolling spot contract there
are no principal amounts that need to be settled. The contract eliminates
Herstatt risk by replicating the payoff from an overnight spot currency po-
sition, but without requiring the payments of the principal amounts. There-
fore, derivative instruments may serve as functional substitutes to reduce
settlement risks. However, even though approximately 80 percent of all for-
eign exchange transactions are trades that do not require the delivery of the
principal amounts, there are still about 20 percent that do require the deliv-
ery of the underlying currency for commercial reasons. These trades cannot
be settled by derivative products and require respective counterparties that
are willing to deliver the currencies. This market dynamic, leading to a chain
reaction, is considered to be the main reason for derivative products of this
type not to be able to penetrate the market (Klein 2006).
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2.4.3 Extension of Payment Systems’ Opening Hours
Actually the most evident approach is to extend the opening hours of all
relevant payment systems. Overlapping opening hours would then allow for
a PvP settlement mechanism. As described in the following chapters this
was the prevailing solution and a prerequisite to develop the CLS system
(see chapter 4). In the following, the 15 currencies settling in CLS and the
large-value payment systems of their corresponding countries and SWIFT
are introduced.
2.5 CLS Currencies and Payment Systems
2.5.1 United States Dollar and Fedwire
There are two major large-value payment systems operating in the United
States. The Fedwire funds transfer system (Fedwire), operated by the Federal
Reserve Bank, is an RTGS system. The Clearing House Interbank Payment
System (CHIPS), a net settlement system, is operated by the Clearing House
Interbank Payments Company. Fedwire enables its participants to send and
receive final US Dollar payments in central bank money on an RTGS basis.
To participate, an account with the Federal Reserve Bank (FED) is required.
Payment instructions are settled individually during the opening hours from
00:30 to 18:30 Eastern Time (ET) which corresponds to 06:30 and 00:30
Central European Time (CET). CHIPS was a former end-of-day multilateral
net settlement system that has been converted to a system that continuously
matches, nets and settles US Dollar payment orders. It provides real-time
finality for the payment instructions that are released from the CHIPS pay-
ment queue. Real-time processing is achieved by settling on the books of
CHIPS against positive positions or by simultaneous offsetting of incoming
payment instructions. To facilitate this process, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York has established a special CHIPS account. Participants must fulfill
an opening position requirement (at no later than 09:00 ET (15:00 CET)
with that account. Funds to this account are transferred via Fedwire and
are subsequently used to settle the payment instructions throughout the day.
CHIPS and Fedwire both open operations at 00:30 ET (06:30 CET). CHIPS,
however, closes at 17:00 ET (23:00 CET) (BIS 2003h). CHIPS, being a net-
ting system, does not offer the prerequisites to transfer funds to CLS. CLS
therefore, is connected to Fedwire and holds an account with the FED.
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2.5.2 Euro and TARGET
The Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Trans-
fer (TARGET) system is the RTGS system for the central banks of the Euro-
pean Union (EU). It is a decentralized system comprising 16 national RTGS
systems, also including the RTGS systems of the four EU countries that have
not adopted the Euro (Denmark, Sweden, Poland and UK). The national
RTGS systems are connected through so called Interlinking accounts. A
project named TARGET2 is under construction at the moment. The current
decentralized system is planned to be consolidated by introducing a so called
Single Shared Platform at the end of 2007 (European Central Bank 2007).
To initiate a payment, the payment instruction is sent to the national cen-
tral bank via the domestic RTGS system. Once the central bank has checked
the validity of the instruction, the amount is debited to the domestic RTGS
account of the sending bank and credited to the Interlinking account of the
receiving national central bank. After the receiving central bank has as well
checked the instruction, it converts it from the Interlinking standard into
the appropriate domestic standard, debits the Interlinking account and cred-
its the domestic RTGS account of the receiving bank. Processing hours are
from 07:00 CET to 18:00 CET. During that time payment instructions are
exchanged on a bilateral basis as described above. The European Central
Bank (ECB) ensures the correctness of the payments only at the end of the
day by checking that all bilateral messages sent by one central bank to an-
other have been received and that the sum of all received payments equals
the sum of all sent payments. None of the participating central banks may
close before the ECB has finalized the positions with all bilateral partners
(BIS 2003a). CLS Bank holds an account with the ECB. All Euro payments
from and to CLS Bank are processed via this ECB account and thus via
TARGET (European Central Bank 2006).
2.5.3 Pound Sterling and CHAPS
CHAPS is an RTGS system and the main interbank payment system for
large value transactions in the UK since 1996. To settle Euros, CHAPS Euro
was introduced in 1999 and connected to TARGET (see 2.5.2). In 2001 a
new technical platform provided by SWIFT (see 2.5.16) was introduced to
link the two systems, CHAPS Sterling and CHAPS Euro. Today, CLS Bank
holds an account with the Bank of England and is connected to CHAPS.
To initiate payments, participants send appropriate SWIFT messages to the
SWIFT network which forwards a settlement request to the Bank of England.
If the sending participant has sufficient funds on its central bank account
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the transaction is settled by debiting its account and crediting the receiving
participant’s account at the Bank of England. As soon as the confirmation
of this process has arrived at the SWIFT network, a corresponding message
is sent to the receiving participant. CHAPS opens at 06:00 Greenwich Mean
Time (GMT) and closes at 17:00 GMT (BIS 2003g).
2.5.4 Swiss Franc and SIC
Payments in Swiss Francs (CHF) are settled in an RTGS system called Swiss
Interbank Clearing (SIC). As there are no value limits to the transactions
the system can be considered as both, a large-value payment system and a
retail payment system. It settles interbank payments in Swiss Francs with
immediate finality approximately 22 hours a day with funds held at the Swiss
National Bank (SNB). The SIC day begins at 18:00 CET with the transfer
of the relevant SNB accounts to the respective SIC accounts. The day ends
about 22 hours later in three steps. After the first cut off at 15:00 CET only
covered payments can be submitted until cut off time 2 which is one hour
later at 16:00 CET. After this time only payments submitted by the SNB
are accepted for same day settlement. End of day processing starts at 16:15
CET until the next day begins at 18:00 CET. To support liquidity, especially
with respect to the introduction of CLS, the SNB introduced an interest-
free intra-day credit facility in form of intra-day repos in 1999. Intra-day
credit may be drawn by SIC participants at the beginning of the SIC day
at 18:00 CET or during the day upon request. In addition to the intra-day
repos, mainly for short-term bridging, the banks are offered interest-bearing
overnight money in the form of lombard loans. SIC is operated by Swiss
Interbank Clearing AG which is a subsidiary of Telekurs Holding, a private
sector company and is overseen by the SNB. CLS Bank holds an account
with the SNB and is hence connected to SIC (BIS 2003f).
2.5.5 Australian Dollar and RITS
The Reserve Bank Information and Transfer System (RITS) is Australia’s
core RTGS system. It is operated and overseen by the Reserve Bank of
Australia. Basic operating hours are between 07:30 Eastern Standard Time
(EST) and 15:15 EST. As the CLS system requires overlapping opening hours
of all participating RTGS systems, a three-hour extension of the RITS’ open-
ing hours had to be introduced. Including the extended hours of operation,
RITS settles transactions from 07:30 EST to 18:00 EST. The Australian
Dollar (AUD) is settled through respective entries in the so called Exchange
Settlement (ES) accounts that the participants hold with the Reserve Bank.
20 Chapter 2. Basics of Settlement
RITS can be accessed either directly via a RITS terminal or by using one of
the two feeder systems, the High Value Clearing System (HVCS) or Austra-
clear Limited’s Financial Transaction Recording and Clearance System (FIN-
TRACS). FINTRACS, a privately owned RTGS system, is mainly used for
settlement of government and private sector debt securities. HVCS is a large
value transfer system, based on a SWIFT service called Payment Delivery
Service (PDS) (see 2.5.16) (Australian Payments Clearing Association 2004).
It is especially built to handle foreign exchange transactions (BIS 1999). CLS
Bank has an ES account with the Reserve Bank and is a member of the
SWIFT PDS, through which CLS payments are transferred (Reserve Bank
of Australia 2006).
2.5.6 Canadian Dollar and LVTS
Canada’s two national payment systems are owned by the Canadian Pay-
ments Association (CPA), a non-profit organization. The Large Value Trans-
fer System (LVTS) is the primary system for the unconditional transfer of
large-value or time-sensitive Canadian Dollar (CAD) payments. It provides
real-time processing and intra-day finality of payments as well as end-of-day
settlement. LVTS differs from most other national large-value payments sys-
tems in that it is a real-time multilateral netting system and not an RTGS
system (Roach 2003). Payments are categorized in tranche 1 and tranche
2 payments. Each tranche has its corresponding risk control mechanism to
provide real-time risk control similar to an RTGS system. Tranche 1 pay-
ments are covered by collateral that the sending institution has pledged to
the Bank of Canada for that reason. The sum of all tranche 1 payments sent
by a particular participant cannot excess the value of the collateral. Tranche
2 payments are caped by a system of bilateral limits that are set at the begin-
ning of each settlement day. Each participant has to deposit collateral with
the Bank of Canada equal to the value of the largest bilateral credit line it has
extended to any other participant. Because of collateral saving reasons the
majority of payments are of type 2. The settlement cycle starts between 00:30
ET and 01:00 ET with the CLS participants setting their individual limit for
tranche 1 payments as well as the bilateral limits for tranche 2 payments.
From 01:00 ET to 07:00 ET CLS members send and receive payments to and
from the CLS Bank through the Bank of Canada. After that, all other LVTS
participants set their limits for tranche 1 and 2 and pledge the necessary
collateral. Finally at 07:00 ET the LVTS opens for all other transactions.
The settlement day ends at 18:30 ET when the two positions are merged and
the final multilateral net positions are settled across settlement accounts at
the Bank of Canada. Canada’s second national payment system is the Auto-
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mated Clearing Settlement System (ACSS) (BIS 2003b). In contrast to the
real-time processing of LVTS, ACSS is a deferred net settlement system. It
clears and settles all Canadian payments that are not handled by the LVTS.
This includes for instance any paper-based payments (e.g. cheques), small-
value electronic payments (e.g. debit card) or automated banking machine
transactions (Bank of Canada 2006).
2.5.7 Danish Krone and KRONOS
In Denmark, large-value payments in Danish Krone (DKK) and Euro are
processed via KRONOS, Danmarks Nationalbank’s RTGS system. It is also
the portal to TARGET, the EU central banks’ real-time Euro gross payment
system (see 2.5.2). To process CLS payments in Danish Krone, CLS Bank
holds an account with Danmarks Nationalbank. KRONOS operates from
07:00 CET to 15:30 CET (Danmarks Nationalbank 2006).
2.5.8 Hong Kong Dollar and CHATS
The payment system for the Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) is named HKD Clear-
ing House Automated Transfer System (CHATS). It is an RTGS system
owned by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). All participants as
well as CLS Bank hold an account with the HKMA through which the funds
are settled. The system operates from 09:00 to 17:30 local time (BIS 2003c).
Besides the HKD settlement system Hong Kong also operates RTGS systems
for USD and Euro. They both use a similar technology as the HKD RTGS
and allow participants to settle US Dollar and Euro transactions real-time
in the Asian time-zone with the advantage of a PvP mechanism (Hong Kong
Yearbook 2005).
2.5.9 Japanese Yen and BOJ-NET
There are two large-value settlement systems in Japan that settle the Japanese
Yen (JPY). The Foreign Exchange Yen Clearing System (FXYCS) and the
BOJ-NET Funds Transfer System. BOJ-NET is an RTGS system owned and
operated by the Bank of Japan. FXYCS is a net system owned by the Tokyo
Bankers Association but operated by the Bank of Japan and handles the
clearing of foreign exchange transactions. Net positions resulting in FXYCS
are transferred via BOJ-NET (Japanese Bankers Association 2003). With
the introduction of CLS the Bank of Japan not also introduced an intra-day
overdraft facility but also implemented a gross settlement option in FXYCS.
CLS Bank is a participant of FXYCS since 2002. Common operating hours
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are from 09:00 to 17:00 local time and until 19:00 for participants that made
an advance application the day before (BIS 2003d). Currently the Bank
of Japan is working on a so called neXt-Generation RTGS project of the
BOJ-NET. Among other features, the new system is planned to integrate
the large-value payments that are currently still handled by FXYCS (Bank
of Japan 2006).
2.5.10 Korean Won and BOK-Wire
The Bank of Korea (BOK) is running the Bank of Korea Financial Wire
Network (BOK-Wire). It is the only large-value RTGS system that settles
the Korean Won (KPW). It operates from 09:30 to 17:00 local time and until
18:30 if the transaction involves CLS. Any financial institution holding an
account with the BOK is eligible to participate in the BOK-Wire. For CLS
Bank to hold an account with the BOK and hence to become a participant
in BOK-Wire, a legal amendment was necessary. Besides the transfer of the
domestic currency, the system also offers transfers in US Dollar and Japanese
Yen between foreign currency accounts held with the BOK. Participants may
therefore transfer US Dollar and Japanese Yen to and from their central
bank accounts to each other without using their correspondent bank (Bank
of Korea 2006).
2.5.11 New Zealand Dollar and ESAS
The Exchange Settlement Account System (ESAS) is operated by the Re-
serve Bank of New Zealand. It is New Zealand’s large-value RTGS system
to settle the New Zealand Dollar (NZD). It provides settlement accounts for
banks to settle their real time payments. ESAS accounts do not allow for
overdrafts. To raise liquidity, participants need to have an intra-day repur-
chase agreement with the Reserve Bank. Liquidity is then provided during
the ESAS day by a so called autorepo facility. An autorepo is generated as
soon as the queued settlement requests hit the trigger amount that is speci-
fied by the participant. The ESAS day starts at 09:00 and ends at 08:30 the
next day (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2006).
2.5.12 Norwegian Krone and NBO
The Norwegian Krone (NOK) settles in Norges Bank’s Settlement System
(NBO). Funds are settled by debiting and crediting the corresponding bank
accounts at the Norges Bank which provides intra-day liquidity against col-
lateral. Settlement starts around 05:45 and ends at 16.30 CET (Norges
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Bank 2006). A new technical platform is currently under construction. The
new system, also an RTGS system, will be linked to a scandinavian cash pool
to facilitate cross-currency liquidity among Norway, Sweden, and Denmark
(CBR Online 2006).
2.5.13 Singapore Dollar and MEPS+
Large-value interbank transfers in Singapore are settled on a RTGS basis in
the MAS Electronic Payment System (MEPS+). The system is operated by
the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) (BIS 2003e). MEPS+ is used
to transfer same-day payments in Singapore Dollar (SGD) between banks.
Payments are initiated by sending SWIFT messages. Provided that the pay-
ing bank has sufficient funds at its settlement account, the instruction will be
settled instantaneously. To facilitate liquidity management the participants’
reserve accounts at the MAS include a settlement sub-account. At 09:00
local time, when MEPS+ begins operation, funds are transferred from the
reserve account to the settlement sub-account. Banks may also shift funds
from the reserve account to that settlement account during the day. The
system closes at 18:30 local time when all funds are transferred back to to
the reserve account (Monetary Authority of Singapore 2006).
2.5.14 South African Rand and SAMOS
The Real-Time Gross Settlement service provided by the Reserve Bank of
South Africa is called the South African Multiple Option Settlement (SAMOS)
system. The system not only settles large-value transactions in Rand (ZAR)
between banks but also retail payments and obligations arising from equity
and bond markets. Large-value transactions, including CLS transactions, are
settled from midnight until 17:00 CET. During the evening hours from 17:00
CET until midnight, only retail transactions are processed. CLS Bank holds
an account with the South African Reserve Bank (South African Reserve
Bank 2006).
2.5.15 Swedish Krona and RIX
The central bank of Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank, operates a national RTGS
system named RIX. It settles large-value transfers and customer payments in
Swedish Krona (SEK) and until the end of 2006 also offered a parallel settle-
ment system for Euros that is connected to TARGET (see 2.5.2). Currently
a new technical platform for RIX is under construction. The new system
will no longer be connected to TARGET. For settlement each bank holds
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either directly a RIX account with the Riksbank or settles indirectly via an
intermediary, called a clearing bank. CLS Bank is a direct participant of the
system. Settlement hours for Swedish Krona are between 07:00 CET and
17:00 CET (Sveriges Riksbank 2006).
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the RTGS systems’ for those currencies
that are included in the CLS system. As they are part of the CLS system they
must have overlapping opening hours. The table shows the systems’ open-
ing hours in CET as well as the corresponding local time and if applicable,
includes extended opening hours to settle CLS transactions1.
Country Currency System CET Hours Local Time
USA USD Fedwire 06:30 - 00:30 00:30 - 18:30
EU EUR TARGET 07:00 - 18:00 07:00 - 18:00
UK GBP CHAPS 07:00 - 17:20 06:00 - 16:20
Switzerland CHF SIC 18:00 - 16:00 18:00 - 16:00
Australia AUD RITS 23:30 - 10:00 07:30 - 18:00
Canada CAD LVTS 07:00 - 00:30 01:00 - 18:30
Denmark DKK KRONOS 07:00 - 15:30 07:00 - 15:30
Hong Kong HKD CHATS 02:00 - 10:30 09:00 - 17:30
Japan JPY BOJ-NET 01:00 - 11:00 09:00 - 19:00
Korea KPW BOK-Wire 01:30 - 10:30 09:30 - 18:30
New Zealand NZD ESAS 22:00 - 21:30 09:00 - 08:30
Norway NOK NBO 05:45 - 16:30 05:45 - 16:30
Singapore SGD MEPS+ 02:00 - 12:30 09:00 - 18:30
South Africa ZAR SAMOS 23:00 - 16:00 00:00 - 17:00
Sweden SEK RIX 07:00 - 17:00 07:00 - 17:00
Table 2.1: Opening Hours of RTGS systems.
2.5.16 SWIFT
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)
is not a payment system but an industry-owned service provider who sup-
1Time conversions are based on winter times.
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plies standardized messaging services. It was formed in 1973 to facilitate
communication among banks and to replace the large post mail and fax
traffic (Riedl 2002). Today almost 8’000 financial institutions in more than
200 countries are SWIFT members and use SWIFT messages to send and
receive instructions or confirmations regarding different kinds of financial
transactions (SWIFT 2006). The messages are transferred on a secure IP
network in standardized formats called Message Type (MT). To each differ-
ent financial transaction a number is assigned, such as the MT300 for foreign
exchange transactions. SWIFTNet FIN is SWIFT’s core messaging service.
It is an interactive communication service providing a request and response
message exchange for these MT-messages among the connected institutions.
The SWIFTNet FINCopy service is a value-adding feature of SWIFTNet
FIN and can be used to automatically send a copy of the original message to
a third party, for instance the settlement institution. Besides this, SWIFT
offers a whole range of other services such as SWIFTNet Accord, a match-
ing machine, or SWIFTNet CLS Third Party Service, a service package for
non-CLS members that use CLS services.2
2.6 Chapter Summary
Settlement is the process of discharging buyer and seller of financial contracts
from their obligations by transferring the corresponding funds and securities.
In case of foreign exchange contracts only funds are transferred and the
transaction is said to have two cash legs. There are four operational features
inherent to RTGS as well as netting systems that are of special interest:
• Settlement finality guarantees that at some point during the settle-
ment process, the transfer of payments is unconditional and irrevocable
under any circumstances.
• Payment versus payment settlement standards eliminate credit risk
by transferring funds simultaneously and only if both counter-payments
are accomplished.
• Provision of performance guarantee is offered by a clearing or
settlement institution that substitutes itself as a buyer to the seller
and as a seller to the buyer. Such an institution is generally called a
central counterparty (CCP).
2For further details on SWIFT products and services refer to www.swift.com.
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• Settlement risk occurs from the time of the trade until the final
transfer of funds and can be split in three different risk types: liquidity
risk, credit risk, and market risk.
While RTGS systems settle transactions sequentially on a gross and contin-
uous basis, netting systems only settle net amounts at specific times during
the business day. The crucial element that relates RTGS and netting sys-
tems is the duration of the settlement delay. It can be shown that an RTGS
system queuing all transactions and settling them at the end of the busi-
ness day, requires the same amount of liquidity from its participants as a
multilateral netting system. As RTGS systems are considered to be more
stable in terms of systemic stability, most large-value transfer systems to-
day are based on RTGS rules. The main issue regarding the settlement of
foreign exchange contracts is the geographical distance between the counter-
parties. They settle transactions in different domestic payment systems that
are possibly located in different time zones. Several potential solutions had
been proposed to reduce or eliminate settlement risk despite these difficulties.
The most obvious is to extend the opening hours of the relevant payment
systems to enable a PvP mechanism. This indeed was the prerequisite for
the construction of the CLS system. Section 2.5 introduces the settlement
systems that are relevant in the context of CLS. They are mostly operated
on a RTGS basis and show overlapping opening hours.
Chapter 3
CLS Environment
This chapter introduces the foreign exchange market environment which rep-
resents the background for the development of the CLS system. The chapter
is focused on three aspects that are considered to be the main drivers for the
development of CLS: (1) the absence of a foreign exchange settlement sys-
tem able to reduce settlement risks at that time, (2) several near collapses of
the systems due to failing market participants, and (3) the recommendations
of the Bank for International Settlements. The chapter starts off with an
overview of the foreign exchange market and its products. It introduces the
difficulties of foreign exchange settlement and shows the implications regard-
ing settlement risks. With this background the following sections describe
the key settlement incidents which evoked serious concerns of central banks
and the Bank for International Settlements regarding settlement risks in for-
eign exchange transactions. It provides a summary of the events and relates
them to actions taken by central banks. The third part summarizes the rele-
vant publications of the Bank for International Settlements. It identifies the
important steps that finally led to the initiative of the G20 to build the CLS
system. The chapter summary provides a chronological overview.
3.1 The Foreign Exchange Market
The foreign exchange market is the largest market in the world and still
shows increasing volumes. For the year 2007 an average daily turnover of
USD 3.2 trillion1 is estimated. Measured at constant exchange rates, this
is an increase of 65 percent compared to the year 2004 (BIS 2007). To
relate this figure to other markets, the average daily trading volume of the
1To compare this figure to other markets, only one leg of the transaction is counted and
not the sum of both legs that are to be settled.
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world’s second largest market, the U.S. Treasury securities market, amounts
to about USD 500 billion (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2004). The
foreign exchange market is more than six times larger in turnover volumes
than the second largest market in the world.
3.1.1 Foreign Exchange Products
The foreign exchange market can be broken down into three traditional over-
the-counter (OTC) segments: spot transactions, outright forwards, and for-
eign exchange swaps. Prior to 1970 these were the only products traded.
Today they still account for the major share of total foreign exchange mar-
ket activity. A spot transaction involves a straightforward exchange of two
currencies within two business days. This two day period provides time for
matching and arranging settlement. Trades for value dates in advance of
the spot value date are also possible (so called pre-spot or ante-spot trans-
actions). Such transactions, however, only account for a small part of the
market, particularly same day cash transactions involving countries in differ-
ent time zones (Cross 1998). For spot transactions, like for outright forwards
the exchange rate is fixed at the day of the contract closure. The only differ-
ence between spot transactions and outright forward contracts is the value
date. While spot transactions settle no later than two business days after
the deal date, outright forwards are settled at any pre-agreed date, three or
more business days after the deal date. The term outright forward is used
to emphasize that it is a single purchase and not part of a foreign exchange
swap. Foreign exchange swaps consist of two transactions which settle at
two different value dates. The near transaction includes the exchange of two
currencies on a specific date while the long transaction represents a reverse
exchange of the same two currencies at a later date. The exchange rates for
the legs usually differ from each other and are set at the day of the contract
closure. The foreign exchange swap can also be reproduced by a spot trans-
action and an outright forward going in opposite directions. Table 3.1 shows
the development of the average daily turnovers in these segments. Besides
the traditional segments, there are three other products which trade OTC:
currency swaps, currency options, and non-deliverable forwards (NDF). Cur-
rency swaps differ from foreign exchange swaps in that it is not only one
exchange and a respective re-exchange but a stream of payments. In a cur-
rency swap transaction counterparties exchange and re-exchange principal
and streams of fixed or floating interest payments in two different currencies.
Mostly, the two parties at first exchange equal initial principal amounts of
two currencies at the spot rate and subsequently exchange a stream of fixed
or floating interest rate payments for an agreed period of time. At the end
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Year 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Spot transactions 494 568 387 621 1’005
Outright forwards 97 128 131 208 362
Foreign exchange swaps 546 734 656 944 1’714
Estimated gaps in reporting 53 60 26 107 129
Total traditional turnover 1’190 1’490 1’200 1’880 3’210
Daily transaction averages in April, in billions of USD. Figures are adjusted for
local and cross-border double-counting.
Table 3.1: Global Foreign Exchange Market Turnover (BIS 2007).
of this period the principal amount is re-exchanged at the initial spot rate
(Cross 1998). Currency options are rights to buy or sell a specified amount of
one currency for another at a specified price on a specified date. In contrast
to forwards and futures it is an option and not an obligation to execute. Cer-
tain currency options as well as currency futures are exchange traded. NDFs
are foreign exchange derivative products. An NDF contract settles not by
delivering the underlying pair of currencies, but by making a net payment
typically in US dollar. The net payment is equal to the difference between the
agreed forward exchange rate and the actually realized spot fixing (Guonan,
Ho & McCauley 2004).
3.1.2 Currency Composition
The US dollar is the world’s most traded currency. In 2001 the dollar was
on one side in about 90 percent of all transactions. For the year 2007, the
US dollar share is estimated to be around 86 percent. It is followed by the
Euro being on one side in 37 percent of all contracts. Table 3.2 shows the
percentage shares of the most traded currencies. Dollar/Euro transactions
account for 27 percent of global turnover which makes it the most traded
currency pair (BIS 2007). Table 3.3 provides an oversight of the percentage
turnover of the relevant currency pairs.
3.1.3 Settlement of Foreign Exchange Transactions
To actually settle the foreign exchange contracts it is important to understand
the anatomy of the transaction in detail. Each foreign exchange transaction
consists of two separate legs, each referring to one of the two involved cur-
rencies and the two contract partners respectively. For one of the legs, one
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Year 2001 2004 2007
US dollar 90.3 88.7 86.3
Euro 37.6 37.2 37.0
Japanese yen 22.7 20.3 16.5
Pound sterling 13.2 16.9 15.0
Swiss franc 6.1 6.1 6.8
Australian dollar 4.2 5.5 6.7
Canadian dollar 4.5 4.3 4.2
Swedish krona 2.6 2.3 2.8
Hong Kong dollar 2.3 1.9 2.8
Norwegian krone 1.5 1.4 2.2
Korean won 0.8 1.2 1.1
Mexican peso 0.9 1.1 1.3
New Zealand dollar 0.6 1.0 1.9
Singapore dollar 1.1 1.0 1.2
Other currencies 11.6 11.2 14.2
All currencies 200 200 200
Percentage shares of average daily turnover in April. Be-
cause two currencies are involved in each transaction,
the sum of the percentage shares totals 200 percent.
Table 3.2: Currency Distribution (BIS 2007).
contract partner is the buyer and the other the seller, for the second leg the
roles of the contract partners are allocated vice versa. Figure 3.1 visualizes
this relation. Each contract partner is the buyer of one particular currency
and the seller of the other currency respectively. To settle the contract, the
two legs of the transaction are processed separately via the respective local
large-value transfer systems (LVTS). In most countries the LVTSs settle in
RTGS mode. However, the time lags between the countries of the currencies’
origins sometimes makes it impossible for the two legs to settle at the same
time (see chapter 2). When one party has released the payment of its owed
amounts it does not know if or when the counterparty has released or will
release the counter-payment. It might then take up to three business days
until the party that has transferred the owed funds, receives final confirma-
tion regarding the receipt of the counter-payment (CPSS 1996). This time
lag between the payment and the final confirmation regarding the receipt
of the counter-payment is the primary source for the emerging risks during
settlement.
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Year 2001 2004 2007
US dollar/Euro 30 28 27
US dollar/Yen 20 17 13
US dollar/Sterling 11 14 12
US dollar/Swiss franc 5 4 5
US/Canadian dollar 4 4 4
US/Australian dollar 4 5 6
US dollar/other 17 16 17
Euro/Yen 3 3 2
Euro/sterling 2 2 2
Euro/Swiss franc 1 1 2
Euro/other 2 2 4
Other currency pairs 2 2 4
All currency pairs 100 100 100
Percentage shares of average daily turnover in April.
Figures are adjusted for local and cross-border double-
counting.
Table 3.3: Market Turnover by Currency Pair (BIS 2007).
3.1.4 Emerging Risks During Settlement
Due to the characteristics of a foreign exchange contract, three main risks
emerge during settlement: market risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk. In the
following, the duration of a successful settlement shall be defined as the time
span between the conclusion of the contract and the final and irrevocable
receipt of the payments of both contract partners. During this time the
following risks may occur (Geiger & Spremann 1998):
• Market risk: each party is exposed to market risk during the time
of the conclusion of the contract up to the irrevocable release of each
party’s payment. In case one party fails in this phase of the settlement
the counterparty would have to replace the contract possibly delayed
and at higher costs.
• Credit risk: after the irrevocable release of one party’s payment, this
party is exposed to credit risk which amounts to the full value of the
contract. The exposure lasts until this party gets acknowledged receipt
of the owing funds. This might take up to three business days. If the
counterparty fails during this phase, the face value of the contract is
32 Chapter 3. CLS Environment
Contract Partner I
Buyer
Seller
Seller
Buyer
Contract Partner II
Leg I
Currency I
Leg II
Currency II
Figure 3.1: Characteristic of a Foreign Exchange Contract (author).
lost. Due to the high face values of foreign exchange contracts, the
amounts at risk can be tremendous and might even excess the party’s
equity (CPSS 1996). However, as the probability of a counterparty
braking down exactly during this relatively short period of time is ex-
tremely low, a common risk measurement based on probability and
value at risk does not provide a sensible estimation of the risks as-
sumed. Due to the exposure dimensions, credit risk is the main driver
for the concerns regarding foreign exchange settlement.
• Liquidity risk: in case the counter-payment is delayed, liquidity risk
occurs because the other party has expected to receive the owing funds
on time. As a consequence it might not be able to meet its existing
payment obligations due to the delay of the incoming funds. Preva-
lently it is operational risk such as technical disruptions that give rise
to liquidity risk.
Figure 3.2 schematically illustrates these different risk phases. In reality,
the three risk phases do not exactly replace each other but overlap. An
alternative illustration of the different settlement phases can be found in
section 3.3.4.
3.2 Causes for Central Bank Concerns
During the last 30 years there have been real losses and near misses high-
lighting the significance of the risks described in the previous section. These
incidents rose central banks’ concerns and stressed the importance of inter-
national cooperation to reduce these risks. The following section provides a
brief summary of the most drastic incidents.
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Figure 3.2: Settlement Risk Phases (Geiger & Spremann 1998).
3.2.1 Collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt
The year 1974 was the starting point of the growing awareness concerning
settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions. In that year, on June 26 at
15.30 CET, after the end of the local banking day, the German authorities
closed down Bankhaus Herstatt. It was a small German bank in Cologne
which was very active in foreign exchange markets. In those days the bank
was known for taking on foreign exchange positions that were much larger
than its capital. Young traders were speculating on an increase of the US dol-
lar. A sharp increase in oil prices, however, caused the US dollar to fall. Ger-
man authorities discovered fraudulently concealed losses in Bankhaus Her-
statt’s books and subsequently withdrew their banking license. All banking
activities were immediately shut down. In the US, the business day had just
started and at least twelve US counterparties of Bankhaus Herstatt had irre-
vocably transferred large amounts of Deutsche Mark (total estimated amount
is USD 200 million) to the defaulting bank. Due to the time lag they did not
receive their outstanding US dollar payments, thus, faced an exposure of the
full amount of their Deutsche Mark payments made (credit risk and liquidity
risk). Moreover, all banks having entered into forward trades with Bankhaus
Herstatt had to replace the contracts in the market (market risk). The failure
caused a chain reaction as other banks refused to make their payments and
closed their credit lines for banks that were suspected to be counterparties
of Bankhaus Herstatt. As it was unknown which banks had suffered losses,
most banks were unwilling to meet their obligations unless they received
confirmation that the counter-payment had been received. The USD/DM
market was immediately disrupted. The multilateral net settlement system
in New York nearly collapsed and the recovery took several business days
(Dale (1984) and Remolona (1990)). Bankhaus Herstatt was the first and
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most severe case in a series of incidents over the following years. It was
the first time that settlement risk in foreign exchange trading had attracted
major public attention.
3.2.2 Drexel Burnham Lambert Group
In March 1989 Drexel Burnham Lambert Group (DBLG), at that time one
of the most profitable investment banks on Wall Street, pleaded guilty to six
felony charges and agreed to pay USD 650 million in fines (Breeden 1990).
For the year 1989 the group reported consolidated assets of USD 28 billion
and USD 836 million of equity. Regardless of the conviction of DBLG its
broker subsidiary Drexel Burnham Lambert (DBL) still had a strong capital
basis and continued its business. As a registered broker DBL was regulated
by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Another subsidiary, Drexel
Burnham Lambert Government Securities Inc. (GSI) stayed a primary dealer
with whom the FED kept on conducting open market operations. The finan-
cial soundness of primary dealers is closely monitored by the FED to assure
their reliability as market makers for government securities. Thus, two of
DBLG’s subsidiaries were operating under federal supervision. However, the
holding company DBLG itself was not subject to federal oversight but to
functional regulation. This means that the different roles of DBLG (as a bro-
ker and a primary securities dealer) were subject to separate regulation and
supervision. Instead of supervising the soundness of DBLG as an institution
itself, the subset of DBLG’s functions were separately regulated (Franklin &
Herring 2001). DBLG was a key player in the secondary market for low-grade
bonds. During 1989 a series of events dramatically depleted the liquidity in
this market. First, confidence in DBLG was undermined by its guilty plea
and another indictment on racketeering and securities fraud. Second, in sum-
mer of 1989 the US Congress ruled that certain thrift institutions must sell
their holdings in low-grade bonds. Third, newly developed covenants sup-
posed to protect investors against abrupt declines in credit quality did not
prove effective. The Campeau Group’s default in September 1989 further
decreased market liquidity in low-grade bonds. The financial structure of
DBLG was violently damaged. In December of the same year Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) downgraded DBLG’s commercial paper and reduced its rating
even further to speculative on February 12 in 1990. Unable to issue any
new commercial papers and without the assistance of the authorities DBLG
was forced to file for protection under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy laws2.
2Chapter 11 allows a defaulting company to temporarily continue operations under the
protection and supervision of the Bankruptcy Court.
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The market, however, did not distinguish the holding company filing Chap-
ter 11 and the solvent, regulated subsidiaries. DBLG’s sound subsidiaries
got blocked in a gridlock situation. Afraid of credit exposures during settle-
ment, counterparties stopped business also with the solvent subsidiaries of
DBLG. Simultaneously, the healthy subsidiaries of Drexel Burnham retained
their payment orders as they were concerned that the counterparty might
use the payment to set-off against liabilities due from other DBLG compa-
nies. The Bank of England as well as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
had to intervene and assured the market participants that transactions with
the solvent subsidiaries of DBLG and the administrator trustee of the hold-
ing company would be completed. The Bank of England set up an ad hoc
settlement facility for one of DBLG’s healthy subsidiaries, Drexel Burnham
Lambert Trading (DBLT). In that, the Bank of England acted as an inter-
mediary between DBLT and its counterparties. Instead of paying directly
to DBLT accounts at the correspondent bank, the counterparties transferred
the amounts due to an account held in the name of the Bank of England at
the correspondent bank. As soon as the receipt of funds was confirmed by
the Bank of England, DBLT irrevocably released the counter payment. In
turn, when a particular counterparty received the payments from DBLT, it
authorized the Bank of England to transfer the deposits to DBLT’s accounts.
This settlement mechanism turned out to be efficient and was kept in place
for a whole week. However, several factors were prerequisite to make this a
viable and efficient solution: the subsidiary DBLT was solvent and willing to
settle all trades, the management and traders of DBLT stayed in place what
significantly supported the unwinding process, and the Bank of England was
accepted as a neutral facilitator by all parties involved. The absence of one
of these factors would have complicated and delayed the unwinding of the
gridlock.
3.2.3 Bank for Credit and Commerce International
The Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was closed on July
5 in 1991. BCCI had built up a complex corporate structure which made it
virtually impossible for supervisory authorities to monitor the activities of
BCCI on a consolidated basis. In 1991 the US Shadow Financial Regulatory
Committee stated, ”BCCI’s headquarters were established in countries with
weak supervisory authorities, strong secrecy laws and neither lenders of last
resort nor deposit insurers who would have financial reasons to be concerned
about the solvency of banks that are chartered in their jurisdictions” (SFRC
1991). None of the relevant national bank supervisors had the authority
to compel BCCI to reorganize its corporate structure so that it could be
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monitored on a consolidated basis. In April 1990, Price Waterhouse which
at that time had become the sole auditor of BCCI reported to the Bank of
England large scale fraud in a number of business activities. The auditors of
Price Waterhouse did not give an opinion on the 1990 accounts and indicated
that they were not even sure whether it was going concern. Price Waterhouse
was assigned by the Bank of England to further investigate on the issue. On
June 24 in 1991, a detailed report was delivered documenting the massive
fraud. At mid day on July 5, the Bank of England applied to the UK court for
appointment of a provisional liquidator. The procedure was carefully planned
and the relevant authorities in each country took parallel action to minimize
the damage to creditors. However, BCCI had sent a payment instruction
message to its New York correspondent one day prior to the close-down to
make a US dollar transfer for value on July 5. Due to a credit limit placed
on BCCI’s correspondent the payment remained in the queue. Having not
yet settled the BCCI transaction the correspondent received a message from
BCCI’s provisional liquidator in London and canceled the payment. BCCI’s
counterparty in that way lost the principal amount of the contract. Other
principal losses occurred for Japanese banks due to the time lag. As Yen had
been paid to BCCI SA Tokyo on that particular day and BCCI’s assets in
New York had already been blocked prior to the settlement of the US dollar
leg, the banks lost the full values exposed. For an extensive discussion of
BCCI, refer to Herring (1993). The BCCI affair illustrates the difficulties
arising from a shutdown of banks that are active in the foreign exchange
market. Today, regulators agree that to minimize damage, an internationally
operating bank must be closed down on Friday night after the closing of the
US business day.
3.2.4 Attempted Soviet Coup D’E´tat
The attempted coup d’e´tat in Moscow in mid August 1991 caused a disrup-
tion in settlement over several days. When members of the Politburo and
the leaders of the Soviet military and security services detained Gorbachev
in the evening of August 18, the international community considered it as a
serious political crisis. Most counterparties of the Russian institutions active
in foreign exchange markets were not willing to expose themselves to the risk
that due to the adverse political situation their contracts will not be fulfilled.
Instead they claimed collateral or acceptable third party guarantees in ad-
vance of releasing the funds. As a result, settlement was delayed. In some
cases the Russian institutions’ correspondents were even unwilling to release
funds despite the received collateral. Instead of paying out funds due on a
particular day, they kept them back to cover amounts that were due to receive
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from that same customer on the following day. Correspondents intended to
protect the western counterparties from principal risk. In that, they exposed
the Russian institutions to serious liquidity risks in a time when money mar-
kets were increasingly unwilling to enter deals with them. Partly with the
support of public authorities and bilateral agreements between institutions
a global collapse of the payments system could fortunately be avoided. For
more details on this incident see CPSS (1996). The crisis demonstrates how
settlement risks can arise from unstable political environments.
3.2.5 Barings Crisis
In February 1995 Barings PLC, the oldest merchant bank in London at that
time, collapsed. Similar to BCCI, Barings was characterized by a complex
international corporate structure. Unlike BCCI which collapsed because of
massive fraud, Barings was disrupted by the fraud committed by a single
trader, Nick Leeson. Being a chief trader he was also responsible for settling
his trades. This was a clear failure of internal controls. It enabled him to use
an error account to hide his losses. Already in December 1994 the loss on this
account amounted to more than USD 500 million without being noticed by
Leeson’s supervisors (BBC 2005). Trying to cover his losses, Leeson specu-
lated on an increase of the Nikkei index. On January 17 in 1995, a disastrous
earthquake hit the Japanese city of Kobe. The Nikkei index dropped by 7
percent within a week. In a desperate attempt to move the market Leeson
took on even more uncovered bets. On Friday, February 24 in 1995 Barings
had to report to the Bank of England that it would not be able to meet its
margin calls for the following Monday. Over the weekend the Bank of Eng-
land was trying to find a solution to avert a final break down. No financial
institution was willing to support Barings as the extent of losses was uniden-
tified. Without any hope of recovery, Barings turned to the bankruptcy
court on Sunday evening, February 26. Besides many other adverse issues
resulting from the closing of Barings it almost caused a substantial settle-
ment problem on that day. A clearing bank had sent a payment instruction
to Barings’ correspondent on Friday 24, for value on Monday. Immediately
after the close-down of Barings the correspondent tried to cancel the instruc-
tion. The clearing process did not permit cancelation nor was the receiving
bank able to reverse the transaction. The sending bank ended up with a net
debit position in clearing that day. To enable settlement, the bank agreed
to borrow the amount from another bank. Without a quick decision to do
so, settlement for that day, involving 45 banks, would have been frustrated
and the clearing would have had to be unwound even though less than one
percent of the payments had anything to do with Barings (CPSS 1996). For a
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detailed discussion of the Barings crisis refer to Herring (2003). The Barings
crisis as well as the other incidents described, demonstrates the importance
of clearing participants having a thorough understanding of the rules and
processes of their clearing system. Even a failure of small transactions may
trigger spill-over effects that can easily initiate serious disruptions in a clear-
ing system. In case of an institution’s break down the timing of the closing
might be very important to avoid systemic disruptions. Central banks’ risk
perception with regard to international settlement was continuously growing
due to these incidents. As a result, the Bank for International Settlements
formed committees such as the Group of Experts on Payment Systems and
the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes to monitor these issues and
to provide future guidance and recommendations. In 1990, these committees
were replaced by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems.
3.3 Reports of the CPSS
The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) was established
in 1990 under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
The committee took over and extended the work of the Group of Experts
on Payment Systems and the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes.
Today, CPSS is one of the permanent Group of Ten countries (G10) central
bank committees reporting to the G10 governors. It serves as a forum to
monitor and analyze developments in domestic payment settlement as well
as in cross-border and multi-currency settlement systems (CPSS 2005). The
reports published by the CPSS provided the main guidance regarding the
development of new settlement standards for foreign exchange transactions
and played a key role in the development of the CLS system. This section
provides a summarizing overview of the relevant CPSS reports.
3.3.1 Angell-Report
In 1989 a detailed study on various kinds of internationally related financial
netting arrangements was initiated. The G10 central banks were interested
in how far existing or future netting arrangement might contribute to the
efficiency of the international payment systems, and what effect they may
have on credit and liquidity risk. The outcome of the study is described in
the ”Report on Netting Schemes” (BIS 1989), the so called Angell-Report,
named after the chairman of the Group of Experts on Payment Systems,
Wayne D. Angell. It finds that banks have strong incentives to lower their
credit exposure as well as interbank payment flows mainly due to transaction
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costs and implicit or explicit costs of holding balances and obtaining credit
to effect settlement. This leads to innovations based on interbank netting
solutions. The report highlights the importance of balancing the efficiencies
of netting solutions against the costs associated with the credit and liquidity
risks that come along. It provides guidance for banks assessing operations
and associated risks concerning their current or future netting arrangement.
3.3.2 Lamfalussy-Report
Immediately after the Angell-Report was published, the G10 governors set up
an ad hoc Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes to further analyze the
policy implications of cross-border and multi-currency netting arrangements
described in the Angell-Report. The Committee prepared in 1990 the ”Re-
port of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of the Central Banks of
the Group of Ten countries” (CPSS 1990) or the Lamfalussy-Report, named
after the chairman of the committee, Alexandre Lamfalussy. The report con-
cludes that netting can reduce the size of credit and liquidity exposures and
thereby contributes to the limitation of systemic risk. Yet it also notes that
even when actual exposures are reduced, multilateral netting systems can
shift and concentrate risks in ways that might increase systemic risk by in-
creasing the likelihood that one party’s failure will undermine the stability of
others. The analysis suggests a centralized, collateral-based approach to be
most efficient with respect to systemic risk. The collateral, however, comes at
a cost. To avoid the cost, the report looks at a purely decentralized approach
and finds that it would maintain incentives for the participants to manage
their own exposures but at a lower level of over all settlement assurance. The
principal concern for monetary policy that is identified by the report, results
from the possibility of inadequate risk management procedures of netting
participants. Based on the analysis the committee concludes that there is a
need for collective policy responses concerning the design and operation of
netting schemes, the management of credit and liquidity risk, as well as effec-
tive central bank oversight. The committee takes a step forward and agrees
upon minimum standards for the design and operation of cross-border and
multi-currency netting schemes. These minimum standards are known as
the Lamfalussy-criteria and are summarized in the following (for supporting
explanations see part C of the report):
1. Netting schemes should have a well-founded legal basis under all rele-
vant jurisdictions.
2. Netting scheme participants should have a clear understanding of the
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impact of the particular scheme on each of the financial risks affected
by the netting process.
3. Multilateral netting systems should have clearly defined procedures for
the management of credit risks and liquidity risks which specify the
respective responsibilities of the netting provider and the participants.
These procedures should also ensure that all parties have both, the
incentives and the capabilities to manage and contain each of the risks
they bear and that limits are placed on the maximum level of credit
exposure that can be produced by each participant.
4. Multilateral netting systems should, at a minimum, be capable of en-
suring the timely completion of daily settlements in the event of an
inability to settle by the participant with the largest single net-debit
position.
5. Multilateral netting systems should have objective and publicly-disclosed
criteria for admission, which permit fair and open access.
6. All netting schemes should ensure the operational reliability of technical
systems and the availability of back-up facilities capable of completing
daily processing requirements.
The committee stressed that these criteria are not a statement of best practice
but only minimum standards which should be met by all netting schemes. In
addition the committee worked out core principles for co-operative central
bank oversight of netting systems. It argued that for cross-border and multi-
currency systems, a similar oversight function as for domestic markets is
necessary. The committee suggested that central banks should respond to
this issue in accordance with the principles set forth. The minimum standards
for netting systems and the principles for co-operative central bank oversight
set the baseline for further developments in cross-border and multi-currency
netting systems. With the publication of the report, the G10 central bank
governors called on the Committee of Payment and Settlement Systems to
”continue to review possible measures that central banks might take - either
individually or on a cooperative basis - to improve efficiency and reduce risks
in the settlement of cross-border and multi-currency transactions” (CPSS
1990).
3.3.3 Noe¨l-Report
Three years later, in 1993 the Committee on Payment and Settlement Sys-
tems responded to the call of the G10 central bank governors and prepared an
3.3 Reports of the CPSS 41
analysis to identify and enhance a common understanding of the advantages
and disadvantages of different central bank services related to payment and
settlement systems. The committee published its work in the report ”Central
Bank Payment and Settlement Services with Respect to Cross-Border and
Multi-Currency Transactions” (CPSS 1993). Named after Tim Noe¨l, chair-
man of the working group, the analysis is also called Noe¨l-Report. The report
looks at four different payment services which currently were or could have
been offered by central banks: (1) local currency payment and settlement ser-
vices, (2) extended operating hours of local currency payment systems, (3)
cross-border links between payment systems, and (4) multi-currency payment
and settlement services. It established a framework to assess these services
with respect to central bank policy concerns. It thereby considered the sub-
stantial differences in legal, institutional, and monetary policy perspectives
of the G10 countries’ central banks. In detail, the report applies the following
policy issues to the different service options:
1. Monetary policy implementation: the ability of central banks to ade-
quately control and forecast supply and demand of reserve balances as
well as open market operations and central bank lending might affect
interests and exchange rates.
2. Private sector source of liquidity: for a new service the necessary degree
of liquidity in each currency to support settlement is influenced by the
availability of a particular currency during settlement, the amount of
final transfers into settlement accounts, and possible collateral.
3. Systemic risk: the impact of a new service on systemic risk depends on
the incentives for participants to reduce credit and liquidity risk and on
the degree of reliance on public and private sector credit and liquidity.
4. Well founded legal basis: there are differences in each country depend-
ing on the legal status of settlements.
5. Competitive effects: depending on which private financial markets are
served and which entities would benefit from the new service, corre-
spondent banking relationships are likely to change.
6. Cost effectiveness: from a participant’s perspective costs include the
initial investment as well as ongoing operating charges and the cost of
idle balances compared to the current service.
7. Acceptability of the service from an individual central bank perspec-
tive: whether a new service is acceptable for a particular central bank
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depends on the amount of the initial investment, the implementation
timetable, later operating costs, necessary legal and policy changes, the
implications for supervision, and the implications for the central bank
as liquidity provider.
Analyzing the different central bank settlement services under these aspects
clearly showed that each central bank will view the issues from a different
perspective determined by individual circumstances of each central bank.
Thus, the Noe¨l-Report did not recommend a single preferred service option.
Central banks from different countries individually weigh the impacts of the
various services on the defined policy issues. Each of the service options shows
potentially significant advantages and disadvantages for each central bank.
In summary, the report highlighted the interrelation of domestic settlement
system features with international settlement arrangements and pointed out
the need for private sector efforts to reduce risks and advance efficiency of
cross-border and multi-currency settlement.
3.3.4 Allsopp-Report
In 1996, three years after the Noe¨l-Report, the Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems formed a steering group to work on a practical approach
to dealing with settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions. The re-
port ”Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions” (CPSS 1996), also
called Allsopp-Report, named after the working group’s chairman Peter All-
sopp, summarizes their findings. This report is the first that extensively de-
scribes the past incidents such as the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt or Drexel
Burnham Lambert (see 3.2). It furthermore identifies the different types of
risks involved in foreign exchange settlement. The report for the first time
provides a well defined measure to quantify foreign exchange settlement expo-
sure. Based on a practitioner’s view it describes foreign exchange settlement
exposure as ”a bank’s actual exposure - the amount at risk - when settling
a foreign exchange trade equals the full amount of the currency purchased
and lasts from the time a payment instruction for the currency sold can no
longer be cancelled unilaterally until the time the currency purchased is re-
ceived with finality” (CPSS 1996). It is noted that in order to apply this
definition to properly measure the size and duration of an exposure, a bank
must be able to identify for each trade its current settlement status. The
report divides the settlement process in the following five categories:
1. Status R = Revocable. Payment instructions have not yet been issued
or may unilaterally be cancelled. There is no settlement exposure at
this stage.
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Figure 3.3: Changing Status of a Trade (CPSS 1996).
2. Status I = Irrevocable. Unilateral cancellation is not possible anymore
but the final receipt of the counter currency is not yet due. The amount
that is bought is currently exposed.
3. Status U = Uncertain. Receipt of the bought currency is due but in
fact the bank does not know whether it has received the funds with
finality. The amount might thus still be at risk.
4. Status F = Fail. The bank has not received the funds. The amount
stays exposed.
5. Status S = Settled. The funds are transferred with finality. The trade
is considered settled and the funds no longer at risk.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the settlement process based on these five steps. To
measure its exposure a bank should know at least two critical points in time:
(1) the unilateral cancellation deadline and (2) identification of final and
failed receipts. The maximum exposure for this particular bank amounts
to the sum of trades in status I, U, and F. It equals the amount of bought
currencies that can no longer unilaterally be stopped but have not been
received and the amount that should, but might not, have been received:
Exposuremax = I + U + F (3.1)
If a bank is able to identify whether the amounts due have actually been
received its minimum exposure results in:
Exposuremin = I + F (3.2)
Hence, banks that identify their final and failed receipts of funds as soon as
they come due exactly know their exposure at any point in time. Having
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set the definitions, the steering group conducted a survey including 80 banks
in the G10 countries to analyze current practices in foreign exchange settle-
ment. The survey led to the conclusion that it usually takes more than three
business days from the point when payment instructions are irrevocable (sta-
tus I) until the bank knows with certainty that it has received the funds due
(status S). Thus, settlement exposures often last for more than three business
days. Due to the fact that most banks did not measure their exposures, the
report does not provide comprehensive statistics on the amounts exposed.
However, the survey indicates that a bank’s exposures could even exceed its
capital. Based on the survey the steering group believed that the private
sector institutions have the potential to significantly reduce settlement risk
in foreign exchange transactions. A three-track strategy was proposed to
achieve these risk reductions. The first track refers to actions by individual
banks. The report calls on banks to immediately apply an appropriate credit
control process to their settlement exposures. The second track involves the
provision of risk reducing multi-currency services by industry groups. The
report encourages industry groups to construct and implement settlement
services as it is believed that the private sector can provide these services
more efficiently than the public sector. The third track addresses central
banks to induce private sector progress. The statements of the Allsopp-
Report can be interpreted as a wake-up call for the industry. The report
clearly pointed out that progress in settlement risk reduction is necessary.
In that, the Allsopp-Report set the basis for initiatives such as CLS, ECHO
and Multinet (see chapter 4 ).
3.3.5 Progress-Report
After the Allsopp-Report had invoked developments to reduce settlement risk
in foreign exchange transactions, the CPSS published a report in 1998, to look
at the progress achieved by the three-track strategy proposed two years ear-
lier. The report ”Reducing Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk” (CPSS 1998)
summarizes the key findings regarding the three tracks. Referring to the first
track, individual banks partly managed to reduce their exposures and treat
foreign exchange settlement risk like other credit exposures of the same size
and duration. A significant increase in awareness at senior management levels
was noted. Further near-term improvements could thus be expected. Actions
taken by the second track, the industry groups, include the advancement of
bilateral netting arrangements provided for instance by FXNet, Valunet, or
SWIFTNet Accord (see 2.5.16 and 4.1.3). Other industry groups worked on
alternative approaches like contracts for difference (CFDs) to replace tradi-
tional foreign exchange trades. CFDs settle by paying the difference between
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the contract rate and the settlement rate multiplied by the notional amount
of the contract (see 2.4.2). The report furthermore mentions the company
CLS Services which ”has been set up to develop plans for a ”continuous
linked settlement” bank (the CLS Bank) to settle foreign exchange deals”
(CPSS 1998). Central banks which represent the third track of the CPSS
strategy improved their wholesale payment systems and extended the oper-
ating hours of the systems. Both actions were assumed to provide potential
benefits for settlement in foreign exchange transactions. It was also noted
that relevant cental banks were about to establish relations to CLS Ser-
vices. Even though actions on all three tracks had been undertaken, the
report concludes that further progress is necessary. It is stated that 60 per-
cent of the banks monitored still underestimate their exposures. Hence, the
three-track strategy is reaffirmed and individual banks, industry groups, and
central banks are equally encouraged to further push the issues. The G10
central bank governors invited the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
to provide international supervisory guidance for banks on settlement risk
management in line with the recommendations of the Allsopp-Report.
3.3.6 Supervisory Guidance-Report
As a result from the invitation by the G10 central bank governors the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision released a report on ”Supervisory Guid-
ance for Managing Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions” (BCBS
2000). The report states the nature and duration of foreign exchange settle-
ment exposures and provides guidance to banks how to manage it. As men-
tioned at the beginning of this section the summarized reports significantly
influenced the developments regarding risk reducing settlement arrangements
for foreign exchange deals, and in that, played a key role regarding the de-
velopment of the CLS system.
3.4 Chapter Summary
Since 1974 a number of incidents triggered central banks’ attention regarding
credit risk exposures during settlement. The Bank for International Settle-
ments established in 1990 the Committee on Payment and Settlement Sys-
tems. The reports published by the committee provided guidance regarding
developments of new settlement standards. Figure 3.4 relates the historic
settlement disruptions to the reports of the Committee on Payment and Set-
tlement Systems to provide a chronological overview of the most important
steps that led to the initiative to build the CLS system.
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Figure 3.4: Chronological Overview (author).
Chapter 4
History of CLS
Originally, the CLS system was supposed to go live with seven currencies
sometime during the year 2000. The project itself and the way it was man-
aged turned out to be much more complex than expected and delays were
inevitable. This chapter looks at the project’s milestones and shows the dif-
ficulties that had to be dealt with. It describes the way from an ambitious
project to an international industry-owned risk management facility. The
chapter is split up in four time periods. It starts with the project’s birth in
1994 and describes the planning and growth stage until CLS was incorpo-
rated in 1997. The second period, lasting from 1997 to 1999, outlines the
history of CLS as a legal entity of its own until the receipt of a banking
licence at the end of 1999. The third period looks at the years from 1999
to 2002 and is dedicated to how the system was brought to life. The last
section brings up some issues that emerged since the system went live. CLS
is a trademarked term within the financial service industry. It may only be
used with references to CLS Bank or CLS Services Ltd. As CLS Bank did
not exist prior to 1999, in the following text the term CLS refers to CLS Ser-
vices Ltd. prior to 1999 and to CLS Bank thereafter. The chapter is based
on historical primary sources. The corresponding documents are referenced
as ”CLS”.
4.1 The G20 Meetings 1994 - 1997
The Group of 20 (G20) was formed in October 1994 as a common inter-
est group of senior bankers from large international financial institutions
whose business includes significant large value cross-border payment activi-
ties (CLS 1995e). After the threat of the Bank for International Settlements
to impose restrictions to reduce settlement risk (see 3.3.4), the G20 took
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initiative and started to meet on a regular basis to work out a private sector
solution to reduce credit risk in foreign exchange transactions. At their first
meeting in late 1994, three alternative models to solve the problem were pro-
posed (see 4.1.1). To check the practicability of these models and to prepare
selection criteria, the G20 formed a so called Operational Feasibility Working
Group (OFWG). Based on the reports of the OFWG, the G20 decided for
the third of the three alternative models. Subsequently, the OFWG started
to exclusively work on the feasibility of that particular model, a continuous
linked settlement solution. During 1996 and 1997 the G20 regularly met to
set up the incorporation of a corresponding entity. This time period, from
the beginning of 1996 until July 1997, may be considered as the preparation
for the actual CLS Bank. Based on original records the following paragraphs
describe the main issues that required consideration during this time.
4.1.1 Selection of the Model
The following three models had been proposed in late 1994:
1. Gross matching with earmarking: settlement via national RTGS sys-
tems with final transfer of earmarked funds only if counterparty settles
respectively. PvP is achieved by using message switching to coordinate
the local payment systems in a way to ensure that all of a set of trans-
actions are completed or none. The concept is set up as a technological
”superstructure” operating on the existing RTGS systems.
2. Matching with netting: solution offering matching and reporting ser-
vices combined with a multilateral net PvP mechanism via self collat-
eralization. Net debit participants are obligated to fulfill their pay-ins
by a specified deadline. The system monitors payments received on the
basis of real-time information from the local RTGS systems and releases
payments owed to participants that fulfill their obligations. Matched
instructions are revocable during the pre-settlement period but become
final with the start of the settlement period. Each participant settles
directly with special accounts in its local RTGS system. While model 1
and 3 are set up as a ”if you don’t pay, then I don’t pay”-concept, model
2 follows the idea of a ”If I do pay, then I will get paid”-mechanism.
3. Clearing house bank: PvP mechanism with continuous real-time linked
processing and item-by-item settlement through the posting of debits
and credits to member accounts in a multi-currency clearing system.
Later on called CLS.
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The third alternative, the idea of a PvP mechanism was developed during
the analysis of model 1 and 2 (CLS 1995c). On their meeting in May 1995
the G20 reviewed the three models and short-listed two of them (CLS 1995b).
After voting, the G20 members agreed to select models 2 and 3 for further
evaluation. They appeared to have superior functionality to model 1 in terms
of information provided to participants and regarding liquidity requirements.
Thus, the OFWG kept on working on the evaluation of model 2 and 3. In
October 1995 the OFWG set up the following five guiding principles that
reflect the Lamfalussy standards (see 3.3.2) as well as the criteria defined by
the G20 themselves. The G20 should use them to evaluate the two models
(CLS 1995d): (1) the system must reduce risk (credit risk, liquidity risk, and
systemic risk), (2) the system must be safe and sound (well-founded legal
basis, operationally workable, and high degree of operational reliability), (3)
the liquidity pressure created by the system must be manageable, (4) the
system should be commercially viable, and (5) the system must function in
a manner that is consistent with the public policy objectives of the relevant
central banks. After comparing the models according to these guiding prin-
ciples, the OFWG concluded that both models were operationally feasible
(CLS 1995a). However, for both models a number of legal and regulatory
issues had yet to be resolved. Most working group members agreed that
model 3 provided superior performance from an operational and liquidity
management standpoint due to the continuous settlement process. Model
2, as a netting system, only offered a determined number of concentrated
settlement sessions. Model 3 would thus cause considerably lower liquidity
and collateral costs. From a technical perspective, the OFWG believed that
both models would be implementable within three years if the expertise of
existing service providers was utilized and with sufficient central bank sup-
port. Liquidity impact simulations conducted by the OFWG at the end of
1995 showed that model 3 provided substantially superior operational per-
formance and liquidity management due to its continuous settlement process
(CLS 1996p). Also regarding collateral cost, model 3 featured more favor-
able properties (CLS 1996m). Consequently, in January 1996 model 3 was
approved by almost all G20 members. Only one European bank was still an
objector of model 3 at that time (CLS 1996c). Another European G20 bank
who was a strong supporter of model 3, finally rendered the necessary lob-
bying to convince the rest of the opposition (mostly stakeholders of already
existing systems (see 4.1.3)) (CLS 1996d). By the beginning of 1996, model 3
had also won central banks’ favors (CLS 1996n). At their February meeting
in 1996, the G20 voted to adopt model 3, the Continuous Linked Settlement
approach and reaffirmed its commitment with an implementation target of
3 years (CLS 1996g).
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4.1.2 Transforming the Project into a Company
After having decided for model 3, the time period from May until December
1996 was called business requirement specification (BRS) phase. The BRS
phase included the development of business specification requirements and
the approaching of Multinet, ECHO, and FXNet to ask them for cooperation
(see 4.1.3) as well as to identify a suitable jurisdiction and get necessary
transaction data from SWIFT to run simulations (CLS 1996g). In March
1996 the following issues were identified as critical project risks in this phase
(CLS 1996f): Under-resourcing and aggressive timescales, disability to work
with the existing netting systems, missing data for modelling, and the ability
to analyze the impact on domestic markets to the satisfaction of the central
banks. Having established the business requirement specification in late 1996,
the G20 proposed to incorporate a CLS core organization to go on with the
next project phase, the formation of CLS Bank. A board of directors out of
G20 members should be established to supervise the project at business level
(CLS 1997g). This project management structure was supposed to evolve
to become the management of the future CLS Bank. At a technical level,
SWIFT was proposed to be the future technical operator once the system was
live. The G20 should remain advisor (CLS 1997n). At the G20 April meeting
of 1997, it was decided to be ready for a new project phase and to form a
company as of July 1, 1997, with the purpose to create and develop CLS
Bank. It would be incorporated as a private company with the legal name
”CLS Services Ltd.” and should be open to further banks as shareholders,
not only the ones represented in the G20. The first board meeting for CLS
Services Ltd. was scheduled for 22 July, 1997 (CLS 1997m). Prior to the
incorporation of CLS Services Ltd. in July 1997 the G20 and its respective
working groups were absorbed by several issues which are summarized in the
following paragraphs.
Estimating Project Costs
At the end of 1995 the OFWG tentatively estimated project costs of USD
40 million to build the central PvP system and USD 20 million per year
to run it (CLS 1995a). The business requirement specification phase (see
p. 53) from May until December 1996, was financed by contributions from
the G20 members. Each member had committed USD 1 million that was
called in step by step over the project phases. For the business requirement
specification phase a tranche of USD 135’000 had to be paid which resulted
in total funds of USD 3 millions for this seven months period. Expenditures
were fully covered by this income (CLS 1997p). For the subsequent period,
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January to June 1997, the business plan projected a total income of USD 1.3
million contributed by members. Again this amount covered total projected
expenditures (CLS 1997n). To become a shareholder in the newly established
CLS Services Ltd., a financial commitment of USD 1 million was required as
of July 1, 1997 for new members (CLS 1997l). These member contributions
widely covered the expenditures until summer 1998 when a recapitalization
was planned (see 4.2.3). To estimate total project costs, the G20 commis-
sioned an economic analysis of the CLS Bank in 1997. The analysis estimated
total building cost of a standalone CLS Bank of USD 70 to 80 million. The
annual cost to run the system were estimated to USD 30 million which was
considered to be a conservative guess (CLS 1997k). Compared to the number
estimated in 1995, projected costs had already doubled. The realized costs,
however, ended up to be well over USD 200 million.
Choice of Jurisdiction
As it was clear that at some point a legal entity must be incorporated to go on
with the CLS project, a proper jurisdiction had to be found. In March 1996
several criteria which should be met by a suitable jurisdiction for the future
CLS Bank were set up (CLS 1996f). To start with the selection process, a
basic questionnaire was sent to eight countries. The questions were to be
answered by these countries in conjunction with suitably qualified in-house
legal experts. Canada, Japan and The Netherlands immediately reported
that their countries should not be given further consideration. The results
from UK, USA, France, Germany, and Switzerland indicated that there were
insufficient arguments to disqualify any of them at this stage. The G20
considered it reasonable to focus on the two countries in which the existing
Net Systems were domiciled (UK and USA) as the plan was to cooperate
with them (see 4.1.3) (CLS 1996j). In January 1997, the G20 conducted a
more detailed legal survey of the remaining five jurisdictions. The survey
covered four interrelated issues (CLS 1997r): (1) funding finality (whether
CLS might be required to repay an amount paid to CLS by a member),
(2) settlement finality (whether CLS, settling linked payments, might be
required to reverse any payment to a member’s CLS account), (3) unity of
account (whether CLS might be prevented from treating its exposure to a
defaulting member as a single net amount, effectively applying long positions
as collateral for short positions), and (4) securities collateral (whether there
might be restrictions on the ability of CLS to rely on securities provided by
way of collateral to CLS to cover any resulting net exposure to that member.
The survey brought up questionable issues regarding a US location (New
York) of the CLS Bank. The US Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)
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rules allow to block funds of foreign banks on CLS accounts for political
reasons. Furthermore, approval of the Federal Reserve System (FED) could
take several years (CLS 1997h). Besides this issue London and New York
did not show substantial differences and the decision could be expected to
be based on political aspects. Therefore, the name CLS Bank was reserved
in both, the UK and US to ensure that it was still available when CLS Bank
was finally formed (CLS 1997m). Eventually the G20’s discretionary decision
made UK the home of CLS Services Ltd.
Legal Issues in Switzerland
To explore legal issues such as finality of payments and unity of accounts in
the countries that were planned to have future access to the CLS system,
the G20 sent out a request for proposal to local legal counselors in the re-
spective countries (CLS 1996o). In Switzerland the G20 decided to engage
legal counsel by Niederer Kraft & Frey. At the end of 1996 Niederer Kraft
& Frey handed in their in depth legal analysis, which raised questions re-
garding funding finality, settlement finality and unity of account under Swiss
insolvency procedures (CLS 1996b). These issues had to be solved in order
to enable the Swiss franc to participate in CLS. The principal concerns noted
by Niederer Kraft & Frey were related to the rules affecting pay-ins and set-
tlements after an application for the opening of composition or moratorium
proceedings or after an order declaring bankruptcy. The underlying problem
was due to the fact that the Swiss law did not provide a practical means
for CLS Bank to be assured that it will be informed prior to a bankruptcy
order (CLS 1997e). From the time of the order, the failing bank was pro-
hibited to move its assets. However, as such an order could become effective
without CLS knowing it, CLS could still have settled the failing bank’s obli-
gations. As a consequence the liquidator could reclaim all pay-ins of the
failing bank that were conducted after the opening of the bankruptcy order.
In this special case finality of payments would not be assured. The issue
could have been addressed by making arrangements with the Swiss Federal
Banking Commission (SFBC) so that CLS Bank would receive notification
of bankruptcy proceedings in advance of the order. CLS Bank could then
cease processing respective instructions before the order is made. However, it
was not clear that the SFBC itself would have advance notice of any applica-
tion for the opening of composition or moratorium proceedings (CLS 1997e).
In fact, there was no legal assurance that they would receive notification in
advance as any cantonal court could open a bankruptcy order without in-
forming the SFBC. This issue, that under Swiss bankruptcy law the finality
of payments in SIC (Swiss Interbank Clearing) may not be guaranteed can
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be considered as the detection of a legal loophole. It could have seriously
compromised not only the participation of the Swiss franc, and thus the
participation of any Swiss bank in the CLS system but also the SIC system.
Even though the practical relevance of a bankruptcy case with the SFBC not
being informed in advance was considered negligible, it was clear that a new
solid legal basis to address this issue was needed to fulfill the CLS require-
ments (CLS 1997j). As a corresponding legal adaption seemed impossible
to be achieved in a timely manner, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission
was requested to officially confirm to CLS Bank the irrelevance of such a
case. In spring 1998 the SFBC formally decided to include CLS Bank in
its notification procedure prior to the time when an order becomes effective
(EBK 1998a). Furthermore CLS Bank was informed that amendments of
the Swiss bank bankruptcy law would be initiated in late 1998 (EBK 1998b).
Based on these statements Niederer Kraft & Frey rendered a second report
which was submitted to CLS Bank in the year 2000. They finally concluded
that under current Swiss law there is no reason that CLS Bank might be
required to reverse any payments made in the settlement process (Niederer
Kraft & Frey 2000). Today the issue is solved on a sound legal basis.
Membership Criteria
Due to the large values that were planned to be settled, it became obvi-
ous that CLS Bank must require members to demonstrate that they are
financially and operationally capable of meeting all the requirements implied
by this scale of operation. Therefore, at the beginning of 1997 CLS Bank
suggested the following membership criteria for its members (CLS 1997c):
applicant must (1) designate an eligible home country, (2) be prudentially
supervised by an acceptable authority, (3) provide an independent legal coun-
sel opinion regarding the absence of legal impediments interfering with the
ability to meet its obligation to CLS Bank, (4) have a minimum long term
debt rating of A-, (5) have a minimum Tier 1 capital of USD 3 billion, (6)
meet certain volume thresholds at the beginning, (7) have access to intra-day
funding, (8) commit liquidity facilities to CLS Bank, (9) meet all technical
and operational requirements imposed by CLS Bank, and (10) accept the
short position limits set by CLS Bank. If and how these rules would cover
the relationship between CLS Bank and its members would depend on the
location of the CLS Bank which at that point had not yet been decided.
Business Requirement Specification
In October 1996, a generic framework for the business case was introduced
(CLS 1996l). It should help the G20 banks to prepare their own business
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cases responsive to their own bank’s unique risk management concerns, busi-
ness mix, system characteristics, and investments (CLS 1996a). It would thus
support the banks in their decision whether to invest in the development and
the implementation of the CLS system. It provided a comprehensive list of
impacts that CLS was expected to have on member banks in the areas of
risk reduction, cash management, trading, operations, and systems. It clas-
sified these impacts according to benefits and drawbacks. The business case,
however, did not contain information on the cost to build and operate the
system. The issuance of a request for proposal which was scheduled for the
end of 1996 would clarify these points (see 4.2.1). In late 1996, the work-
ing group presented a first version of the business requirement specifications
for the CLS system (CLS 1996l). The working group was assigned to put
together the system requirements in terms of volume estimates, interfaces,
contingency and MIS by the end of January 1997 (CLS 1996i). At their
February meeting, the G20 accepted the business requirement specification
as an effective and complete design (CLS 1997n). To develop the CLS design
and to assess its potential performance, a computer simulation model had
been used. The model was initially run with statistically generated data.
At the beginning of 1997 a sample of G20 transaction records was collected
by SWIFT and FXNet in accordance with the involved banks to produce
estimates of the market size and to provide transaction data for the simu-
lation. PriceWaterhouse acted as data custodian. For the G20 transactions
in the seven CLS currencies, the daily market size was estimated to about
USD 500 billion (counting both legs). For 40 banks the market was assumed
to be almost twice as large. Settlement value for all counterparties in the
seven CLS currencies was estimated to add up to USD 2’700 billion. The
simulation with real transaction data confirmed that the CLS design worked
effectively and efficiently (CLS 1997u).
RTGS and Central Bank Access
While working on the business requirement specification it became clear that
to avoid the cost and operational requirement of establishing a branch of the
future CLS Bank in each country, it was necessary to request from each
central bank remote access. CLS Bank should maintain an account at each
central bank and be remotely connected to the local RTGS systems from the
country where CLS Bank would legally and physically be located. To discuss
this issue, the OFWG regularly met with the Steering Group on Settlement
Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions, a sub-committee of the CPSS during
1996 and 1997 (BIS 1996). By spring 1997, the following three central bank
service requirements to support CLS operations were identified (CLS 1997o):
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(1) to move CLS funds to and from its members, a central bank account and
membership in the respective RTGS is needed, (2) the central bank access
must allow remote initiation of payment instructions and real-time balance
reporting, and (3) adequate operational and computer back-up procedures
must be available. Besides the options of joining the RTGS systems directly
or indirectly, the preferred solution which met these demands was based on
a nostro relationship of CLS Bank with the respective central banks. Due
to the fact that the connection to a multitude of RTGS systems required
complex technical interfaces as well as strong and comprehensive IT support
functions, it was recognized that this solution could become prohibitively
expensive. It was concluded that the G20 should form a dedicated project
team that would negotiate the solutions with each central bank individually
(CLS 1997j). To evaluate the different alternatives and to identify a cost
effective approach, the project team started off with a questionnaire that was
sent to the relevant central banks (CLS 1997d). By the end of 1997, most key
central banks had been visited and the remote access requirements had been
discussed. It was the aim to reach mutual commitments with each country
regarding detailed solution specifications by March 1998 (CLS 1998e). Of
the initial seven currencies that were planned to settle in CLS, the operating
hours of payment systems in four of them already overlapped sufficiently. For
three of them, these being AUD, CAD and JPY, it was necessary to extend
operating hours. Technical and operational infrastructure changes had to
be determined by the respective central banks and actual implementation
procedures had to be coordinated with CLS Bank (CLS 2001d).
4.1.3 Other Initiatives
Under the pressure of the central banks there were also several other foreign
exchange settlement solutions that were developed by private sector initia-
tives besides the one of the G20. At the end of 1996, the following systems
were in operation or in their development phase:
• FXNet: offers a bilateral netting service to various banks.
• Multinet International Bank (Multinet): clearing house concept with
counterparty substitution intending to offer multilateral netting. Dur-
ing the mid-nineties it was only offering bilateral netting via its Valunet
service, a real-time, cash flow obligation netting and risk management
system, similar to FXNet. Multinet suffered from discussions regarding
regulatory issues and never found the critical mass needed to get full
operations started.
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• Netting the Nets: was yet in development. Funds netted by FXNet were
planned to be transferred to Multinet where they would be netted once
more. Multinet would act as counterparty.
• Netting Plus: a concept that addressed bilateral risk reduction by
rolling cash flows forward and only settling mark-to-market valuation
of the closed out contracts (see 2.4.2). The idea was based on the
assumption of consistent two-way business.
• Exchange Clearing House Ltd. (ECHO): offering multilateral netting
through a concept called ”open offer” and contract substitution. Was
at operation since 18 August 1995, but was running at loss.
For several reasons such as high entry barriers and a gridlock situation re-
garding cooperation, none of these concepts had the potential to penetrate
the market. A combination of some of these netting systems and the CLS
system looked like a promising approach at this stage (CLS 1997v). But the
mainly US shareholders of Multinet as well as the European ECHO share-
holders blocked each other while the third group of neutral banks simply
kept out. It was feared that this gridlock could be carried forward to CLS.
Notwithstanding, the G20 identified the three netting systems, Multinet,
ECHO, and FXNet (”the Net Systems”) collectively as the preferred partner
in achieving the CLS solution (CLS 1996h). This conclusion helped to get all
involved parties to the side of model 3 (see 4.1.1) as many of them were also
owners of the Net Systems (CLS 1996j). In February 1996, the first meetings
with the Net Systems took place and CLS was presented (CLS 1996f). Af-
ter two meetings and further telephone conferences the Net Systems did not
seem willing to cooperate due their fear of competition in case CLS will be
successful and due to the fact that their approach was more similar to the re-
jected model 2. Discussions rather pointed to a merger scenario. The G20 at
this time officially believed that CLS and some of the Net Systems’ services
would co-exist in the future as complementary processes, providing market
participants with the ability to manage their foreign exchange risk in a vari-
ety of ways (CLS 1996j). However, other opinions found a co-existence rather
questionable since foreign exchange multilateral netting would not only be
redundant but even unnecessary in the first place (CLS 1996e). The G20
agreed on creating an integrated solution that would bring the Net Systems
and CLS together (CLS 1996k). In December, Multinet and ECHO finally
agreed to establish a framework for creating an integrated industry-wide sys-
tem to provide both, netting and CLS (CLS 1996i). In February 1997, the
G20 accepted the following target design. The cooperation should be set up
as a holding company with three subsidiaries under UK law: a combination of
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ECHO and Multinet, FXNet and CLS Bank (CLS 1997i). Discussions with
ECHO and Multinet regarding the necessary merger started immediately. In
June 1997, ECHO and Multinet agreed to merge their companies under a
common owner, Netting Holdco, located in London. The merger would lead
to ECHO being the netting counterparty and Multinet being the sole set-
tlement banker for ECHO. Netting Holdco would then approach FXNet for
the purpose of inviting it to cooperate (CLS 1997q). In a next step Netting
Holdco was planned to be merged with CLS Services Ltd. In September
1997, the proposal document for a share sale agreement was ready (see 4.2.2)
(CLS 1997s).
4.2 CLS Services Ltd. 1997 - 1999
In summer of 1997, the CLS project transformed into an own legal entity.
CLS Services Ltd. was incorporated and therewith the project entered a new
stage.
4.2.1 Procurement Strategy
In view of the considerable risk associated with the CLS project and to avoid
a large increase of headcounts it was concluded that an optimal approach
to procurement for CLS Services Ltd. would be to select a single prime
contractor who agrees to develop and to operate the system (CLS 1997f). As
a first step, about 20 suppliers were asked to provide information regarding
their capabilities to ensure that the ones that were asked to respond to the
request for proposal were able to meet the requirements. Based on the results
derived from the request for information, 9 vendors were invited to respond
to the request for proposal as potential prime contractors for the supply of
the required services. In October 1997, the final version of the request for
proposal was approved and sent out to the potential vendors. There were
three potential contractors, British Telecom (BT), EDS and IBM that came
up with viable offers and showed a strong interest in competing. SWIFT
decided not to bid as a prime contractor but committed to offer its full range
of services to any of the three remaining potential contractors (CLS 1997b).
It was planned to award the contract at the end of April 1998 (CLS 1998e).
Up to then central bank issues regarding remote access requirements were
supposed to be resolved (see p. 54). At the board of directors meeting in
late April 1998, IBM was decided to become the prime contractor to develop
the CLS system. BT disqualified due to uncompetitive pricing. EDS and
IBM issued comparable offer in every respect. CLS management preferred
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IBM(CLS 1998c). The application was planned to be developed by IBM
Global Services in Belgium, with assistance from ATOS, a French software
company (CLS 1998k). Even though at the board meeting in April 1998 it
was envisaged that negotiations would be closed by May, it took another two
month to get the contract signed on 22 July 1998. It took more time than
expected to develop the contractual mechanisms for controlling costs. The
scope of the contract with IBM covered three main phases. First, the design
and build of the CLS system, second, the implementation of the system in
IBM’s own data centers, and third, operation and maintenance of the system
for an initial period of five years after going live (CLS 1998l). At the same
time SWIFT was contracted to design and implement a member network
system over an IP network known as SWIFTNet (see 2.5.16) and to provide
consultancy services regarding correspondent banking (CLS 1998l). Both
agreements were targeted to go live in summer 2000.
4.2.2 Merger with ECHO and Multinet
The completion of the merger between CLS Services Ltd., ECHO and Multi-
net (Netting Holdco) was scheduled for the end of 1997. As mentioned in
section 4.1.3, by September 1997, the proposal document for a share sale
agreement had been finalized. Regulatory approval from the Bank of Eng-
land, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the New York State Banking
Department had still been outstanding. The final closing date was ultimately
dependent on the timing of their actions. However, on 17 December 1997,
ECHO and Multinet became wholly owned subsidiaries of CLS Services Ltd.
It was clear that after the completion of the merger the Board Committees
of the CLS Services Ltd. needed to expand. An effective distribution of
responsibilities, provision of appropriate segregation of duties and control as
well as an effective management of this integrated industry facility had to
be implemented (CLS 1997t). The revised roles of the CLS Services Ltd.
allotted the following 6 committees1: (1) Executive Committee (strategic
development and operational oversight), (2) Admissions Committee (devel-
opment of shareholder criteria and marketing plan for acquisition of new
shareholders, was abolished at the end of 1998), (3) Audit Committee (per-
formance measurement and reporting), (4) Nominating and Directors Affairs
Committee (director selection and qualification supervision), (5) Operations
and Information Technology Committee (oversight of system architecture
development and business plan implementation), and (6) Risk Management
1This structure underwent numerous changes over time. For the current company struc-
ture refer to chapter 5.
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Committee (development of risk policies and management of credit and liq-
uidity issues). On the operational side it was discussed how netting provided
by ECHO and Multinet could be integrated in the services offered by CLS.
The idea was to process the multilateral net settlements in CLS. The net-
ting mechanism would reduce pre-settlement risk while the CLS mechanism
would eliminate principal risk. CLS and netting could thus operate as com-
plementary services. In a first step it was concluded to enhance ECHO’s
platform and to discontinue Multinet’s multilateral netting operations and
to transfer available staff and resources to CLS. As the inconvenience of this
decision was entirely born by the former Multinet users, a transition period
was granted. Multinet’s Valunet (see 4.1.3) should be continued while the
affected banks were assisted in adapting to the ECHO system (CLS 1998i).
On 14 July 1998, Multinet’s directors resolved to liquidate the bank and to
wind up its affairs with the target to finally close down operations in Jan-
uary 1999 (CLS 1998b). Pursuant to the applicable filing with the New York
State Supreme Court and the New York State Banking Department, Multinet
was effectively dissolved on 4 May 2000 (CLS 2000e). The decision to keep
ECHO’s operations up was based on the assumption that the members would
use both, a principal risk reduction (CLS Bank’s PvP mechanism) and a pre-
settlement risk reduction mechanism (ECHO’s multilateral netting). ECHO
was therefore planned to be upgraded with respect to risk management and
some additional services. These changes were designed to make ECHO more
appealing to a larger number of users and thus to generate substantial rev-
enue growth (CLS 1998f). However, due to serious concerns regarding the
legality of certain ECHO services under the US Commodity Exchange Act2
and the introduction of the Euro, the Y2K problem3 as well as due to the
expected going live of the CLS system, banks simply did not have capacity
nor interest to adapt to another new system. The projected growth did not
occur. At the end of 1998, the group agreed that the current ECHO business
was not commercially viable given the available capital. It was estimated
that if the operation would be continued, all capital held in contingency for
ECHO would be exhausted by early 1999. Hence, it was considered whether
2The US Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) prohibits the sale or offer of future contracts
in or from the United States except on organized exchanges that are regulated by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Under the Treasury Amendment to
the CEA, bilateral off-exchange transactions in currencies between large financial insti-
tutions are permitted as long as they are not entered into a market that can be considered
a Board of Trade. The term ”Board of Trade” had generally been interpreted to mean
centralized execution facilities that can be used by multiple participants. However,
the CFTC had recently begun an investigation of a clearing house offering comparable
services to ECHO.
3Checking and upgrading the IT systems for the new millennium.
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the service should be abandoned or reconfigured in a way that would re-
duce costs and develop a better fit with CLS (CLS 1998g). Modifications of
the ECHO service were rejected mainly for legal, regulatory and market ac-
ceptability reasons. Hence, at their February board meeting in 1999, CLS’s
management recommended to suspend the ECHO system (CLS 1999e). At
an extraordinary general meeting on March 15, 1999, the recommendation
was approved by a majority of 52 against 6 shareholder votes (2 were in-
valid) and the suspension process was started (CLS 1999c). On 30 April,
1999 the service of ECHO was discontinued (CLS 1999a). Despite the plan
to cooperate and integrate the Net Systems, they were merged into CLS and
subsequently both closed down.
4.2.3 Recapitalization in Summer 1998
CLS’ initial owners had provided aggregate funding commitments of USD 20
million for the first year of development (see 4.1.2). This capital was called
in step by step and was intended to cover expenditures through mid 1998.
At this time, additional capital was needed. At the end of 1997, the costs
to develop the CLS system were estimated at USD 70 million to USD 80
million (CLS 1997a). Including adequate contingency funds, total capital
requirements for the three year period from mid 1998 to mid 2001, were as-
sumed to be about USD 150 million. To raise these funds, new participating
banks had to be found. The business plan as of April 1998 indicated a per
capita commitment for a new owner of USD 3.5 million and another USD
2.5 million contribution for existing owners (as existing owners already had
committed USD 1 million) (CLS 1998d). Immediately after the recapitaliza-
tion, no shareholder should have more than five percent of the voting rights
in the company. This provision led to discussions due to the fact that several
mergers had taken place among the G20 banks. In July 1998, an ownership
of 60 shareholders had been reached and a successful recapitalization was an-
nounced to the public (CLS 1998j). A total commitment of USD 160 million
from 60 subscribers in 14 countries had been achieved.
4.2.4 Contract Issues with IBM
CLS Services Ltd. had completed its software vendor selection process in
April 1998 and IBM, as the preferred supplier, had signed the procurement
contract in July 1998 (see 4.2.1). The winning bid totalled USD 54 million
building cost, USD 4 million for initial deployment, and USD 2.6 million for
pre-testing the system as well as USD 49 million for the five year mainte-
nance period after the going live. Including contingencies of almost USD
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30 millions, CLS calculated total project costs of about USD 130 million.
Based on the business requirement specifications established one year ear-
lier, in spring 1997 (see p. 53), IBM immediately started to work out the
functional requirements specifications (FRS) in cooperation with CLS. The
business requirement specifications were relatively simple compared to the
final FRS. Faced with this level of complexity, IBM changed its position and
claimed that the scope of the development had increased considerably. CLS
management disagreed and price negotiations recurred (CLS 1998h). After
an extensive review of the FRS, the two parties agreed on 1’480 additional
programmer days that would be required. Based on this, IBM proposed the
following three options to CLS. First, to cut out the user member functional-
ity (see 5.1) and complete the rest of the system by 30 June 2000 as targeted.
Second, to split the project in two phases and deliver the user member func-
tionality later. Third, to complete the full system with a delay of 70 days. All
three options included cost increases of up to 20 percent. In January 1999,
after a sound evaluation of IBM’s propositions, CLS management decided
to proceed with option three. A delay of 70 days was considered less costly
than going live with a system that does not cover the industry’s needs and
would thus not reach the necessary degree of market penetration required
by the regulators. Going live was therefore rescheduled for October 2000
(CLS 1999d).
4.3 CLS Bank International 1999 - 2002
4.3.1 Structural Changes
In June 1999, CLS Services Ltd. proposed to form a subsidiary that was to be
incorporated as a bank under the Edge Act of the United States of America
under the name CLS Bank International (CLSB). The application was filed
with the Board of Governors of the FED on 6 August 1999. CLS Bank was
intended to function as a special purpose, multi-currency bank which would
provide its members with continuous linked settlement services. The form
of an Edge Act corporation with centralized US regulatory oversight and
no restrictions on citizenship for directors, was considered the most flexible
structure for this purpose. The bank was planned to be headquartered in New
York and to have supporting operations in London and Tokyo (CLS 1999b).
On 1 November 1999, the FED approved the application (CLS 1999h), and
CLS Bank International in New York became a sister company of CLS Ser-
vices Ltd. Two years later, in June 2001, the board approved a new CLS
Group corporate model that included the formation of a new CLS Group
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holding company based in Switzerland (CLS 2002g) which set the base for
CLS’s current structure (see chapter 5).
4.3.2 First System Tests
In order to generate sufficient volume during the start-up phase of the system,
a roll-out strategy was planned. The core programming of the system was
completed in April 1999. This enabled the first phase of system testing, de-
fined as integration testing. Four shareholders assisted the integration testing
phase; Barclays Bank, HSBC, J.P. Morgan and UBS. These four test banks
were called beta banks. The second testing phase, the Operational Trials and
Acceptance process (OTA), was planned for the second half of 2000. Within
this phase another 16 shareholders, named the millennium banks, should en-
ter the live testing. In the third wave, soon after the OTA, further 11 banks
were to go live (CLS 1999h). CLS Services Ltd. requested the respective
shareholders to sign a letter of intent under which each bank committed to
start using CLS Bank for the eligible currencies within a specified time frame
(CLS 1999g). However, programming by IBM and beta bank testing did not
progress according to the time line and delays became inescapable.
4.3.3 Project Delays
After due discussions and renegotiations regarding the procurement contract
at the end of 1998, IBM and CLS agreed on an accepted delay of 70 days
(see 4.2.4). One year later, at the end of 1999, it was clear that the go live
date again had to be rescheduled. It was realized that the FRS were not sta-
ble and IBM denoted them as partly unclear. With hindsight the CLS board
resumed that purchasing a banking system and adapting it to the necessary
payment functionalities would have been more appropriate than building a
Unix platform from scratch (CLS 2000b). For instance, the two data centers
selected by IBM were too far apart (40 miles) to use standard Unix products
for the mirroring of the databases (CLS 2000h). Instead of being able to use
one of the existing mirroring products for standard banking systems it head
to be developed for the new Unix platform. Furthermore, IBM struggled
with personnel issues. In May 2000, Ernst & Young presented the results
of a close examination of the project’s financial figures and concluded that
total costs would increase to nearly USD 300 million (CLS 2000f). Com-
pared to the originally planned USD 130 million, costs more than doubled
since June 1998 (see 4.2.1). At this stage the FED considered the project
to be in serious trouble and advised IBM to be aware of the project’s in-
ternational importance (CLS 2000a). Even though IBM had large customer
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accounts at stake and was threatened with exclusion from other projects un-
dertaken by CLS shareholder banks, it did not assign its claims. Discussions
and appropriate actions to turn around the project were pushed by CLS
management(CLS 2000h). Under a revised time line, IBM was supposed to
deliver the integrated system to CLS at the end of February 2001. OTA
(see 4.3.2) would then begin in mid April 2001 and end in August of the
same year. Business could thus start in September 2001 with a total delay
of about 14 months.
4.3.4 Recapitalization in Summer 2000
During the debate with IBM, it became clear that due to the delays, refi-
nancing was necessary earlier than planned. The USD 160 million that were
raised two years earlier, in mid 1998, would not be able to cover costs until
operational start (see 4.2.3). At the end of 1997, system development costs
had been estimated at USD 60 to 80 million. In 2000, after adapting the
financial plans to the project delays, total system development costs were
projected to be almost USD 300 million. Therefore all shareholders were
requested to contribute new equity to raise total funds of USD 115 million
(CLS 2000h). In order to incentivize all shareholders to make full contribu-
tions, it was resolved that lagging shareholders would not be connected to the
CLS system until all other paying members first have successfully started op-
erations (CLS 2000b). 52 shareholders secured the necessary USD 115 million
and recapitalization was successfully executed in June 2000 (CLS 2000g).
4.3.5 More Tests, Trials and Delays
The first trial phase including the four beta banks (see 4.3.2) at the end of
2000 was a disappointment. The banks’ firewalls turned out to be a diffi-
cult issue and made the testing a painful procedure (CLS 2000c). Further
technical reviews became necessary and more delays foreseeable. On Mon-
day, 11 December 2000, IBM again asked for a delay of another two months.
Besides the IBM related issues, everything was well on track and therefore,
CLS board was not willing to again rescheduled the go live date (CLS 2000d).
Instead, the CLS board commissioned a risk assessment of IBM’s ability to
meet its development commitments and its capability to support the cur-
rent timetable. Following a minimum risk strategy, it was agreed that CLS’s
functionality would be delivered in two releases. The first release would en-
able CLS to operationally go live in September 2001 but with temporary
operational redirections. The second release was planned to be introduced
in February 2002 and would be focused on eliminating the compromises ac-
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cepted for the first release (CLS 2001c). The year 2001 was planned to be
split in two phases (CLS 2001d). The testing phase should last from April to
July and included extensive assessments of all participants’ systems to give
confidence to the industry and to mobilize for the start of the second phase,
the live trial stage. The key distinction between ”testing” and ”trialling” in
this context is that the latter involves real monetary values passing across
the trialling participants’ real production systems. During the system inte-
gration test (SIT) in June 2001, further delays had to be communicated. As
a result of insufficient system stability the time line was extended by another
four weeks and the start for the first live phase named CULP (controlled un-
scripted live processing) was scheduled for 26 November 2001. At this time
IBM’s and the members’ commitments regarding the project were undoubt-
edly strong. IBM had more than 450 headcounts assigned to the project and
more than half of all members were on time with testing and ready for the
live trials (CLS 2001a). On 3 September 2001, only a few months after the
last delay had been announced, IBM once more suggested major revisions to
the time line. According to the new proposal, CULP would start more than
half a year later, in summer 2002. CLS negotiated a cost cover by IBM which
enabled the going concern for its business plan at all. However, discussions
at the board meeting in September 2001 made clear that now the point had
come that IBM had lost its credibility. IBM project leaders had to admit
that the system’s maturity had recently been overestimated. Due to miss-
ing understanding regarding the business field of CLS, the system had been
built far more complex than needed (CLS 2001b). Also high staff turnover
on both sides aggravated a consistent development of the project. CLS had a
new management and the IBM project management had been fully replaced
already twice until then.
4.3.6 Bringing the System Live
The year 2002 started by redefining IBM’s contract milestones regarding the
going live time line. The new schedule is summarized in table 4.1. Before
starting with trials (i.e. End to End Trial), the system integration test (SIT),
as the last testing phase, had to be completed. As noted before, the term
”trial” refers to real values going through the RTGSs while ”testing” indicates
simulations based on artificially generated transaction data. Even though
involving only 7 pilot banks, the end to end trials should prove the functional
capability of the CLS system to its member as well as to the industry. In
the so called controlled scripted live trial (CSLT) phase a larger number of
members would then be connected to the system. However, settlement would
still be scripted in the sense that no exceptional transactions are entered to
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New Milestone Due Date Detail
End to End Trials March 2002 Real value flows via local RTGSs
CSLT May 2002 Trialling with more participants
CULP June 2002 Live transactions
Ramp-Up Pricing August 2002 Introduction of pricing per transaction
Release 2 Live Undefined Introduction of second release
Table 4.1: New Milestones (CLS 2002j).
the system. Only the CULP phase would then allow for real unscripted and
therefore potentially high value transactions. Ramp-up pricing was a concept
to assure revenues during the starting phase of the system. Members were
assigned fixed settlement volumes that they had to pay for whether or not
they would use CLS to settle their contracts. As March approached it became
clear that the due dates for the different milestones, particularly the start
of the End to End Trials, would not be met. While the system had been
stable since January 2002, the fine tuning of the different interfaces still
caused serious errors during testing. The CLS board though, well aware of
IBM’s creeping delays, decided not to set an unconditional date to go live.
It was considered to be more important to demonstrate the outside world
CLS’s commitment to quality than to stick to a fixed time line (CLS 2002b).
End to End Trials as well as the subsequent CSLT and CULP finally turned
out satisfactory during summer 2002, and with a delay of more than two
years, CLS started service operation on 9 September 2002 with 39 settlement
members and 7 currencies (CLS 2002c). Figure 4.1 displays the different
stages of projet delays. CLS delivered a 100 percent settlement performance
ever since with only a low number of minor disruptions.
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Figure 4.1: Project Delays (CLS 2002k).
4.4 CLS in Operation 2002 - 2005
4.4.1 Renegotiating the Service Agreement
During the going live phase, discussions regarding financial issues of the ser-
vice agreement emerged (CLS 2002d). IBM stated that development costs
had now significantly exceeded budget (see 4.3.4) and claimed to restruc-
ture the original facilities management (FM) and application management
services (AMS) contracts.(CLS 2002e) To better understand the cost drivers
regarding FM for the next ten years, CLS carried out a product review with
IBM and at the same time issued a request for proposal to four other po-
tential facility management suppliers. A competitive proposal was achieved
by one of them which put CLS in a strong position with respect to the con-
tract negotiation with IBM (CLS 2002a). The new service agreements were
finally signed at the end of 2002 and still included a cost increase of almost
30 percent compared to the initial agreements. Over a 10 year term, total
charges were agreed to GBP 200 million (CLS 2003h). As a result of the cost
over-runs, CLS found itself undercapitalized. In November 2002, the board
decided to close the financing gap by a balanced approach of vendor financ-
ing and tariff revision. By 1 July 2003, settlement prices were increased by
10 percent and the remaining deficit was financed by IBM debt. In contrast
4.4 CLS in Operation 2002 - 2005 67
to a capital increase, this solution spread costs evenly among all sizes of
shareholders (CLS 2002f).
4.4.2 Business Continuity Planning
The tragedy of September 2001 launched general discussions regarding the
need for rapid recovery of critical infrastructure following regional disrup-
tions. In September 2002, the FED, the Department of the Treasury Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) published a draft version of an interagency paper
on sound practices to strengthen the resilience of the US financial system
(FED 2003). The paper identified business continuity objectives and sound
practices to ensure resilience by minimizing the immediate systemic effects
of disruptions on critical financial markets. The core statement of the pa-
per asks for rapid recovery and resumption of critical operations following a
widescale disruption or loss of staff in major operating locations. The agen-
cies expected organizations that fall within the scope of this paper to adopt
these practices (SEC 2006). Therewith, the paper became a worldwide stan-
dard regarding contingency and resilience issues. CLS was identified as one
of the organization within the scope of this paper and hence should be able
to recover and resume from any disaster within a specified time. It became
clear that CLS would need to meet a number of the paper’s requirements
such as to satisfy a two hour recovery period in the event of any disruption
and to establish an ”out of region” capability which would be a second site
at least 1’000 miles off, able to take over full operations in case of a dis-
ruption. As the two IBM data centers, both located at the south coast of
the UK, and the IBM command center, located at the East End of London,
were close to each other, CLS board was well aware of the implications of
the FED’s requirements (CLS 2002h). Missing the funds to replicate the
command center’s complete infrastructure outside the UK, it was agreed to
expand the New York site to effectively operate the system from there in case
of an incident in London. While the CLS applications remained in the UK
the business continuity office with its backup systems would be moved to the
US. Regarding the data centers, CLS was faced with similar problems. Due
to distance constraints of the technology used for the data centers, they must
be located within around 70 miles of each other. To fulfill the FED’s ”out
of region” requirement, a different and thus very costly solution would be
necessary to build a third data center sufficiently remote from the primary
site. Hence, it was agreed with the FED to temporarily delay the movement
of the data center to have more time for working on technical progress. The
FED accepted a longer term action plan that started off with checking the
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technical potential regarding the operational systems and staff (CLS 2003c).
4.4.3 Service Disruptions
From a service point of view, on 25 March 2003 the only severe operational
disruption occurred. Due to a database error, about 30 percent of that day’s
instructions were rejected and the Asia-Pacific RTGS systems’s operating
hours had to be extended. While IBM was the initial source of the problem,
CLS contributed with late reaction. The situation aggravated as settlement
members subsequently did not put the proper level of seniority to the issue.
One day later however, on 26 March 2003, the problem was fixed and no
service incidences occurred. The rejected instructions that were resubmit-
ted, successfully settled on that day (CLS 2003d). Further minor disruptions
appeared during the following months such as the one on 27 May. Due to
operational errors at CLS, funds were paid out that had not yet been settled.
Standard failure management action was taken successfully, the money was
called back and settlement was still completed on time (CLS 2003c). Set-
tlement volumes increased in line with forecasts and the system proved its
resilience ever since. The delivery of CLS Bank has fulfilled the ambitious
target to set a new standard of globalization in the industry.
4.5 Chapter Summary
The initial sponsors of the CLS project were a group of twenty international
banks (the G20). The G20 established a number of working groups to confirm
the viability of a CLS Bank. In July 1997, the G20 created a new company,
CLS Services Ltd., incorporated in England. The company was formed to be
the organization to fund and build the CLS system. In December 1997 CLS
Services Ltd. acquired the entire issued share capital of ECHO and Multinet
and discontinued their operations. The acquisition enabled the creation of
a single industry facility for the reduction of settlement risk. IBM, being
the prime contractor to build the CLS system, soon encountered serious
difficulties to implement the required specifications and major delays incurred
during the following years. In 1999, the FED approved CLS’s application
for a banking licence and the CLS Bank International was incorporated as
a special purpose, multi-currency bank under the Edge Act of the United
States of America. Finally, after a long series of set-backs and with a delay
of more than two years CLS Bank entered live operations in September 2002.
Table 4.2 summarizes the key milestones of the CLS history.
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Date Event
Oct 1994 Formation of the G20
Dec 1994 Proposition of 3 different models
May 1995 Cancelation of model 1
Aug 1995 Going live of ECHO
Nov 1995 Estimated project costs: USD 60 mio.
Feb 1996 Approval of model 3,
first meetings with Net Systems
Mar 1996 Basic questionnaire regarding choice of jurisdiction,
start of BRS phase
Oct 1996 Generic framework for business case completed
Dec 1996 Legal issues regarding Switzerland:
first report by Niederer Kraft & Frey
Jan 1997 Detailed legal survey of possible jurisdictions
Feb 1997 Approval of BRS, setting membership criteria
Apr 1997 Decision to form a legal entity,
estimated project costs: USD 80 mio.
Jul 1997 Incorporation of CLS Services Ltd.
Oct 1997 Sending request for proposal to potential vendors
Dec 1997 Merger of Net Systems with CLS
Mar 1998 Discussions regarding remote access to RTGS of
relevant central banks completed
Apr 1998 IBM becomes prime contractor
Jun 1998 Estimated project costs: USD 130 mio.
Jul 1998 Signing of IBM contracts
going live target is July 2000
Decision to liquidate Multinet
Aug 1998 Recapitalization successful
Nov 1998 IBM resumes contract discussions due to complexity of FRS
continued on next page
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Date Event
Jan 1999 CLS accepts a delay of 70 days,
go live target is Oct 2000
Feb 1999 Board recommends to suspend ECHO
Apr 1999 Closing of ECHO, core programming of CLS completed
Jun 1999 First phase of system testing with 4 beta banks
Aug 1999 Application for banking licence at FED
Nov 1999 Banking licence, formation of CLS Bank
Mar 2000 Legal issues in Switzerland:
second report by Niederer Kraft & Frey
Rescheduling of going live to Sept 2001
Apr 2000 Estimated project costs: USD 300 mio.
May 2000 Final dissolving of Multinet
Jun 2000 Second recapitalization successful
Dec 2000 IBM asks for further delays,
CLS insists on timely delivery of a first release
Jun 2001 Corporate restructuring:
formation of a holding company in Switzerland
Communication of further delays
Nov 2001 IBM again suggests revision of time line,
CLS negotiates 100 percent cost cover
Jan 2002 Redefining IBM’s milestones
Aug 2002 Interface errors, delay of another 4 weeks
Sep 2002 Going live
Dec 2002 Signing of new IBM service agreements
with cost increases of 30 percent
Mar 2003 Only severe service disruption
Jul 2003 10 percent settlement price increase
Table 4.2: Milestones of CLS’s History.
Chapter 5
Design of CLS
To provide insight into different aspects of the company and its processes as of
today, this chapter describes CLS as a legal entity as well as the design of the
system. The chapter starts off with an overview of CLS as a legal entity and
its members, followed by a technical description of the settlement process.
The paragraphs of the section explaining the CLS system’s mechanism, are
organized according to the original director’s manual (CLS 2004c). The
remaining sections discuss two specific issues that need particular attention,
the risk management framework and the liquidity management.
5.1 CLS as a Bank
The CLS entity is set up as a limited purpose bank that provides simultaneous
multi-currency real-time gross settlement with finality. CLS holds accounts
with the central banks of each eligible currency and is directly connected to
each respective domestic RTGS system. Banking status is necessary in order
for some central banks to allow CLS Bank to hold accounts with them.
5.1.1 Corporate Structure
Settlement members and user members (see 5.2) are the shareholders of the
CLS Bank. Prior to the year 2000, CLS Bank was named CLS Services
Ltd. and was incorporated in the United Kingdom with a subsidiary called
CLS Operations. With the receipt of a banking licence in 1999 (see 4.3.1),
a second subsidiary with the name CLS Bank International was established
in the United States. To create a robust governance structure and provide
a clean solution for tax purposes, CLS Services Ltd., the former UK com-
pany, became a shell company and changed its name to CLS UK Holdings
72 Chapter 5. Design of CLS
Ltd. The operational subsidiary was now named CLS Services. At the same
time and for the same reasons a holding company domiciled in Switzerland
was introduced. The Swiss CLS Group Holdings AG is today regulated by
the Federal Reserve in the United States as a bank holding company. The
two subsidiaries, CLS Bank International in New York and CLS Services in
London manage the operations (see figure 5.1) (CLS 2004a).
5.1.2 Corporate Governance
The CLS Group Holdings board comprises 26 directors of which at most 3
directors hold a senior executive position. One director is the Swiss based
company secretary and the remaining 22 directors are composed of non-
executive shareholder representatives (see figure 5.1). They are selected
based on eligibility criteria such as the shareholders financial contribution
to the CLS Bank and their individual quality. The main function of the
Group Holdings board is to provide ultimate direction and supervision, con-
trol and business oversight. It is setting the guidelines for the general policy
and strategy of the company and ensuring appropriate communication to its
shareholders (CLS 2004a). The Executive Committee, the Nominating &
Governance Committee, and the Audit Committee are three subsets of the
CLS Group Holdings board. The Executive Committee includes the CEO
of the CLS Group Holdings as well as seven non-executive directors. It pro-
vides a vehicle for rapid response regarding issues that require endorsement
on the board level. The Nominating & Governance Committee also consists
of seven non-executive directors and the CEO of the CLS Group Holdings.
The committee assures proper governance of the CLS Group and makes rec-
ommendations to the board regarding new directors of the board, subsidiary
boards and the different committees. The Audit Committee encompasses
eight non-executive directors of which at least one has relevant up-to-date
financial experience. The committee ensures compliance of internal control
systems with applicable company law and current regulatory frameworks.
It monitors the integrity of the financial statements and manages the rela-
tionship with the external auditor (CLS 2004a). Due to its function as a
shell company CLS UK Holdings Ltd. only includes two executive direc-
tors. The management of CLS Bank International is based in New York.
The board of CLS Bank International includes ten non-executive directors
and 2 executive directors. The Risk Management Committee includes up to
ten non-executive members and the Executive Vice President of Risk Man-
agement and Regulatory Affairs. The committee’s role is to continuously
evaluate the effectiveness of the risk management policies and practices and
to provide advice and counsel in this regard (CLS 2004a). CLS Services’s
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Figure 5.1: CLS Corporate Structure (CLS 2004b).
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board of directors consists of 15 non-executive and four executive directors.
Until 2003 the Operations and Implementations Committee was affiliated to
CLS Services. The committee’s objective was to provide advice and support
to the Board of CLS Services regarding service operation, system implemen-
tation and the planning for customer service support (CLS 2003b). Since
2004 the Operations and Implementations Committee is integrated into the
CLS Services’s board. From a business perspective, CLS’s governance struc-
ture is designed to enable consistent and effective shareholder influence over
the group and in particular CLS Bank. The possible overlap of CLS Group
Holdings and CLS Bank board of directors is supposed to allow flexible gov-
ernance arrangements (CLS 2004b).
5.2 Membership
CLS Bank offers two different membership options and one user only option:
settlement members, user members, and third party users. Banks acting
as nostro agents are not members of CLS but still involved in the payment
flows between CLS and its members (see figure 5.2). All members must
fulfill certain criteria such as being a shareholder of CLS, being a qualified
financial institution, adhering to defined measures to combat money launder-
ing, demonstrating sufficient operational capability and meeting minimum
financial and credit requirements (CLS 2004b)(see also 4.1.2). The different
membership options are described in the following sections.
5.2.1 Settlement Members
Settlement members are banks, trust companies or broker-dealers under su-
pervision of an authority that is acceptable to CLS Bank. They can submit
settlement instructions for themselves, as nostro agents, and for their cus-
tomers directly to CLS Bank. Each settlement member has a single multi-
currency account with CLS Bank. To connect to the CLS core system, mem-
bers must use a CLS gateway. To do so, settlement members as well as
user members are required to become users of SWIFTNet InterAct1. As of
2006, CLS encompasses 54 settlement members. All settlement members are
also shareholders of CLS Bank. The total number of Shareholders, however,
amounts to 71 at the beginning of 2007.
1SWIFTNet InterAct is a messaging service that supports the exchange of automated
and interactive messages between two parties (see also 2.5.16).
5.2 Membership 75
Figure 5.2: Participants of the CLS System (CLS 2006).
5.2.2 User Members
The category of user members had been created to address the pressure from
smaller banks and especially from broker/dealers that would either not meet
the eligibility criteria for settlement membership or were not involved in set-
tlement at all. A third party solution was not considered by the broker/dealer
shareholder as in the position of such they would have had to disclose their
trading strategy to the settlement member in order to get the instructions
settled. Confidentiality of trades would have been lost. Therefore, a third
party solution was out of question and a settlement membership with all
its consequences such as the timed pay-ins (see 5.4.4) unwanted. For this
reason and to address the central bank’s concern for open and fair access
for participation, the user member status was created (CLS 1998a). Today,
however, there is only one bank with status of a user member. User members
are also shareholders of CLS Bank and may submit transactions for settle-
ment, including transactions for third parties, directly to CLS on the trade
day. However, user members cannot settle transactions in their own name
within CLS nor have a separate account. Instead a transaction submitted
by a user member must be settled through a designated settlement member,
who will assume responsibility, as principal, for settlement of the transaction
and for fulfilling all funding obligations. The user member does not receive
CLS pay-in schedules (see 5.4.4), but has its own payment schedule agreed
with its settlement member. Hence, the principal distinction between a user
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member and a settlement member is that the relationship of the user mem-
ber to CLS bank is solely operational in nature. The user member does not
assume responsibility for settlement and liquidity risk.
5.2.3 Third Parties
Using the CLS system, settlement members and user members can supply
third parties with integrated multi-currency foreign exchange settlement ser-
vices with minimal settlement risk. In that, third parties are defined as any
parties involved in foreign exchange trading, who are not CLS members. At
the beginning of 2007, the number of third parties exceeded 900. Third party
services, however, are only offered by about 18 settlement members. Third
parties have no contractual relationship nor any other direct relation to CLS.
It is necessary for a third party to submit both, the pay and the receive leg
of each individual transaction through the same CLS member. Otherwise,
the transaction would not be self collateralized.
5.2.4 Nostro Agents
Settlement members send their pay-in instructions directly to CLS if they
are connected to the local RTGS of the respective currency. Otherwise the
service of a nostro agent is necessary. However, to act as a nostro agent
for a CLS member no contractual relation to CLS is needed. The nostro
agent only needs to be connected to the respective local RTGS to transfer
the pay-ins to CLS in lieu of the settlement member.
5.3 Eligible Currencies
In September 2002, CLS went live with 7 currencies: United States dollar,
Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Euro, Japanese yen, Swiss franc and UK
Pound sterling. During 2003 the currencies of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and
Singapore were enclosed, followed by the currencies of Korea, South Africa,
Hong Kong, and New Zealnd in 2004 (CLS 2003e). Today, CLS Bank settles
in 15 currencies (see also 2.5). Currencies may be designated as eligible by
the board of directors if they satisfy the following criteria:
1. At least two CLS shareholders have requested the eligibility of that
currency.
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2. There are at least three commercially acceptable institutions that have
indicated their willingness to act as liquidity providers (see 5.5.2) for
this currency.
3. The relevant payment system meets the requirements of CLS including
opening hours that sufficiently overlap with the settlement period for
all eligible currencies.
4. The cost to include the currency are deemed reasonable.
5. An adequate risk reduction results from its inclusion to justify the
necessary investments.
6. Any exchange restrictions or similar conditions on the transferability as
well as convertibility, liquidity and historical volatility are acceptable
to CLS Bank.
7. The relevant central bank has agreed to establish a special account
for CLS Bank to facilitate the transfer of the currency from and to
settlement members.
8. CLS Bank has received a legal opinion addressing finality of payments
made to and from CLS Bank’s account with the relevant central bank.
5.4 Settlement and Funding
To address the risk associated with settling foreign exchange transactions,
CLS ensures the continuous and simultaneous settlement of linked currency
exchanges. Actual settlement processing is executed during a five-hour win-
dow when all relevant RTGS systems are open to send and receive funds. For
Asia Pacific currencies the window is limited to only four hours. During this
time, matched transactions are selected one at a time and are subject to the
risk management tests. After having passed the tests, settlement becomes
irrevocable and is effected immediately with finality, through the posting
of debits and credits of the settlement member’s accounts on the books of
CLS. Settlement members are required to pay in funds into their CLS bank
accounts to cover short currency positions according to a pay-in schedule
issued by CLS to its members. At the end of the settlement day all long
balances are disbursed to the settlement members. The following sections
lead in detail through this settlement process (CLS 2004c).
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5.4.1 Settlement versus Funding
CLS Bank maintains one account for each settlement member and one ac-
count for each currency with the relevant central bank. The design of the
service draws a clear distinction between settlement instructions and pay-
in instructions. Settlement instructions trigger settlement on a gross basis
between members, while pay-in instructions release the funds that need to
be sent from a member to CLS. The necessary pay-ins are calculated on a
net basis. Combined it may be summarized as gross settlement with net
funding. Although settlement and funding are legally separate processes, the
two processes are linked and run operationally in parallel. Settlement occurs
when CLS Bank simultaneously debits and credits the account of two settle-
ment members in accordance with eligible settlement instructions that were
submitted by the settlement members (or by user members and authorized
by settlement members acting as their designated agent). The transaction
is final and binding for both involved members. Funding is the process by
which a settlement member (or its nostro agent) transfers eligible currencies
into CLS Bank’s central bank accounts. CLS Bank is notified of the receipt
and credits the settlement member’s account. The pay-in is completed. To
process pay-outs, CLS Bank disburses funds from its central bank account to
a settlement member (or its nostro agent) and debits its account accordingly.
5.4.2 Submission and Initial Processing of Instructions
Settlement instructions direct CLS Bank to settle certain obligations and
entitlements to receive payments arising pursuant to a single, specifically
identified, foreign exchange transaction. The instructions are submitted by
members using specific SWIFT messages sent via SWIFTNet to CLS Ser-
vices. Each instruction must clearly identify both, the member sending it
and the member that is expected to submit an instruction with respect to
the same transaction. Further, it specifies the exchange rate, the amounts,
and the identities of the currencies to be delivered and received pursuant to
the instruction, as well as the date on which the instruction is scheduled for
settlement in CLS Bank (the value date) and the two counterparties to the
underlying foreign exchange transaction. In general, members may submit
instructions for settlement from the time the foreign exchange transaction
is executed, up to approximately 06:30 CET on the value date specified in
the instruction. From a risk perspective a prompt submittance of settlement
instructions after a trade is desired. Possible misunderstandings at contract
closure (trading often takes place via phone calls) may not be detected until
matching. Hence, as sooner as matching occurs after a trade the shorter the
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period until contract errors are noticed. A member that wants to amend
or rescind previously submitted settlement instructions must send an amend
or rescind instruction prior to the applicable deadlines on the value date
(see 5.4.3). Once a settlement instruction has been properly authenticated,
it is subject to further processing and validation. When an instruction is
received at CLS, the submitting member is notified of the status of that
instruction. An instruction can be classified as either rejected (e.g. when
it is recognized as a potential duplicate instruction), invalid (e.g. members
or currencies that are suspended or value dates that are not banking days),
suspended (e.g. when it fails to pass certain filters) or unmatched (see fig-
ure 5.3).
5.4.3 Matching
CLS Services matches a pair of validated settlement instructions based on
the following information contained in each instruction: (1) identification
codes of members submitting the instruction relating to the same transac-
tion, (2)the value date, (3) the amounts and identities of the buy and sell
currencies, and (4) the identification codes of the two counterparties of the
underlying foreign exchange transaction. As mentioned before, settlement
instructions may be submitted up to the release of the final pay-in sched-
ule at about 06:30 CET. Each pair of settlement instructions that can be
matched is designated as matched instruction, and the relevant members are
notified of this new status. An instruction that has not been matched is
held in the CLS system until the settlement process for the relevant cur-
rency has been completed on its value date. At this time, the instruction
is rejected. Matched instructions can unilaterally be rescinded or amended
by members at any time prior to the initial pay-in schedule deadline for
that instruction’s value date which is at 00:00 CET. Bilaterally, matched
instructions may be rescinded up to the final pay-in schedule approximately
at 06:30 CET. Unmatched instructions that have not been rejected by the
CLS system may unilaterally be rescinded or amended up to the final pay-in
schedule. As soon as a pair of instructions is matched CLS Services deter-
mines whether it is eligible for settlement. Matched instructions submitted
by two settlement members are automatically designated as settlement eli-
gible instructions. If at least one user member is involved, it is verified that
each settlement member identified in the matched instructions is approved
by the other. Settlement members approving each other allows them to man-
age their exposures to each other arising from instructions that involve user
members. After an instruction submitted by a user member is classified as
eligible for settlement, it will not be processed until it is authorized by the
80 Chapter 5. Design of CLS
Figure 5.3: Simplified Instruction Flow (author).
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applicable settlement member. Usually authorization is targeted to occur ap-
proximately between 22:00 and 00:00 CET on the day prior to the value date
and approximately between 00:00 and 06:30 CET on value date for same-day
instructions. Figure 5.3 summarizes this process.
5.4.4 Pay-In Schedules
The pay-in schedule contains CLS Bank’s projection of the amounts that a
settlement member must pay to and expects to receive from CLS Bank if all
settlement eligible instructions scheduled to be processed that business day
do in fact settle. Due to its function as a continuous linked settlement fa-
cility settling currencies in different time zones, funding in CLS significantly
differs from other market practices. Minimum installments of the total net
pay-in obligation in each currency must be made by specified times on each
settlement day. Thus, the pay-in schedule not only defines the total amount
of each currency that a settlement member must pay to CLS Bank during
a day, but also the times on or before which such amounts must be paid
in. Each settlement member must be operationally capable of meeting, ei-
ther directly or through a financial institution that acts as its nostro agent
(see 5.2.4), the pay-in requirements. The schedule is structured to ensure
that settlement is completed by the target time of approximately 09:00 CET
and that pay-outs of the Asian-Pacific currencies are made prior to the clos-
ing of their local payment system at about 10:30 CET. To accomplish this,
CLS Bank accelerates the pay-in schedules to ensure that sufficient amounts
are paid in by 09:00 CET and all settlement members are within their short
position limits (see 5.5.1) to complete settlement on time on 09:00 CET. The
several hour funding period makes the best use of the overlapping opening
hours of the local payment systems in the different time zones and facilitates
liquidity management by allowing settlement members to spread their pay-
ins at least across these hours. Late pay-ins are penalized by CLS Bank. For
each value date, two pay-in schedules are issued. The initial pay-in schedule
is generated at about 00:00 CET and shows the expected net pay-in require-
ments and the pay-outs resulting from the settlement eligible instructions
so far. After 06:30 CET no further instructions will be classified as eligi-
ble for settlement for that day and no instructions can be rescinded by any
member (see 5.4.3). Once this cut-off time has passed, CLS Bank delivers
the second pay-in schedule. The second schedule may differ from the ini-
tial one due to inclusion of same-day instructions designated as eligible for
settlement between 00:00 CET and the cut-off at 06:30 CET or bilaterally
rescinded instructions. Upon receipt of its pay-in schedule, settlement mem-
bers acknowledge it to CLS Bank and subsequently instruct their payment
82 Chapter 5. Design of CLS
departments to transfer funds to their respective accounts at CLS Bank in
accordance with their schedules.
5.4.5 Queue Formation and Splitting Process
CLS Bank processes instructions for settlement on any day on which the
local payment systems for at least two eligible currencies are in operation.
Prior to the start of the actual settlement, a processing queue is formed that
contains all settlement eligible instructions for that particular value date.
When the initial pay-in schedule is generated, those instructions that have
been classified as eligible for settlement, including those that are the result of
the splitting process (see below), will be assigned a random sequence num-
ber. Each instruction is subsequently placed on the settlement processing
queue in accordance with this assigned sequence number. Modelling studies
had indicated that in the event of a pay-in failure by a settlement member,
instructions split into amounts below short position limits (see p. 86) may
limit the effect of unsettled instructions on that value date. If instructions
are not split, the largest ones that need the most liquidity tend to be the last
settled and this occurs closest to the completion target time. In addition, if
the amount of the instruction is greater than the currency’s short position
limit, a pay-in failure could cause the entire position to remain unsettled even
though the short position limit would permit part of the instruction to settle.
For example, if the short position limit for a currency is USD 1 billion and
the size of an instruction is USD 1.5 billion, a pay-in failure could result in
the entire USD 1.5 billion to remain unsettled. This could have a significant
knock-on effect for other settlement members. By splitting this instruction
into smaller components, approximately USD 1 billion of the original USD
1.5 billion could be settled within the short position limit (provided the ac-
count has sufficient overall value). To facilitate earlier settlement and to
minimize the magnitude of the effect of unsettled instructions, the CLS sys-
tem established splitting thresholds. For Euro transactions for instance, the
current threshold is set at 150 million for one instruction (CLS 2004d). When
the initial pay-in schedule is generated at about 00:00 CET, each settlement
eligible instruction is tested against currency splitting threshold values and
if applicable, the instruction is split in two or more separate instructions.
The period for processing same-day instructions occurs between 00:00 and
06:30 CET. Within this period of time, CLS Bank opens so called same-day
gateways during which same-day instructions are placed on the settlement
processing queue. Whenever a same-day gateway is opened, each same-day
instruction is also tested against the currency splitting threshold values and
split in two or more instructions if applicable. These instructions, includ-
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Figure 5.4: Time Line of Settlement Process (CLS 2006).
ing those that result from the splitting process, are assigned a sequential
number that is larger than the largest random sequence number. Thus, the
settlement processing queue consists of all instructions that are classified as
settlement eligible prior to the calculation of the initial pay-in schedule in
random order, followed by all same-day instructions entered to the system
after the calculation of the first pay-in schedule in sequential order.
5.4.6 Settlement
To execute the pay-ins and pay-outs, the involved local payment systems of
all involved countries must offer overlapping opening hours. The commence-
ment of the settlement period is therefore set to 07:00 CET (see figure 5.4).
Settlement processing begins by selecting the first matched transaction in the
queue. The system tests the two counterparties of the transaction against
the three risk management criteria Net Positive Overall Value, Short Position
Limit and Aggregate Short Position Limit (see 5.5). If the transaction passes
the tests, then it is settled immediately through the posting of debit and cred-
its to the member’s accounts on the books of CLS. The settled transaction
is irrevocable and final. If the transaction selected for settlement fails the
risk management tests, it is returned to the settlement processing queue (see
figure 5.3). CLS settlement is complete when all transactions have left the
settlement processing queue and have been settled or rescinded. The target
time for settlement completion is 09:00 CET. Funding lasts until 12:00 CET.
In order to be in a position to fulfill its obligations to make pay-outs of long
positions to eligible settlement members on a same-day basis, CLS Bank must
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complete funding in each currency before the relevant local payment system
closes. CLS will process funding until the so called currency close deadline
which is at approximately 10:30 CET for Asian-Pacific currencies and 13:00
for European and North American currencies. If not all instructions involv-
ing Asia-Pacific currencies are settled by the currency close deadline, CLS
Bank will no longer attempt to settle those instructions as their local pay-
ment system closing time approaches. Since more time remains before the
closing of the European and North America payment systems, CLS Bank
attempts to settle instructions not involving Asian-Pacific currencies past
the currency close deadline for Asian-Pacific currencies. After 12:00 CET,
however, unsettled instructions are removed from the queue and the affected
members have to decide whether to resubmit the instruction for settlement
processing the next business day or to settle the underlying foreign exchange
transaction outside CLS Bank and manage the arising settlement exposure.
5.4.7 Pay-Outs
CLS Bank is obligated to pay-out long positions to settlement members. In
order to minimize the liquidity impact on the local markets, CLS Bank seeks,
within the constraints of the risk parameters, to make pay-outs throughout
the settlement process. Under normal circumstance, where settlement is
successfully completed, CLS Bank pays out any long balances in its central
bank accounts to the settlement members before the closing of the respective
payment systems. As a result, a settlement member has a zero balance in its
CLS account and CLS Bank has no funds in its central bank accounts at the
end of each business day.
5.5 Risk Management Framework
A risk management framework has been elaborated in order to achieve con-
tinuous stability and integrity of the CLS settlement process. The main
principles of the framework include the protection of principal losses and
irrevocability of transferred funds. All operational risks are borne by the
members and not by CLS Bank. Neither liquidity providers (see 5.5.2) nor
central banks should bear incremental, unsecured risk. The framework is
built on three main pillars: Overdraft facilities, liquidity providers, and loss
sharing arrangements.
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5.5.1 Overdraft Facilities
To support the efficiency of the settlement process but still to control the risk
of a liquidity shortfall due to a failing member, the following three risk man-
agement tests are applied to each transaction in the settlement processing
queue on the respective settlement day: (1) Net Positive Overall Value, (2)
Short Position Limit, and (3) Aggregate Short Position Limit. Transactions
will only be marked eligible to settle if they have successfully passed these
risk management requirements. The rules also apply to the pay-outs of long
positions after the completion of settlement.
Net Positive Overall Value
This risk management rule ensures self collateralization in that each member
maintains a Net Positive Overall Value (NPOV) across its accounts at CLS
Bank. A NPOV is met when the mark-to-market value of the member’s
aggregated long currency position is more than the aggregate of the mark-to-
market values of its short positions. The currency positions are continuously
marked to market and assessed in US dollar equivalents provided by Reuters.
Furthermore the mark-to-market will always include a haircut. Haircuts are
used as a risk management tool to protect against exchange rate volatility
when evaluating a settlement member’s account balance. CLS Bank sets
an individual haircut level for each currency. It is based on a volatility
calculation for a 6 day holding period and four standard deviations as well
as a variable 5 percent add-on. Depending on market volatility, the add-
on percentage may be increased with the approval of the Risk Management
Committee and the CLS Bank board of directors. The haircut reduces the
positive value of long positions and increases the negative value of short
positions. It is designed to provide an adequate cushion to manage through
a crisis rather than covering risk in normal operation. As settlement members
do not put up separate collateral to cover their market risk exposures, haircut
levels can be seen as a form of intra-day collateral. It ensures that CLS Bank
disposes of sufficient counter currency to acquire needed liquidity through a
transaction with a liquidity provider and hence, minimizes the risk of other
settlement members being assessed a loss allocation (CLS 2004d). If mark-
to-market variations and applied haircuts change a member’s overall balance
resulting in a negative overall value, the member is asked to accelerate its pay-
in schedule or place immediate cash deposits in any eligible currency. In the
meantime all transactions involving this particular member are set on hold.
As en example for a net positive overall value table 5.1 displays the assumed
mark-to-market positions (after applied haircuts) for a particular settlement
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Multi-Currency Account
in USD Equivalents
debit credit
CHF 200 500
300
500 500
USD 200 300
100
300 300
GBP 700 200
500
700 700
Aggregated 1’100 1’000
100
1’100 1’100
Table 5.1: Example of NPOV.
member. Even though the settlement member is short in its mark-to-market
positions of CHF and USD, its account shows a long position in GBP which
results in a net positive overall value. The positions in this example look as
follows:
• short position in CHF = 300 USD
• short position in USD = 100 USD
• long position in GBP = 500 USD
• aggregated short position = 400 USD
• net overall value = 100 USD
Short Position Limit
Each settlement member’s short currency position is constrained within the
member’s short position limit (SPL) for a particular currency. During bank
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holidays the SPL is set to zero for the affected currency as the domestic pay-
ment system for that currency is closed. This risk management rule limits
the size of a potential liquidity shortfall in a particular currency and en-
sures that the amount can be covered by liquidity providers (see 5.5.2). The
maximum SPL for a given currency is the same for all members and is a
function of the committed liquidity in that currency. Thus, the maximum
SPL for a single member allows for the failure of the single largest liquidity
provider. As required by the Lamfalussy-standards (see 3.3.2) this enables
CLS to duly complete any settlement day even if the failing member is a
liquidity provider and shows the largest net-debit position. In contrast to
the required net positive overall value that manages credit risk aspects re-
garding the failure of a member (self collateralization), the short position
limit reduces liquidity risk arising from failed pay-ins. It assures that even
in case of a failing member the right currencies can be paid out to the other
members. To improve settlement efficiency there is also a minimum SPL
which is derived from modelling the CLS process. Referring to the example
on page 86 each of the currencies has its own short position limit. In this
example for instance, the SPL for Swiss francs is at least equivalent to 300
USD as each member must lie within the SPL of each currency at any time.
Aggregate Short Position Limit
The aggregate short position limit (ASPL) places a cap on the sum of a
member’s short positions to contain a potential liquidity shortfall across all
currencies in case of a member’s failure. A member’s aggregated short po-
sition is represented by the sum of its currency short positions marked-to-
market valued continuously in US dollar equivalent and applied haircuts.
The example on page 86 results in an aggregate short position of 400 USD.
The ASPL is related to the level of the member’s capital and CLS internal
credit rating. An example of how an ASPL is established for a settlement
member is set forth in the following. Note that figures for this example are
assumed for illustrative purposes. Bank A applies to CLS Bank for settle-
ment membership. The applicant has a current tier 1 capital of USD 8.5
billion equivalent and an internal short term credit rating of A1. CLS Bank
defines four internal short term credit ratings: A1+, A1, A2, and A3. This
level of capital and credit rating is defined to correspond to an equity factor
of 80 percent and a credit risk factor of 90 percent. These factors, applied
to a maximum aggregate short position limit of USD 1.5 billion, lead to a
suggested aggregate short position limit of USD 1.08 billion for Bank A. The
short position limit for any currency, however, is the same as for any other
settlement member.
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5.5.2 Liquidity Providers
CLS Bank has established liquidity providers to limit the impact of a payment
default by a member. Liquidity providers are banks that commit to provide
liquidity in a certain currency in case other members fail to meet their pay-ins
in that particular currency. There are at least three liquidity providers for
each currency. It is assumed that the shortfall is of temporary nature and the
arrangement is basically set up as an overnight foreign exchange swap. This
means that CLS Bank sells parts of the positive balances off the defaulting
member’s sub-accounts to the liquidity providers who in turn provide the
missing amount in the particular currency. The transaction is supposed to
reverse the next day. However, CLS Bank has established a risk model for
liquidity providers to assure the repayment in any kind of scenario. The risk
model is designed to provide three stages of repayment (CLS 2003g):
1. In the most basic case the failing member recovers and pays in the
short funds.
2. If the member does not recover, CLS Bank will execute an outright
transaction based on the long positions of the failing member’s sub-
accounts. To do so CLS Bank will access the funds at its central bank
accounts which come from that day’s pay-ins. The haircuts applied to
the aggregate short position limit ensure an adequate coverage at all
times.
3. Should arrangement 1 or 2 not provide the necessary funds, CLS Bank
is able to initially allocate the losses to those settlement members that
had traded with the failing member. If even that proves insufficient, a
general loss allocation will be invoked (see 5.5.3).
Figure 5.5 illustrates an example. A particular settlement member is unable
to meet its pay-in obligations in EUR (1) but is long in Yen. CLS accesses
the failing member’s central bank account containing the Yen position (2)
and enters an overnight EUR/Yen swap with the euro liquidity provider
(3) to receive the missing EUR to pay them out to the other member that
expect a EUR pay-out (4). If the failing member recovers the next day,
the swap is reversed. Otherwise the swap is transformed into an outright
purchase and the liquidity provider does not retrieve its EUR but must keep
the Yen position. In case it is not possible to execute an outright purchase
or the funds are not sufficient, CLS will introduce a loss sharing arrangement
(see 5.5.3). The aggregated commitments of the liquidity providers in a
particular currency are large enough to cover a shortfall even in a worst case
scenario. In case of a default by the most important liquidity provider in
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Figure 5.5: Liquidity Provider Transaction (author).
each currency the remaining liquidity providers of that particular currency
are still able to cover the short balance. Up to date, it was not necessary to
make use of the liquidity provider facility at all.
5.5.3 Loss Sharing Arrangements
Despite the liquidity facilities described in the previous section, exceptional
circumstances might still cause losses to CLS Bank. Losses may be caused
for two main reasons. First, an adverse change in foreign exchange rates
eroding the haircuts keeps CLS Bank from being able to complete the trans-
action with the liquidity provider. If for instance the variation in one or
more currencies exceeds the volatility haircuts in those currencies, the bal-
ances of a failing member’s sub-accounts might turn negative. CLS Bank
would then not have sufficient funds to swap transactions with the liquidity
providers. Second, the liquidity provider with whom CLS Bank has entered
the swap is unable or unwilling to provide quotes for an outright purchase.
The swap might then be rolled over for up to 4 banking days on a one day
”today/tomorrow” basis (CLS 2003a). However, if the time for rolling over
the swap ends, or CLS bank decides there is no point in continuing to roll
it over and an outright transaction is still not possible, CLS Bank will have
to perform a loss allocation to raise enough of the particular currency to
complete the swap (CLS 2003f). To do this, CLS Bank will use the pay-ins
of its settlement members. Prior to the combined loss allocation CLS Bank
will perform a failure adjustment in which it debits the failing member’s sub-
accounts for all amounts due. The resulting negative account balance of the
failing member will be subject to a loss allocation. There is a systematic
allocation scheme which starts off by a combined loss allocation. It is a pro
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rata allocation of the losses to members who had dealt with the defaulting
member. The total loss borne by a particular settlement member is thus
capped by the bilateral net amount traded with the failing member. If this
does not raise enough funds to cover the shortfall, it will be subject to a
general loss allocation in which the outstanding losses are shared among all
surviving members (the general loss allocation is subject to a USD 30 million
cap). As soon as the necessary funds are raised by CLS Bank it completes the
swap with the liquidity provider. CLS Bank now endeavors to liquidate the
received currency in the market and to collect the amount of the negative ac-
count balance from the failing member with interest. The proceeds from this
process are redistributed pro rata to the settlement members that covered
the loss (CLS 2003f). Hence, the loss sharing arrangement is only applied in
circumstances where other risk management rules have been inadequate and
could not cover the short positions of the failing member.
5.6 Liquidity Management Framework
Payment systems operate on a single currency basis and execute instructions
during the normal business hours of the locations of the currencies in ques-
tion. In nearly all instances, payments have to be made by the end of the
payment system day. CLS funding flows, however, are fundamentally differ-
ent for two reasons. First, payments are made on a net basis and second,
they are time critical. For USD and CAD, CLS clearing is completed before
normal clearing begins. Making large pay-ins to CLS can be a cost and credit
issue because covering funds are only received much later that day. For the
European currencies, CLS and normal clearing happens at roughly similar
times. However, an institution with large CLS short positions may have dif-
ficulties at the start of the day due to front-loading of the pay-in schedule.
For Asia-Pacific currencies, normal clearing is completed before CLS clear-
ing begins. An institution expecting to receive a large CLS pay-out very late
in the day is likely to build up a significant debit position in the domestic
payment system prior to the CLS pay-out (CLS 2002i). These issues were
identified before the going-live of the system. In 1999, a European G20 bank
explicitly addressed one of these time lag problems between currency cash
flows of CLS Bank requirements and flows of other settlement systems. An
example of such a mismatch is the timing of USD settlement between CLS
Bank requirements and CHIPS, when combined with SIC settlement in CHF
(for explanations regarding CHIPS and SIC see 2.5). If a CLS settlement
member enters into a foreign exchange swap between CHF and USD in order
to transfer a long CHF cash position into USD, and invest the resulting USD
5.6 Liquidity Management Framework 91
in a Money Market instrument settling in CHIPS, settlement takes place as
follows:
• Day one:
Sale of CHF and purchase of USD
Purchase of USD Money Market instrument
• Day two:
Maturity of USD Money Market instrument
Sale of USD and purchase of CHF
The two foreign exchange trades are settled in CLS, while the Money Market
trade settles at CHIPS. Therefore on day one, the first leg of the foreign
exchange swap will require a CLS pay-in of CHF during 07:00-12:00 CET.
USD will be provided at the same time (01:00-06:00 Eastern Standard Time
(EST)). The Money Market trade settling at CHIPS will require the USD
pay-in at Fedwire by 24:00 CET (18:00 EST). On day two, the maturing leg of
the foreign exchange swap again settles in CLS and requires a Fedwire pay-in
between 01:00-06:00 EST. CHF will be released through SIC simultaneously
between 07:00-12:00 CET. However, the payment resulting from the maturing
Money Market trade settling in CHIPS will only be available at 18:00 EST
(24:00 CET). As a result, the settlement member is long in USD on day one
for half a day and short on day two for a similar period. Hence, even though
a member might close its trading day with a balanced currency position (and
therefore with no net liquidity needs), large pay-ins to CLS might be required
because of onesided CLS trades. In other words, net liquidity needs might be
zero for the day if all currency transactions are included in the calculation but
looking only at CLS trades, large pay-ins might be due during the morning
hours of CET generating a net liquidity need during the day. This imparity
of CLS trades and non-CLS trades can be eased by the mechanism of in-out
swaps (CLS 1999f).
5.6.1 In-Out Swaps
Given the complexity of the liquidity management it was agreed that an
appropriate tool is necessary to support the settlement members in managing
their liquidity imbalances that result from having only a sub-set of their
foreign exchange counterparties settling their payment instructions through
CLS. An in-out swap working group was formed in February 2000 to turn
in-out swaps into reality. The in-out swap consists of two foreign exchange
transactions which are equal and opposite. Both are agreed at the same
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time as part of a single swap. They modify the required intra-day cash
flows, thereby leaving the settlement members’ foreign exchange positions
unchanged. In-out swaps recognize that an institution with a large short
position in one CLS currency almost certainly has a large long position of
another currency in CLS. The swap reduces these in-CLS cash positions, as
well as corresponding liquidity positions outside CLS (CLS 2002i). At the
end of 2000 the board reluctantly approved CLS’s role as calculation agent for
in-out swaps. This service was regarded as a tactical solution in the interim
and not as a long-term instrument. Participation of member in in-out swaps
was never mandatory and it remained a strategic objective to find better
solutions for liquidity management. Although regulators did not like the
reintroduction of Herstatt risk, they tolerated it at that moment (CLS 2000b).
From a total risk management point of view the reduction of liquidity risk
was considered more valuable than the abandonment of reintroducing a small
amount of Herstatt risk. Up until now, the in-out swap has evolved into an
integral part of CLS operations (Credit Suisse 2004).
The Mechanism of In-Out Swaps
The in-out swap mechanism involves one foreign exchange trade settled via
CLS Bank in which they sell long positions and buy short positions and
one trade settled outside CLS Bank which is an exact mirror image of the
inside transaction. The point is to relieve time and liquidity pressure as the
outside transaction, unlike the CLS transaction, does not need to match a
specific timing. While the inside transaction reduces the necessary pay-ins,
the outside transaction may be settled at any time during the day of the
local payment system. With this mechanism some credit risk is reintroduced
due to the outside leg (Sawyer 2004). This of course contradicts the goal of
CLS to eliminate credit risk. However, it reimports only a small fraction of
it. Typically, the value of in-out swaps on any day is equal to about 5 to 7
percent of the gross amount settled, but reduces funding needs to about 2.5
percent of the gross amount that is settled for a particular member (Credit
Suisse 2004). There is an upper limit to the volume and value of the in-
out swaps depending on bilateral limits between members and overall caps
concerning the value of a single in-out swap a member is willing to do on a
particular day.
Example of an In-Out Swap
Between 00:00 and 06:30 CET, a settlement member A may enter intra-day
swap transactions with settlement member B (FED 2000).
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Initial positions
According to the pay-in schedule member A must pay in 2’000 USD at time
t and receives a pay out of 3’000 CHF at some later point in time. To cover
the pay in of 2’000 USD it is assumed that member A must raise an intra-day
credit. Member B’s pay-in schedule includes a pay in of 3’300 CHF at time t
and a pay out of 1’500 USD at some time later. It is assumed that member B
needs to take on an intra-day credit to meet its CHF obligation. The current
exchange rate is assumed to be 1.20 CHF/USD. The CLS positions therefore
look as follows:
Member A Member B
USD CHF USD CHF
CLS -2’000 3’000 1.500 -3’300
Transactions
Member A buys 1’000 USD from member B and sells 1’200 CHF to member
B via CLS system. Furthermore member A buys 1’200 CHF from B and
sells 1’000 USD to B. This second transaction is settled outside CLS via the
national settlement systems SIC and CHIPS respectively. Summarized the
positions look as follows:
Member A Member B
USD CHF USD CHF
Initial positions -2’000 3’000 1’500 -3’300
Inside CLS transaction 1’000 -1’200 -1’000 1’200
Total in CLS after in-out swap -1’000 1’800 500 -2’100
Outside CLS transaction -1’000 1’200 1’000 -1’200
Overall total -2’000 3’000 1’500 -3’300
While the overall position of the transactions stays the same, the CLS volume
can significantly be reduced. Member A’s time-critical pay-in obligation is
reduced by half (from USD 2’000 to USD 1’000) and member B’s by more
than one third (from CHF 3’300 to CHF 2’100). Part of the transaction is
transferred to the local settlement systems and thus excluded from the tight
pay-in schedule of the CLS system. The transfer, however, reintroduces a
certain amount of credit risk.
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Current Limitations of In-Out Swaps
Even though in-out swaps are an essential part of the CLS system, not every
settlement member makes use of them. The main reasons for not partici-
pating in in-out swaps are (Credit Suisse 2004): (1) Trading volumes of a
specific member are not worth the effort. (2) As the process for the in-out
swaps takes place in the early morning hours of CET, for some countries it is
difficult to mobilize the necessary work force due to time lags. Not all of the
57 settlement members participate in in-out swaps which somewhat limits the
effectiveness of the mechanism as imbalances between in-out swap users and
non-users may arise (Credit Suisse 2004). As in-out swaps are matched only
on a bilateral basis, the swap will not be executed when the value hits the
bilateral limit of these two counterparties. In this case ”multilateral” in-out
swaps could improve liquidity for the system as a whole (Credit Suisse 2004).
A third party with enough liquidity on its CLS sub-accounts would have to
be involved to match the in-out swap between the original two parties. For
instance, if a member A shows a short position in EUR and is long in USD
and another member B has the opposite positions, an in-out swap is still not
executed if member A and member B have reached their bilateral limit for
in-out swaps. In a world with ”multilateral” in-out swaps a third member
C currently holding positions within the short position limit could do in-out
swaps with both, member A and member B. Even if it might not make sense
for this third member to be involved in this transaction it could still improve
liquidity for the system as a whole and would not change the net pay-ins of
member C.
Top-Up and Contingency Swaps
Besides the in-out swap tool an optional contingency process was established.
Some members did not feel comfortable with only the in-out swap mechanism
on hand and hence, formed the TUCS Group (Top-Up and Contingency
Swap). The TUCS Group is operated manually, mainly via phone calls, it
consists of 9 members and is privately organized. Due to the manual nature
of the process it seems not very efficient. According to the statement of a
member, an appropriate counterparty to enter a swap is only found in about
50 percent of all cases (Credit Suisse 2004).
The Semaphore Group
For the same reasons as the TUCS Group the Semaphore Group was formed.
The Semaphore Group includes 18 members. Its operation is similar to the
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TUCS Group besides being based on a Reuters whiteboard to announce the
funding needs for better matching.
5.6.2 Needs for Other Tools
The need for intra-day liquidity is closely linked to the development of clear-
ing and settlement systems like CLS Bank. Without CLS Bank, for instance,
treasury funding is less complex as flows from all kinds of different products
are interchangeable. It is only the value date of the trades that needs to
be managed by the funding desk. With the CLS system, large volumes of
trades are moved to a separate basket, the CLS account. The original funding
basket is thus split in two discrete baskets that both need separate liquid-
ity management (Credit Suisse 2004). While the market for overnight funds
has evolved in response to these new treasury needs, intra-day markets still
need improvement. CLS Bank with its multi-currency settlement and its
strict timed payment framework challenges the intra-day markets of multiple
currencies. Sophisticated operational infrastructure is required to track and
charge for timed intra-day borrowing (CLS 2002i).
5.7 Chapter Summary
CLS Bank provides a continuous linked settlement service that simultane-
ously settles both payments relating to a foreign exchange transaction. It
thereby eliminates the risk that one payment could be made and the corre-
sponding counter-payment not received (Herstatt risk). Banks may join CLS
as either a settlement member or a user member. Each settlement member
holds a multi-currency account with CLS Bank, while user members do not
have an account and must instead be sponsored by at least one settlement
member. Third party users are not members of CLS Bank and can only set-
tle in CLS Bank through a private arrangement with either a settlement or a
user member. Instructions are settled during a five-hour window when CLS
Bank debits and credits the relevant settlement member’s accounts. While
these debits and credits occur throughout the settlement process, settlement
members fund pay-ins on a net basis hourly between 07:00 and 09:00 CET.
From 09:00 to 12:00 CET the pay-ins and pay-outs are finalized. By 12:00
CET all funds are disbursed back to the settlement members. The hourly
pay-in schedule for the CLS funding imposes new challenges to the intra-day
liquidity management of a settlement member. The difficulties arising from
these changes were identified prior to the start of the CLS system and led to
the creation of the in-out swaps. By shifting particular transactions outside
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CLS Bank, time and liquidity pressure can be reduced. Liquidity manage-
ment, however, is still an issue as in-out swaps were planned to be only an
interim solution.
Chapter 6
Impact on Credit Risk
Based on publicly available data the following chapter presents two ap-
proaches to estimate the effects of CLS on foreign exchange credit risk elim-
ination during settlement. In this chapter, the term credit risk refers to the
definition in chapter 3. For simplification, this chapter uses also the term
settlement risk as a synonym for credit risk.
6.1 Introduction
One of the most often discussed issues in foreign exchange trading is credit
risk arising during settlement (see chapter 3). In 1996 the CPSS (1996) for
the first time explicitly addressed the fact that credit risk exposures in for-
eign exchange settlement are enormous. The report calls on banks, industry
groups as well as on central banks to improve the current settlement practices
to reduce the credit risk exposures. This public demand note from the Bank
for International Settlements set a cornerstone for the foundation of CLS.
As described earlier, the settlement process of CLS is set up as a PvP mech-
anism with credit risk elimination being its main objective. The following
sections propose an estimation of CLS’s achievement of credit risk reduction
during the past years.
6.2 Data Availability
The CPSS (1996) conducted a survey including about 80 banks to estimate
the current credit risk at that time. The report concludes that a banks’s
foreign exchange settlement exposure directly depends on the duration of
exposure of each single trade. If the average duration of exposure is two
business days, this would result in a permanent credit risk exposure of the
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average sum of two day’s foreign exchange trades. It is estimated that for a
large number of banks, this exposure exceeds by far their usual short-term
credit lines. To calculate the total credit risk exposure in the industry, the
sum of individual exposures would provide an indication. Unfortunately, no
figures have been published, neither regarding the value of the trades nor
regarding the exposures that were reported by the banks in the survey. The
only figures available regarding global foreign exchange markets are the ones
reported in the Triennial Central Bank Survey conducted by the BIS (2005
and 2007) and the FX Poll published by Euromoney (2007). In contrast
to the Triennial Central Bank Survey which is based on the estimations of
54 central banks (latest version), the current publication of the FX Poll
by Euromoney includes more than 8’300 foreign exchange service providers.
Both reports release some estimations regarding the global foreign exchange
market.
6.2.1 Global Foreign Exchange Turnover
The latest two Triennial Central Bank Surveys were conducted for the month
of April in the years 2004 and 2007. According to the survey, the average
daily turnover in April 2004 was USD 1’880 billion and USD 3’210 billion in
April 2007. Counting both legs of the transactions, results in an average daily
turnover of USD 3’760 billion and USD 6’420 billion respectively. Figure 6.1
shows the development of the global foreign exchange turnover since 1992.
For the year 2001 and 2004 it shows the currency split for the five most
often traded currencies. The underlying numbers were already introduced
in chapter 3 (table 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3). As mentioned before, the US dollar
is the world’s most important currency. In 2007 it had a global market
share of approximately 43 percent in the foreign exchange market which
means that in 86 percent of all transactions the US dollar was on one side.
The US dollar is followed by Euro, Yen, Pound Sterling, and Swiss Francs.
The currency split did not change significantly over the past years. After
a downturn during the millennium year, total turnover increased by more
than 50 percent from 2001 to 2004 and even by 65 percent from 2004 to 2007
(BIS 2007). The second publication regarding foreign exchange turnover is
Euromoney’s FX poll. The foreign exchange poll 2004 (Euromoney 2004)
reports an annual turnover of USD 24 trillion. If this number is divided
by 260 working days, an average daily turnover of USD 92 billion results.
Counting both legs, the number sums up to USD 184 billion average daily
turnover. This is only a fraction of what is reported in the Triennial Central
Bank Survey for the same year. Although the report comprises more than
3’500 valid respondents, it does not cover the entire market. The latest poll
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Figure 6.1: Average Daily Foreign Exchange Turnover (BIS 2007).
(Euromoney 2007) encompasses more than 8’300 respondents and reports an
annual foreign exchange turnover of about USD 125 trillion which results
in an average daily turnover of USD 960 billion (counting both legs). This
figure is still far below the numbers reported by the Triennial Central Bank
Survey. Euromoney’s poll at least provides an idea on who are the largest
players in the market. With regard to the global foreign exchange market
volume the Triennial Central Bank Survey provides the most cited figures.
6.2.2 CLS Turnover
CLS settlement volume gradually increased since the start of operations in
September 2002. Table 6.1 compares the annual number of transactions
as well as the annual settlement values of 9 different Large Value Transfer
Systems and CLS. The systems that are presented in table 6.1 were selected
based on data availability. There are two main reasons for which the CLS
figures cannot directly be compared to the figures of the other systems: (1) in
contrast to the Large Value Transfer Systems, CLS is not a payment system
but a settlement organization. (2) The fact that the actual fund transfer is
completed by the respective Large Value Transfer Systems and not by CLS
causes the settlement value of CLS to be double counted. In other words, the
transaction values that are settled in CLS must be transferred by any of the
Large Value Transfer Systems and therefore also appear in their transaction
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values. Nevertheless, table 6.1 provides an impression regarding scale and
growth of CLS. CLS’s three-year average growth in both, the number and
value of transactions is significantly higher than for the payment systems.
Comparing the total transaction value of the payment systems to the value
of transactions settled by CLS results in a share of approximately 35 percent
in 2005. 35 percent of the payment systems’ transfers are therefore assumed
to be CLS related. This assumption, however, does not allow for conclusions
regarding CLS’ share in the foreign exchange market. Payment systems do
not exclusively transfer CLS related values but manage a whole range of
different payment types. To estimate CLS’s share in the foreign exchange
market, its settlement value would have to be compared to the portion of
foreign exchange related transfers in the payment systems. According to
their own statements, CLS’s current global market share is estimated to be
about 60 to 70 percent. CLS members are assumed to settle even 95 percent
of their business with each other via CLS.
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2003 2004 2005 3yG
Number of transactions (in million)
LVTS (Canada) 4.1 4.4 4.6 5.9%
CHATS (Hong Kong) 4.5 5.1 5.6 11.6%
BOJ-NET (Japan) 4.9 5.2 5.3 4.0%
MEPS (Singapore) 2.1 2.2 2.5 9.1%
RIX (Sweden) 1.4 1.4 1.6 6.9%
SIC (Switzerland) 192.7 209.1 256.4 15.4%
CHAPS (UK) 31.4 33.0 34.7 5.1%
Fedwire (USA) 123.3 125.1 132.4 3.6%
TARGET (EU) 66.8 69.4 76.3 6.9%
CLS 19.3 32.6 47.9 57.5%
Value of transactions (in billion USD)
LVTS (Canada) 22’500 25’400 30’300 16.0%
CHATS (Hong Kong) 12’400 14’500 16’500 15.4%
BOJ-NET (Japan) 161’900 188’800 196’500 10.2%
MEPS (Singapore) 5’700 5’800 7’600 15.5%
RIX (Sweden) 16’100 16’800 17’600 4.6%
SIC (Switzerland) 33’200 33’800 33’000 -0.3%
CHAPS (UK) 117’300 134’700 140’000 9.2%
Fedwire (USA) 447’300 478’900 518’500 7.7%
TARGET (EU) 478’500 558’100 613’600 13.2%
Total 1’294’900 1’456’800 1’573’600 10.2%
CLS 220’600 379’500 545’800 57.3%
CLS share 17.0% 26.1% 34.7%
3yG = 3-year average growth rate. For payment systems with multiple currencies,
the transaction number and values were added.
Table 6.1: Annual Comparative Turnover (CPSS 2007).
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2004 2005 2006 2007
Annual values (in billion USD)
Global turnover 977’600 1’167’400 1’396’200 1’669’200
CLS turnover *379’500 *545’800 *650’000 780’000
Daily values (in billion USD)
Global turnover *3’760 4’490 5’370 *6’420
CLS turnover 1’460 2’099 2’500 3’000
CLS share 39% 47% 47% 47%
* figures published by BIS or CLS. Calculation assumptions: one year
= 260 days, global turnover growth is constant from 2004 to 2007, CLS
turnover estimates are based on BIS figures and on a 20 percent growth
assumption.
Table 6.2: Credit Risk Elimination Estimates.
6.3 Elimination of Credit Risk
6.3.1 Global Turnover Approach
Under the assumption that the average settlement period during which the
face value of the contracts is at risk, is one working day, then the total
amount at risk can be estimated as the average daily turnover. For April
2004 this results in an aggregated settlement exposure of USD 3’760 billion.
If it is further assumed that all transactions settled via CLS do not include
any credit risk, CLS turnover could be subtracted from global turnover. As
stated in the previous section, the annual CLS turnover for 2004 was reported
as 379’500 billion USD (counting both legs). Dividing this figure by 260
working days results in an estimated daily CLS turnover of 1’460 billion
USD. Risky average turnover per day would then equal 2’300 billion USD
(3’760 billion USD - 1’460 billion USD). It might be concluded that in 2004,
CLS was able to eliminate roughly 40 percent of total settlement risk in
the foreign exchange market. Table 6.2 repeats this calculation for the year
2005, 2006 and 2007 by assuming an average growth rate of 20 percent for
the global foreign exchange turnover. 20 percent is estimated based on the
average growth rate between 2004 and 2007 (BIS 2007). CLS turnover for
2006 is estimated based on the turnover in April 2006 which was provided
by CLS. And to estimate CLS turnover for 2007, a 20 percent growth rate
is assumed. Under these assumptions, CLS can be estimated to eliminate at
about 50 percent of credit risk in the foreign exchange market. It is clear that
this estimation is by far too simple. It does not account for any bilateral or
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multilateral netting arrangements outside CLS that reduce credit risk in the
foreign exchange market. There are no estimations for failure probabilities.
It is likely that failure probabilities vary among institutions which is reflected
in different bilateral limits they set each other. However, even if an average
failure probability for the industry as a whole could be estimated, it can be
expected that the average failure probability of the remaining trades would
change significantly when all CLS trades are excluded. This is because CLS
members can be assumed to be rather large and strong industry players.
Additionally, the expectations of large increases in global foreign exchange
turnover as well as in CLS turnover weakens the significance of the figures. As
CLS volumes are growing faster than the global foreign exchange market, it
can at least be expected that global settlement risk exposures are decreasing.
As mentioned before, CLS today is most likely to eliminate more than 50
percent of settlement risk in foreign exchange markets. These are only the
most obvious reasons for the weakness of such an estimation. The main
reason for the lack of better information is the absence of comprehensive
data availability. An alternative way to estimate the elimination of credit
risk due to the introduction of CLS would be to look at an individual bank
level.
6.3.2 Individual Bank Approach
Instead of estimating settlement risk on a global level, settlement exposures
for individual banks are estimated. Unfortunately, banks in general do not
explicitly report on their settlement risk exposures. An exception is UBS. In
the UBS (2007) annual report, the bank states that it was able to increase
trade volumes without increasing settlement risks to the same extent. The
main reason for a reduction in settlement risk is the elimination of credit risk
due to an increase in CLS volume. UBS settles about 60 percent of its total
foreign exchange volume via CLS and reports a total settlement exposure of
22 percent of gross trade volume. Assuming that the 60 percent CLS vol-
ume is settlement risk free, another 18 percent must obviously be eliminated
by other means such as netting arrangements. According to the latest FX
Poll by Euromoney (2007) UBS is one of the most important players in the
global foreign exchange market. It might therefore be a viable assumption
that other CLS settlement members playing in the same league regarding
foreign exchange trade volume, show a similar risk exposure profile. In the
Euromoney (2007) report, the 20 largest market participants (all CLS set-
tlement members) account for more than 90 percent of total turnover. This
leads to the assumption, that the volume of all CLS settlement members to-
gether represents a substantial part of the global foreign exchange turnover.
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It might then be estimated that the global settlement risk elimination by CLS
is close to 60 percent. It is obvious that this estimation suffers from similar
weaknesses as the global turnover approach. Publicly available data regard-
ing individual bank’s exposures is rare and imprecise. The individual bank
approach, however, benefits from more current information as it is based
on UBS’s latest annual report. A more qualitative approach is introduced
by TowerGroup that conducted a CLS member survey (TowerGroup 2004).
They had 41 responses from settlement members and 137 from third parties.
To the question whether CLS has reduced settlement risk, about 80 percent
of the respondents answered with a clear yes. None of the settlement mem-
bers responded with no. Third parties classified risk reduction as the most
important factor for the decision to participate in CLS. Altogether these dif-
ferent statements denote a significant increase in CLS’ market penetration
and a substantial reduction of foreign exchange settlement risk. This points
to the fact that CLS has well achieved its main objective. It satisfied the
request called on the industry by the Bank for International Settlements in
1996 and helped the market to grow further.
6.4 Chapter Summary
The main objective of CLS is to eliminate credit risk. This chapter offers
some insights to the achievements of CLS in this regard. Although esti-
mations of global credit risk exposures are rather vague, an analysis at an
individual bank level provides some indications. The figures suggest credit
risk eliminations of roughly 40 percent of total foreign exchange turnover
in 2004 to about 60 percent today. The main problem of the estimations
presented in this chapter is the lack of data availability. Even though the
evidence from publicly available figures cannot be considered strong, there is
some indication that CLS has well achieved its objective to reduce settlement
risk in a globally growing market.
Chapter 7
CLS Settlement Structure
The previous chapter provided estimations regarding the achievement of
credit risk elimination in the global foreign exchange market. It leads to
the conclusion that risks could be lowered substantially since the introduc-
tion of CLS. As CLS members were able to increase their trading volume
and value by more than the corresponding settlement risk, CLS can be as-
sumed to be a driver for market growth. The number of CLS participants,
in particular the number of third parties, has grown significantly and might
have affected trade relationships among each other. This chapter presents
an empirical study regarding the changes in trade relationships among CLS
participants. Based on a network model and a unique data set provided by
CLS, the structure of trade partners settling their foreign exchange deals
in CLS is analyzed over time. The chapter starts off with an overview on
network literature and a description of the relevant network statistics before
introducing the data set.
7.1 Network Literature Review
Network theory is based on concepts of discrete mathematics known as graph
theory. The classical model of network is called random graph. It basi-
cally consists of a fixed number of nodes and a randomly distributed number
of links between these nodes. This kind of network was first described by
Rapoport & Solomonoff (1951) in the early 1950s. Ten years later, Erdo¨s
& Re´nyi (1960) published a series of papers discussing the random graph
in depth. Their work is considered the most influential to current network
science (Newman, Baraba´si & Watts 2006). During the same years, based on
random graph theory, the sociological community started to develop a new
class of random graph networks, the so called small-world networks. The typ-
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ical characteristic of this class of networks is that every node can be reached
from every other node in only a few steps. Pool & Kochen (1978)1 analyzed
patterns of social contacts and with it, set the base for many other articles
in the area of social networks (e.g. empirical studies by Milgram (1967) and
Travers & Milgram (1969)). Also information science soon started to make
use of small-world network models. Price (1965) was the first to study the
network of citations between scientific papers. Today, not only social and ci-
tation networks but also the connectivity of the internet or gene networks can
well be described by small-world networks (Watts & Strogatz 1998). More
recently, enhanced data availability enabled empirical studies of complex real
networks such as the World Wide Web or biochemical networks. Simple net-
work structures such as the random graph turned out not to be powerful
enough to understand and quantify the structure of these complex networks
found in the real world. One of the most famous works was conducted by
Albert, Jeong & Baraba´si (1999) who described the degree distribution of
the World Wide Web approximately as a power law distribution. Baraba´si
& Albert (1999) introduced the term of scale-free networks and set a new di-
rection for network research (Newman et al. 2006). A large number of papers
by various authors dealing with scale-free networks has been published ever
since. In the wake of the extensive scale-free network research during the
past years, the banking and finance community started to make use of these
models. Payment- and settlement systems, shareholder ownership, as well as
borrowing and lending relationships can well be described and analyzed based
on the topology of scale-free networks. Their topological properties allow for
conclusions regarding resilience and contagion in case of systemic failure or
attacks. Important work in that context has been conducted by Albert &
Baraba´si (2000) who found that scale-free networks display a high degree of
robustness but are extremely vulnerable to systematic attacks. Their and
other findings regarding network topology were adapted to several different
aspects of corporate dynamics and the banking system. A selection of dif-
ferent publications is summarized in the following. Based on a data set of
the O¨sterreichische Nationalbank, Boss, Elsinger, Summer & Thurner (2003)
conduct an empirical study of the network structure of the Austrian inter-
bank market. They show that the distribution of mutual credit relations can
be modelled as a scale-free network. A social network approach was used by
Battiston, Bonabeau & Weisbuch (2003) to predict the decision dynamics
outcome in corporate boards. Iori, Masi, Precup, Gabbi & Caldarelli (2005)
use network statistics to analyze the Italian overnight money market. They
look at the lending and borrowing activities of banks with different sizes. It
1The article was written in 1958 but not published until later.
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allows them to draw conclusions regarding the optimization of institutional
settings to minimize the risk of contagion and systemic failure in the banking
system. Rossi & Taylor (2005) model the Brazilian inter-city banking rela-
tions as an interlocking network. It allows them to construct cartograms to
show the relative importance of different Brazilian cities regarding domestic
and international banking activity. Garlaschelli, Battiston, Castri, Servedio
& Caldarelli (2005) propose a network description of large market invest-
ments. In their model, stocks and shareholders are represented by nodes
while the links between these nodes are defined as the corresponding stock
ownerships. They find that the distribution of assets held and the invested
wealth follow a power law. A publication by Inaoka, Ninomiya, Taniguchi,
Shimizu & Takayasu (2004) analyzes the network structure of financial trans-
actions, using the logged data of transactions via BOJ-Net. They show that
interactions between financial institutions display fractal structure2. The
work done by Sorama¨ki, Bech, Arnold, Glass & Beyeler (2006) is based on
a similar idea. They explore the network topology of interbank payments
transferred via Fedwire. A set of network statistics is applied to determine
weather the properties of the payment network has changed since the attacks
of September 11, 2001. Lublo´y (2006) describes the topology of the Hungar-
ian large value transfer system and finds a permanency over time. This is
not a complete list of work conducted in this area but provides an impression
of the current empirical research in the area of scale-free network statistics
applied to financial economics.
7.2 Network Analysis
Mathematics and physics have proposed a broad set of topological statis-
tics to characterize complex networks (Albert & Baraba´si (2002), Newman
(2003), Newman (2004) and Barthe´lemy, Barrat, Pastor-Satorras & Vespig-
nani (2005)) which have been adapted by the economic community (Iori et al.
(2005) and Sorama¨ki et al. (2006)). The following section presents a set of
definitions that are used to analyze the subsequent network model. A net-
work is a set of items, that are called nodes, with connections between them,
called links. In most mathematical literature the term graph is used instead
of network. Binary networks have links that are either present or not. This
kind of network can be represented by (0, 1) or a binary matrix. The matrix,
called the adjacency matrix A is defined as an N ×N matrix where N is the
2Fractal is a shape that is recursively constructed and hence appears similar at all scales
of magnification. For mathematical definition see ”Benoˆıt Mandelbrot, 1982: the Fractal
Geometry of Nature”.
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number of nodes in the network. If there is a link from a node ni to a node
nj, then the element aij of the matrix A is 1, otherwise it is zero:
aij =
{
1 if ni and nj are connected,
0 otherwise.
(7.1)
In this case the links aij are unweighted. They are simply either existent or
non-existent. In a weighted network, links have weights attached to them-
selves. Mathematically, such a network can be represented by an adjacency
matrix with entries that are equal to the weights on the links:
wij = weight of connection from ni to nj (7.2)
The most basic characteristic of a network is its size N , defined as the
number of nodes in the network. Each node has its own degree ki defined
as:
ki =
∑
j∈V(i)
aij (7.3)
j ∈ V(i) represents the set of all neighbor nodes of i. Hence, the degree of
a node i is the number of links connected to this particular node i. Links
can either be directed or undirected. In a network with directed links, nodes
have both, an in-degree and an out-degree. They represent the numbers of
incoming and outgoing links respectively. Along with the degree of a node, an
important measure of the network properties in terms of the actual weights
is obtained by looking at the strength of the nodes. The strength si of a
node is the result of the sum of all weighted links connected to that node:
si =
∑
j∈V(i)
wij (7.4)
The connectivity ci of a node is given by the number of links relative to
the number of possible links in the network. It is hence the unconditional
probability that two nodes are connected by a link:
ci =
ki
(n− 1) (7.5)
The probability distribution that a node has exactly degree k is the so called
degree distribution p(k). It is a function describing the total number of
nodes with a given degree. Equivalently, p(k) is the probability that a node
chosen at random has degree k. The degree distribution of a network can be
plotted by drawing a histogram of the degrees of all nodes in the network.
The degree distribution of most networks observed in the real world are
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found to be highly right skewed. This means that there are a few nodes
with a degree number far above average. Formally, the degree data is best
presented by a plot of the cumulative distribution function P (k) which is the
probability that the degree of a node is greater than or equal to k:
P (k) =
∞∑
k′=k
p(k′) (7.6)
The distribution that is most common to real world networks follows a power
law. Networks featuring power law degree distributions are often referred to
as scale-free networks3. Most of their nodes are of low degree but a minority
exhibits a high degree and can be interpreted as highly connected hubs.
7.3 The Data Set
The data set for this analysis was provided by CLS Bank. It includes trade
values transmitted to CLS for settlement in dollar equivalents of 54 settle-
ment members and 391 third party users aggregated on a daily basis for the
month of April in 2006. It is important to understand that the data is re-
ported on a bilateral gross basis. This means that there are three different
types of records: the daily gross settlement value between (1) two settlement
members, (2) a settlement member and a third party, and (3) two third par-
ties. It does not provide information regarding the settlement arrangements
between settlement members and third parties. In other words, a settlement
relation between a settlement member and a third party (record type 2) does
not necessarily indicate that this particular settlement member is the third
party’s settlement bank. It only indicates that this particular settlement
member has a trade relationship with that third party. The same is true
for record type 3. On an operational level, both third parties must settle
via their settlement bank as they do not have direct access to CLS. This
operational level is not reflected in the data set. It only reflects settlement
relations stemming from trade relations. To analyze the development of this
trade relationship structure over time, the April 2006 data is compared to the
transaction data of April 2005, 2004, and 2003. The month of April as point
of reference was chosen to be consistent with the surveys of the Bank for
International Settlements. Yet, the figures reported by the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements cannot directly be compared to the figures presented here.
3The term scale-free refers to any functional form f(x) that remains unchanged when
the independent variable x is rescaled. Since the only solutions to f(ax) = bf(x) are
power law forms, the term power law and scale-free are synonymous in this context.
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The latter represent settlement values while the former represents trade val-
ues. The trades underlying the settlement values may have been completed
several days or even months ago. To apply network statistics to these set-
tlement transactions, the following is defined. The participants of CLS form
the nodes of the network. The nodes are categorized by sm-, and tp-nodes.
Settlement members are represented by sm-nodes, and third party users are
reflected by tp-nodes. A link between any two nodes exists if the correspond-
ing CLS participants have settled at least one foreign exchange transaction
via CLS. For a particular settlement transaction, both nodes involved can be
seen as a sender and receiver node, because each settlement transaction has
two legs. Neglecting currency rate fluctuations, the value of these two legs is
equal. Each settlement transaction, therefore, consists of a pair of directed
links with equal value. For simplification, the following analysis only looks
at undirected links, or in other words, only at one side of the transaction.
To do so, each node is interpreted as a sender node.
7.4 Research Design
To keep the analysis straight forward and to avoid over interpretation, a set
of basic suppositions is defined. Due to the fact that the data is encoded,
it does not allow for a detailed analysis regarding specific CLS participants.
As a consequence, the following suppositions are intentionally kept at an
elementary level.
1. The largest part of settlement value is generated by settlement mem-
bers.
2. Large settlement members grow even larger in terms of settlement value
and number of trade partners.
3. Settlement members with large overall settlement values deal with a
larger number of third parties.
4. Settlement members with many trade relations in total, deal with a
larger number of third parties.
5. Settlement members with a large number of third parties tend to attract
more third parties as trade partners.
6. New third parties tend to be smaller than already existing ones.
After having presented the data’s statistics, the subsequent sections elaborate
on these suppositions. Section 7.7.1 is dedicated to supposition 1 and 2,
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2003 2004 2005 2006
Settlement Members
Quantity 53 54 57 54
Total gross value 15’400 25’500 36’800 43’000
Mean 290 470 620 800
Median 120 250 340 480
Max 1’680 2’210 3’110 3’770
Min 0 0 0 0
Stdv 380 540 730 900
Third Parties
Quantity 36 118 257 391
Total gross value 600 2’700 5’000 8’200
Mean 17 23 19 20
Median 0.9 3 0.9 0.2
Max 180 720 880 1’040
Min 0 0 0 0
Stdv 40 80 70 80
Except for ”Quantity”, all values in billion USD.
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics.
section 7.7.2 treats supposition 3, 4, and 5. While these suppositions are
from the settlement members’ point of view, section 7.7.3 changes side and
takes the view of the third parties.
7.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 7.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the data set. The number
of settlement members varies between 53 in 2003 and 57 in 2005. Besides
a few new settlement members, merger and acquisition activities are the
main reason for the number of settlement members to vary. The gross value
(GV) that was settled by settlement members in the month of April 2006
was about 43 trillion USD. Gross value was increasing year by year. The
so called ramp-up pricing (see p.65) assured that settlement members would
push CLS transactions during the first years of CLS’s operations. This is
reflected in high value growth rates in 2003 and 2004. From April 2003 to
April 2004 gross value increased by more than 60 percent. Even though the
gross value growth rate is declining, it was still around 17 percent from 2005
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to 2006. In April 2006 each settlement member completed transactions worth
around 800 billion USD on average. As indicated by mean and median, gross
value seems not to be equally distributed among the settlement members.
The median being lower than the mean suggests a right skewed distribution
of gross value. As displayed in figure 7.1, 75 percent of the settlement mem-
bers settled gross values less than one trillion USD each. This accounts for
only one third of total value settled. At the other tail of the distribution
two settlement members settled more than 3 trillion USD. The three largest
settlement members generated 25 percent of total gross value in April 2006.
The characteristics of this gross value distribution are similar in each year.
Average and median gross value have grown roughly in line with total gross
value. The number of third parties considerably increased from 36 in April
2003 to 391 in April 2006. Total gross settlement value increased sharply
from April 2003 to April 2004 and grew in line with the number of third
parties thereafter. In April 2006 around 8 trillion USD were settled by third
parties. Mean and median, being far apart from each other, stay around
the same levels over the sample years. As figure 7.2 shows, the skewness of
the gross value distribution of third parties is much stronger than the one for
settlement members. In April 2006, 75 percent of the third parties accounted
for only 3 percent of total gross value. The largest 10 percent of the third
parties account for more than 80 percent of value. Or to put it differently,
almost 90 percent of all third parties generate settlement values less than 55
billion USD. The largest third party accounts for almost twice as much of
total value as the second largest third party in the sample. These figures sug-
gest strong power law characteristics. This means that the majority of third
parties generates low volumes while a relatively small group of third parties
generates a major portion of total value. This is true for all years included
in the sample. It seems that among settlement members as well as among
third parties, the value distribution characteristics have not changed much
over time. The distributions are right skewed in all years and do not indicate
any shifts in the value structure within the group of settlement members or
third parties. In each year, relatively small groups of settlement members
and third parties generated significant portions of the respective settlement
value.
7.6 Network Statistics
This section presents the data set in terms of the network statistics introduced
in section 7.2 and offers a visualization of the network. In April 2006, the
network consists of 54 sm-nodes and 391 tp-nodes which results in an overall
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Figure 7.1: GV Distribution of Settlement Members in April 2006.
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Figure 7.2: GV Distribution of Third Parties in April 2006.
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2003 2004 2005 2006
Size 89 172 314 445
Degree
Mean 40 49 41 37
Median 49 45 18 10
Min 1 1 1 1
Max 72 128 196 285
Stdv 25 39 48 53
Strength (in billion USD)
Mean 180 164 131 115
Median 48 13 3 1
Min 32 0 0 0
Max 1’680 2’210 3’110 3’770
Stdv 323 370 397 409
Connectivity
Mean 45% 29% 13% 8%
Median 56% 26% 6% 2%
Min 1% 1% 0% 0%
Max 82% 75% 63% 64%
Stdv 28% 23% 15% 12%
Table 7.2: Network Statistics.
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Figure 7.3: Degree Distribution in April 2006.
network size of 445 nodes. Table 7.2 shows the relevant network statistics
from 2003 to 2006. The descriptive statistics in table 7.1 already showed the
increase in the network’s size. From 89 nodes in 2003 the network grew to
445 nodes in 2006. The degree of a node represents the number of trade part-
ners that a particular settlement member or third party had a relation with
in April of the respective year. The minimum degree, consequently, must be
at least one. It seems that after 2004, mean and median degree start to drift
apart. While the average number of trade partners seems to stay relatively
constant, the median degree decreases. This development might indicated
that the new nodes in the network are of relatively low degree. This seems
to be a reasonable interpretation considering that the new nodes are predom-
inantly third party nodes of which it can be assumed that they are less active
in trading than settlement members. Figure 7.3 shows the degree distribution
for April 2006. Half of all the nodes have a degree lower than 10 while about
15 percent of the nodes have a degree that is higher than 100. The degrees
cannot be considered as approximately normal distributed. In fact, the distri-
bution shows rather power law characteristics. The strength of a node is the
sum of its weighted links. A link represents a trade partner relationship and
the corresponding weight equals the gross value that is exchanged via this
trade relation. Average node strength, therefore, equals the average gross
settlement value per participant. Mean and median being far apart indicate
that there is a small group of nodes with high strength while the majority of
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nodes are of low strength. This characteristic was already observed by means
of the descriptive statistics in section 7.5. In figures, this means that about
90 percent of all nodes have a strength that is lower than 350 billion USD.
This sums up to a little more than 10 percent of gross settlement value. In
contrast, the top ten percent of nodes in terms of strength account for almost
90 percent of gross settlement value. The network is highly heterogeneous
in terms of its nodes’ strengths. The connectivity of the network was higher
in 2003 and decreased gradually each year. In 2006 the network shows a
connectivity of 8 percent. This figure can be interpreted as the probability
that a node has a link to any other particular node in the network. It is clear
that over time, the connectivity shows the same development as the degree
distribution. Mean and median are drifting farther apart from year to year,
indicating the development of power law characteristics. The graphical rep-
resentation of the network underlines this impression. Due to the fact that
a graph of the entire network rather evokes the notion of a massive cotton
wool ball, a minimum transaction value had to be set to reduce the number
of links. Figure 7.6 and 7.7 at the end of the chapter, show organic layouts of
the network in 2003 and 2006 with a minimum link weight of 5 billion USD.
The term organic layout refers to the type of graph layout. It arranges nodes
as if they were physical objects repulsing each other. The links between the
nodes hold them together. Heavier links are colored darker. The position of
a node is determined by the number of links of that node. Nodes with more
links are located closer to the center of the network. The resulting graphical
configuration of the nodes and links represents an equilibrium of their forces.
As mentioned earlier, each node is interpreted as a sender node which results
in onesided links between them. If both legs of the transactions would be
displayed, the links would be two-sided and their weight would double. The
direction of the links, therefore, does not provide any additional information.
The graphs clearly show the large growth of the network from 2003 to 2006.
Nodes that were central in 2003, are also central in 2006. Peripheral nodes
in 2003 seem to have moved towards the center and were replaced by new
nodes, including also tp-nodes. Additionally, strong triangular relationships
among the central sm-nodes evolved and some of them clearly show hub char-
acteristics. In summary, the graphical representation confirms at first glance
what was suggested by statistics. The following section takes a closer look
at the two different types of nodes. To do so, the network is split into two
subgraphs. The first consists of all sm-nodes, the second includes the set of
tp-nodes.
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2003 2004 2005 2006
SM Subgraph Connectivity
Mean 89% 96% 88% 92%
Median 94% 98% 93% 96%
Min 6% 49% 7% 13%
Max 100% 100% 100% 100%
Stdv 19% 8% 17% 16%
TP-Connectivity
Mean 27% 36% 26% 24%
Median 31% 36% 28% 23%
Min 0% 1% 2% 3%
Max 61% 64% 55% 59%
Stdv 17% 16% 14% 14%
Table 7.3: SM-Subgraph Statistics.
7.6.1 SM Subgraph
The network size for the sm subgraph varies from 53 to 57 nodes. Table 7.3
shows the connectivity statistics for the subgraph and additionally displays
the tp-connectivity which is defined as the connectivity of sm-nodes to tp-
nodes. Strictly speaking the latter is not a statistic of the sm subgraph but
describes the connectivity of the sm-nodes with regard to the tp-nodes. It
is the number of third parties that a particular settlement member deals
with in relation to the number of all third parties that it could deal with.
A settlement member that has trade relations with each single third party
would show a tp-connectivity of 100 percent. Settlement members that do
not trade with any third party show a tp-connectivity of zero. The tp con-
nectivity in table 7.3 indicates relatively stable connectivity over time. In
2006, settlement members had around 90 trade relations with third parties in
average. The maximum number was 232 third party trade relations for one
settlement member, the minimum 10. Figure 7.4 shows the corresponding
degree distribution. Unlike most other distributions presented earlier, this
one does not show power law characteristics. Third party trade relations
rather convey the impression of being normally distributed among the settle-
ment members. Coming back to the first part of table 7.3, it shows a highly
connected sm-network. A major part of the settlement members had trade
relations with most other settlement members in the network. This is not a
surprise, as settlement members can be considered as large market players.
Nevertheless, there are a few settlement members that show less than 10 re-
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Figure 7.4: TP-Degree Distribution in April 2006.
lations to other settlement members. Neither the subgraph connectivity nor
the tp-connectivity points to significant structural changes over time.
7.6.2 TP Subgraph
The subgraph consisting of tp-nodes grows significantly from 36 nodes in
2003 to 391 nodes in 2006. As displayed in table 7.4, the average subgraph
connectivity is low compared to the sm-subgraph. In average, a third party
has trade relationships with only 9 other third parties. The median, laying
below the mean, indicates that it is a small group of third parties that sup-
ports numerous trade relations with other third parties. Even though there
are several third parties that do not trade with any other third party, the
maximum number of trade relations among two third parties was 143 in 2006.
The sm-connectivity is defined as the number of trade relations that a third
party maintains with settlement members compared to the total number of
settlement members. Table 7.4 shows that in each year at least one third
party did not have any trade relations with settlement members. At the
other end, at least one third party had relations with all settlement members
except one. In average, third parties had around 13 trade relations to settle-
ment members in 2006. Figure 7.5 underlines these characteristics. The trade
relations to settlement members cannot be considered normally distributed
among third parties. The larger part of third parties maintains relatively few
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2003 2004 2005 2006
TP Subgraph Connectivity
Mean 6% 8% 4% 2%
Median 0% 3% 0% 0%
Min 0% 0% 0% 0%
Max 34% 49% 31% 37%
Stdv 9% 10% 6% 5%
SM-Connectivity
Mean 27% 36% 26% 24%
Median 19% 31% 9% 13%
Min 0% 0% 0% 0%
Max 81% 94% 95% 98%
Stdv 27% 31% 27% 27%
Table 7.4: TP-Subgraph Statistics.
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Figure 7.5: SM-Degree Distribution in April 2006.
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relations to settlement members while about 10 percent of the third parties
has relations to more than 40 different settlement members. Looking at the
development over time, again shows mean and median drifting apart since
2005. This observation might be considered consistent with what was stated
in section 7.6. It seems reasonable to assume that new third parties with
rather low sm-connectivity have entered the network since 2005. In general,
the subgraph perspective confirmed substantial differences in the structure of
sm-nodes and tp-nodes. While the network of sm-nodes is highly connected
and does not seem to undergo significant shifts over time, the network of tp-
nodes is of relatively low connection and alters its degree distribution over
time. In contrast to the sm-nodes that show relatively normal distributed
connections to third parties, the tp-nodes rather show power law characteris-
tics in terms of the number of settlement member trade partners. Figure 7.8
at the end of the chapter, offers a graphical approach to these suggestions.
It represents an organic layout with a minimum link weight of 2 billion USD.
The visualization makes clear that the tp-subgraph (tp-nodes are marked
in red, corresponding links in blue) tend to be located at the periphery of
the network while sm-nodes form the core. There are a few tp-nodes that
are highly connected and, referring to their location in the network, could
just as well be sm-nodes. The following section provides further insights
into the structure suggested by the statistics and deals in particular with the
assumptions presented in section 7.4.
7.7 Further Results
7.7.1 Development of SM Size
This section deals with supposition 1 and 2 that were introduced in section 7.4
(p. 110). Supposition 1 in the research design can easily be confirmed by
looking at table 7.1 or the graphical representations of the network. The
largest part of gross settlement value is generated by settlement members.
As figure 7.1 already demonstrated, gross value is not equally distributed
among settlement members. The 5 largest settlement members account for
more than 50 percent of gross value. The fraction of value that is produced
by third parties is proportionately small. It was 6 percent in April 2003,
but grew in each of the following years. In April 2004, 2005, and 2006 third
party value contingent amounted to 11, 14, and 20 percent respectively. As
third party value seems to grow much faster than settlement member value,
it might be a reasonable expectation that the portion of third party value
will exceed 20 percent of total settlement value in the next years. For the
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GV03 GV06 GVg06 GVg03-06 k06 kg03-06
SM1 1’700 (1) 3’000 (3) 3% (30) 21% (44) 200 (9) 142% (15)
SM2 1’500 (2) 3’800 (1) 21% (19) 36% (34) 254 (2) 155% (5)
SM3 1’100 (3) 2’200 (6) 10% (26) 27% (41) 243 (4) 151% (8)
SM4 1’100 (4) 3’500 (2) 54% (6) 48% (21) 285 (1) 160% (4)
SM5 1’100 (5) 2’600 (4) 25% (13) 34% (36) 227 (5) 154% (6)
Rankings in parentheses. GV03/06 = gross value 2003/2006 in billion USD. GVg06/03-
06 = gross value growth from 2005-2006/2003-2006. k06 = degree 2006. kg03-06 =
average degree growth from 2003 to 2006.
Table 7.5: Top 5 Settlement Members.
second supposition, the correlation of gross value, gross value growth, degree,
and degree growth is analyzed. Table 7.5 summarizes the top 5 settlement
members in terms of gross value. Settlement members that were not existent
in at least one of the four years were excluded from this part of the analysis.
Thereby, the sample was reduced to 50 settlement members. The table is
sorted by gross value in April 2003 and additionally shows gross value in
April 2006, the corresponding growth rate from 2005 to 2006, the average
growth rate from 2003 to 2006, as well as the corresponding degree in April
2006, and the average growth in degree from 2003 to 2006. The figures in
parentheses indicate the respective rank. The correlation matrix displayed
in table 7.6 serves as the basis to explore whether large settlement members
grow even larger in terms of gross settlement value. It relates the gross value
in 2003 to the one in 2006 as well as to different growth periods and to the
number and growth of the degrees. Looking at table 7.6, reveals that besides
the correlation of gross value in 2003 and 2006 and the correlation of the
gross value and the degree, none of the coefficients is large enough to be con-
sidered as statistically significant. A correlation of 0.88 between gross value
in 2003 and gross value in 2006 indicates that settlement members which
already had large gross settlement values in April 2003 tend to have large
gross settlement values in April 2006. Though not statistically significant,
the average value growth from 2003 to 2006 shows negative signs when re-
lated to the gross value in 2003 and 2006. As mentioned before, settlement
members that were large in 2003, tend also to be large in 2006 but do not
explicitly show higher value growth, neither from 2003 to 2006 nor in the
year 2006. Average value growth from 2003 to 2006 is not significantly cor-
related to the value growth in 2006. This suggests that settlement members
with high average growth over the four year period are not the same ones
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GV03 GV06 GVg06 GVg03-06 k06
GV06 0.88
GVg06 -0.03 0.13
GVg03-06 -0.27 -0.07 0.05
k06 0.72 0.86 0.00 0.00
kg03-06 0.01 0.36 0.17 0.31 0.38
GV03/06 = gross value 2003/2006 in billion USD. GVg06/03-06 = gross value growth
from 2005-2006/2003-2006. k06 = degree 2006. kg03-06 = average degree growth from
2003 to 2006.
Table 7.6: Correlation Matrix.
that have experienced high growth in 2006. It seems that in each year there
are alternating settlement members with high value growth rates. According
to table 7.6 there is a positive correlation between the degree in 2006 and
the gross value in 2003 (0.72) and even stronger in 2006 (0.86). Settlement
members with large settlement values in 2003 and 2006 tend to maintain a
large number of degrees in 2006. Looking at the average degree growth over
the four year period does not reveal significant correlations with any of the
other variables. The coefficients of zero for value growth and number of de-
gree indicate that it is not the settlements members with high value growth
that have large degrees. Furthermore, settlement members with high value
growth do not necessarily also grow in the number of degrees. In addition,
settlement members that show large degrees in 2006 do not seem to have
high degree growth rates over the four year period. In summary, table 7.6
suggests that in 2006, settlement members with large gross settlement val-
ues tend to have high degrees and that these settlement members already
had similar characteristics in 2003. Regarding supposition 2 in section 7.4
(p. 110) the following conclusions might be drawn: (1) large settlement mem-
bers still show positive value growth rates and thus grow larger. But it is
not the largest settlement members that have the highest value growth rates.
(2) Larger settlement members in terms of settlement value always had more
trade partners. In contrast, smaller settlement members tend to have higher
growth rates for both, gross value and degree. Based on these observations,
the development of settlement member size is assumed to stay relatively con-
stant. As the graphical representation of the network already showed, nodes
that were central in 2003 kept their position up to 2006 and increased the
number of links as well as their weight. The size ranking, therefore, is not
likely to change in the short run.
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2003 2004 2005 2006
ρ1 0.62 0.61 0.67 0.86
ρ2 0.62 0.55 0.58 0.80
ρ3 0.88 0.97 0.89 0.99
ρ4 0.56 057 -0.01 0.10
ρ5 -0.46 -0.30 -0.18
ρ1 = GV sm ∼ tpk,
ρ2 = (GV sm/k) ∼ tpk,
ρ3 = k ∼ tpk,
ρ4 = tpk ∼ (tpGV/GV ),
ρ5 = tpk ∼ tpkgrowth/avg.growth.
Table 7.7: SM Business Structure Correlation.
7.7.2 SM Business Structure
This section treats supposition 3, 4, and 5 that were presented in section 7.4
(p. 110). It provides insights into the third party business structure by look-
ing at the development of the relationships between settlement members and
third parties. It must be emphasized once again that the linkage between
settlement members and third parties in this context does not reveal any in-
formation regarding the operational settlement relation between them. The
observed relations merely represent trade relationships and not settlement
arrangement. For the same reasons as in the previous section, the sample
was reduced to 50 settlement members. Referring to supposition 3, settle-
ment member gross value is compared to the number of third parties that
they maintained relations with. As already confirmed for supposition 2,
larger settlement members show higher degrees, indicating that they have
more overall trade relations than smaller settlement members. So far it was
not distinguished between trade relations to other settlement members or to
third parties. ρ1 in table 7.7 shows the correlation coefficient for settlement
member gross value and the number of third party relations. The number
of third party relations is defined as the third party degree. Except for 2006
the correlation cannot be considered to be significant. Hence, it is yet not
clear whether there is dependency between gross value and third party de-
gree. Because the gross value is likely to be dependent on the number of
total trade relations, gross value is divided by its corresponding degree to
receive a relative gross value. Computing the correlations between these rel-
ative gross values and the third party degrees results in ρ2 that is displayed
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in table 7.7. It shows the same picture as for absolute gross values. Before
2006, there was no significant correlation between settlement member size
and number of third party relations. Consequently, supposition 3 cannot
be confirmed for these years. Only for 2006 it might be stated that larger
settlement members in terms of total settlement value deal with a larger
number of third parties. Supposition 4 refers to the question whether there
is a relation between the total number of trade partners and the number
of third party trade partners. The idea is the same as for supposition 3,
except that size is redefined as number of trade partners instead of gross
value. As ρ3 in table 7.7 shows, the correlation of total degree and third
party degree is very high. This is not a surprise. The total degree is mainly
driven by the third party degree due to the fact that the settlement members
are highly connected (see table 7.3). For this reason it seems more interest-
ing to suppose that settlement members with a large number of third party
trade partners also generate a large fraction of their gross value with those
third parties. A positive correlation might indicate that there are settlement
members with a third party focus. The average fraction of settlement mem-
ber gross value that was generated by third party relations increased from
3 percent in 2003 to 16 percent in 2006. ρ4 shows the correlations between
these fractions and the number of third party connections. No significant
dependency is detected. The fraction of the settlement members’ gross value
that they generate with third parties does not depend on the number of third
parties they deal with. In 2006 for instance, there are three settlement mem-
bers that generate more than 40 percent of their total value with relations
to third parties. The number of third parties that they deal with, however,
varies between 12 and 113. In summary, supposition 4 can be confirmed,
though it might not provide much additional information. The fact that
there is no correlation between the number of third party relationships and
the business value generated with them seems somewhat surprising. It might
indicated that the relations between settlement members and third parties
are divers and rather randomly distributed. This will further be explored in
the context of supposition 6. Supposition 5 treats the question whether some
concentration process in third party relations can be observed. It is analyzed
if settlement members with high third party degrees also show large growth
in the third party degree relative to total third party degree growth in that
year. ρ5 in table 7.7 does not show any significant correlation between these
two factors. Settlement members with many third party relationships do not
show larger growth in new third party relationships for the following year.
Supposition 5 can thus not be confirmed. The tp-degree distribution of
the sm subgraph that was presented in figure 7.4 supports this picture. It
does not show strong skewness in settlement members’ third party degrees.
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If a concentration would have proceeded during the last years, the distribu-
tion would rather show power law characteristics. Summarizing the insights
from supposition 1 to 5 leads to the conclusion that today settlement mem-
bers account for about 80 percent of gross CLS settlement value. Settlement
member value is highly concentrated as the 5 largest settlement members ac-
count for more than 50 percent of total settlement member value and almost
30 percent of overall gross settlement value. They are highly connected to
other settlement members and deal with a larger number of third parties.
The fraction of value that they generate with them, however, is not above
average. The development during the past years shows a relatively stable size
ranking and does not suggest any significant future shifts in the settlement
member structure. Coming back to supposition 1 to 5, the responses look as
follows:
1. Figures confirm that the largest part of settlement value is generated
by settlement members.
2. Large settlement members show positive growth rates in settlement
value and number of trade partners. Growth rates of smaller settlement
members, though, seem to be higher.
3. Except for 2006 it cannot be confirmed that larger settlement members
in terms of value also deal with a larger number of third parties.
4. It seems true that settlement members with many trade partners deal
with a larger number of third parties. But somewhat surprisingly, the
portion of value that they generate with third parties is not related to
that number.
5. It could not be confirmed that settlement members with a large number
of third parties tend to attract more third parties as trade partners.
7.7.3 TP Business Structure
This section changes its point of view from settlement members to third
parties. Looking at third party gross settlement value reveals that the 5
largest third parties account for almost 40 percent of total third party value.
Third party connectivity is clearly more divers than settlement member con-
nectivity. The top 5 third parties show connectivity characteristics similar
to settlement members. The majority, however, has only a few settlement
members and even fewer third parties that they deal with. In average, third
parties have five times more links to settlement members than to other third
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parties. Larger third parties also show more links to settlement members as
well as to other third parties. The 34 third parties that were existent in each
year from 2003 to 2006, in average had 14 connections to settlement members
and only 2 to other third parties in 2003. In 2006, the average connection
to settlement members almost doubled to 26 while the average connection
to other third parties increased to 22. In a network context, this does not
mean better connectivity because the number of tp-nodes increased signifi-
cantly. The third party connectivity even decreased over the years which is
well reflected in table 7.4. As noted earlier, the network statistics suggest
that newer third parties are smaller in terms of settlement value. Supposi-
tion 6 explores this more closely. Looking at the gross value distribution in
figure 7.2 makes clear that 90 percent of all third parties fall in the first gross
value decile. Calculating the percentage of new third parties that show gross
values larger than 100 billion USD results in 11 percent for 2004, 6 percent
for 2005, and 1 percent for 2006. This means that of all the new third parties
in 2006, only 1 percent has a gross settlement value of more than 100 billion
USD. A comparison of former years suggests a confirmation of supposition
6. It seems that new third parties tend to be smaller in value. Even though,
the majority of third parties is considerably smaller in value and degree than
most settlement members, there are a few with connectivity characteristics
similar to settlement members. In an isolated network context there is no
obvious reason for them not become settlement members. In summary, the
relationship structure of settlement members is more homogeneous compared
to the set of third parties.
7.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter explores the trade relations among settlement members and
third parties based on their CLS gross settlement value. To gain insights
into the relationship structure, descriptive statistics as well as specific net-
work statistics are applied. Except the distribution of settlement member
relationships to third parties, the distribution of all other relationships show
power law characteristics. This means that there is a small group of settle-
ment members and third parties that account for a large portion of relation-
ships and generate a major fraction of total settlement value. It is important
to understand that these relationships do not reveal any information regard-
ing settlement arrangements on an operational level.
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Figure 7.6: Network in April 2003.
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Figure 7.7: Network in April 2006 (I).
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Figure 7.8: Network in April 2006 (II).

Chapter 8
Liquidity Aspects
8.1 Introduction
Liquidity issues are one of the main topics today when it comes to clearing
and settlement processes. Due to its net funding mechanism, CLS requires
only 2 to 3 percent liquidity of gross settlement value to be paid in. Even
though this is a substantial netting performance, the cash amounts are still
considerable. The basic problem arising with CLS is caused by the fact that
not the entire world of possible counterparties settles their foreign exchange
trades through CLS. Settlement members trade not only with other CLS
members but also with counterparties that do not settle through CLS. This
may cause an imbalance in liquidity needs during the funding hours of CLS
and the funding hours of the traditional payment systems. A particular
settlement member may have well balanced its trading books but still might
experience a mismatch when it comes to settlement. Trades settling through
CLS require funding early in the CET morning hours while the liquidity from
non-CLS trades may only be available later that day. If the whole universe of
counterparties would settle through CLS, this discrepancy would disappear.
The net sell and buy positions of all settlement members would balance and
funding could be minimized. Today, it is not clear by what the net positions
of CLS participants are driven. Bilateral net positions among the participants
vary widely day by day without any obvious reason. This chapter takes a
closer look at these bilateral net positions. It looks for factors in the CLS
participants’ connectivity structure that may be identified as drivers for the
level of these positions.
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SM1 SM2
trade 1 buy 100 USD buy 75 EUR
sell 75 EUR sell 100 USD
trade 2 buy 50 EUR buy 80 CHF
sell 80 CHF sell 50 EUR
trade 3 buy 150 EUR buy 200 USD
sell 200 USD sell 150 EUR
sell EUR 75 EUR 200 EUR
sell USD 200 USD 100 USD
sell CHF 80 CHF 0 CHF
net sell EUR 0 EUR 125 EUR
net sell USD 100 USD 0 USD
net sell CHF 80 CHF 0 CHF
overall BNSP 168 USD 168 USD
Table 8.1: Calculation of Bilateral Net Sell Position.
8.2 Definition of Bilateral Net Sell Position
Additionally to the gross settlement value already used in chapter 7, chapter
8 introduces the so called bilateral net sell position (BNSP). It is the net
sell value of all trades settled by a pair of settlement members and/or third
parties on one day. An example illustrates the calculation of the bilateral
net sell position. Consider two settlement members, SM1 and SM2, that
settle three trades as summarized in table 8.1. To settle trade 1, SM1 needs
to deliver 75 EUR and receives 100 USD. SM2 must deliver 100 USD and
receives 75 EUR. The same mechanism is true for trade 2 and 3. For SM1
this is equal to a sell position of 75 EUR which implies that SM1 must
theoretically come up with 75 EUR in liquidity at a specific time. SM2, in
turn, must come up with 200 EUR in liquidity which results in a net sell
position of 125 EUR for SM2. Converting it to dollar-equivalents results
in an overall bilateral net sell position of 168 USD for SM2. Repeating this
calculation for all currencies leads to net positions of 100 USD and 80 CHF for
SM1. This corresponds to an overall BNSP of 168 USD for SM1. Neglecting
currency fluctuations during the day, the bilateral net sell positions must
always be equal. The bilateral net sell position may be interpreted as a
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driver for the amount of liquidity that must be delivered by the settlement
members or third parties. It is important to understand that the bilateral net
sell position is not equal to the net pay-in that has to be made by settlement
members. The pay-ins are the effective net cash transfers (after possible in-
out swaps or other netting arrangements) from the settlement members to
CLS as described in 5.4.4. The net sell position, in contrast, is a calculatory
dimension that reflects a CLS member’s position in the market in terms
of its trading activity. It is not a direct measure for liquidity needs. It
merely indicates a settlement member’s net sell position against other CLS
participants. Using the cash pay-ins as a proxy for liquidity needs seems
more straight forward. Yet, it would not allow for insights into the actual
positions of the CLS participants. There are two main reasons for this:
(1) third parties do not make any pay-ins. The pay-ins for third parties
are accomplished by settlement members. Hence, pay-ins do not reflect the
actual positions of the CLS members. In particular the liquidity positions for
third parties could not be identified. (2) pay-ins do not reflect the underlying
trade relations due to the in-out swap mechanism that generates trades only
for netting purposes. The bilateral net sell position does not suffer from these
two problems and is therefore considered as an adequate proxy for the CLS
participant’s liquidity positions. On the downside there is the argument that
a theoretical liquidity position is not of much interest. It is only the actual
liquidity that is of concern. But due to data availability constraints the
bilateral net sell position is currently the best applicable measure. Table 8.2
summarizes the average, minimum, and maximum bilateral net sell position
per day in million USD of the five largest settlement members and third
parties (in terms of gross settlement value) in the first week of April 2006. In
average, the bilateral net sell position is about 50 percent of gross settlement
value. This is not only true for the month of April 2006 but also for April
in former years. The average bilateral net sell position has increased in line
with the average gross settlement value. The following analysis is therefore
not focused on the development over time but on the cross sectional data for
April 2006.
8.3 Regression Analysis
To identify a possible dependency between the CLS’ participant connectivity
structure and the level of bilateral net sell positions, regression analysis is
applied. It is analyzed whether specific connectivity characteristics of CLS
members lead to lower bilateral net sell positions. The degree serves as proxy
for the specific connectivity characteristic of a member. It is defined as the
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mean % min max
SM1 434 41% 0 15’700
SM2 405 40% 0 15’500
SM3 390 42% 0 7’900
SM4 417 45% 0 8’900
SM5 369 42% 0 13’400
TP1 392 35% 0 3’400
TP2 546 66% 0.2 2’100
TP3 590 75% 0 3’200
TP4 334 65% 0.6 1’000
TP5 179 36% 3 900
Mean, min, max in million USD equiva-
lents. % = mean bilateral net sell position
in percent of mean gross value.
Table 8.2: Bilateral Net Sell Positions in April 2006.
number of links from a particular node to all others. The higher the degree
of a node in the network, the higher its connectivity. A formal definition of
degree and network connectivity can be found in section 7.2. The regression
analysis is based on four panel data sets including the four weeks of April
2006. The first data set includes 49’124 bilateral net sell positions from April
3 to April 7. The second set consists of 42’342 records between April 10 and
April 14. The data set representing the third week of April includes 42’005
data records from April 17 to April 21, and the fourth week 49’002 from
April 24 to April 28. The dependent variable is defined as the bilateral net
sell position between a pair of CLS participants: BNSPi = Yi.
8.3.1 Basic Regression
As a first step, the following regression model is defined:
Yi = α + β1DEGi + β2∆DEG
2
i + δ1SMDi + δ2TPDi + i (8.1)
i refers to the observed pair of settlement members or third parties that is
involved in the respective bilateral net sell position. DEGi is defined as the
sum of the degrees of the two involved participants. This independent vari-
able is expected to have a negative effect on the bilateral net sell position.
This means that the higher the degree and therewith the connectivity of the
involved parties, the lower the bilateral net sell position. The rational for
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Regression I
BNSPW1 BNSPW2 BNSPW3 BNSPW4
IC -478.3*** -423.5*** -456.3*** -510.2***
(-70.7) (-59.1) (-60.2) (-68.6)
DEG 2.5*** 2.2*** 2.3*** 2.6***
(92.7) (77.9) (79.1) (90.2)
∆DEG2 -3’230.6*** -2’881.2*** -2’848.6*** -3’293.5***
(-27.8) (-23.4) (-21.9) (-26.2)
SMD 103.3*** 86.9*** 103.2*** 99.4***
(23.2) (18.5) (20.7) (20.2)
TPD 92.6*** 88.6*** 97.5*** 101.2***
(18.2) (16.1) (16.4) (18.1)
Adj.R2 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.22
t-statistics in parentheses.*** indicates statistical significance at a 1% level
based on a two-sided test. Coefficients for IC, DEG, SMD, TPD in million. IC
= intercept. BNSPWi = bilateral net sell position in week i of April 2006. DEG
= sum of counterparties’ degrees. ∆DEG2 = squared difference of counterpar-
ties’ degrees. SMD = relation type dummy equaling 1 if both counterparties
are settlement members, zero otherwise. TPD = relation type dummy equaling
1 if both counterparties are third parties, zero otherwise.
Table 8.3: Basic Regression.
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this expectation is the fact that a participant with higher connectivity has
more counterparties within CLS that it can trade with. Its world of CLS
trade partners is more complete than for a participant with low connectivity.
The mismatch caused by the split between CLS trades and non-CLS trades
should be smaller because a highly connected participant is less dependent on
non-CLS trade partners. ∆DEG2i is the squared difference between the con-
nectivity of the two involved trade partners. This variable provides insights
to whether or not large differences in connectivity of the two trading partners
play a significant role regarding the level of bilateral net sell positions. While
the variable DEGi controls for the absolute level of connectivity, ∆DEG
2
i
isolates the effect of differences in the connectivity of the two trade partners.
SMDi and TPDi are dummy variables that specify the type of trade rela-
tion. Three relations are possible: (1) a settlement member deals with a third
party (sm-tp link). This combination type is defined as the control group.
(2) a settlement member deals with a settlement member (sm-sm link). In
that case the variable SMDi equals 1 and zero otherwise. (3) a third party
deals with a third party (tp-tp link). If this is true, TPDi equals 1 and zero
otherwise. Table 8.3 shows the results for the four weeks of this regression
model. Each of the defined variables shows statistical significance at a high
level. The degree variable does not, like expected, indicate a negative impact
on the net sell position. In contrast, the degree difference variable shows a
negative sign, indicating that the net sell position is smaller, the larger the
difference in the degree of the two involved parties. This result is also unex-
pected. The two dummy variables show that the net sell position is larger in
case of sm-sm links and tp-tp links compared to mixed links. The positive
dependency between tp-tp links and the net sell position would be inline with
what is expected. Namely, that the net sell position resulting from a rela-
tionship between two third parties would be larger than from a relationship
between a third party and a settlement member, because latter involves at
least one party that is highly connected. For the same reason, it would be
expected that a relationship between two settlement member would result in
a lower net sell position than between a settlement member and a third party.
This is not confirmed by the sign of the SMD coefficient. In summary, the
regression results are robust over the four different time periods, but do not
reflect the expected dependencies. The results raise doubts regarding the
adequacy of the model. It provokes the suspicion that the degree variable
rather acts as a proxy for size than for connectivity. As described in chapter
7, degree and gross settlement value are correlated. Large participants in
terms of gross value also show high degrees. Gross value, in turn, is highly
correlated with the net sell position. These dependencies must somehow be
excluded from the regression model to isolate the effect of connectivity. As a
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first step, the following section introduces an amended regression model that
controls for the bilateral gross settlement value.
8.3.2 Controlled Regression
To exclude the size effect from the degree variable, the bilateral gross set-
tlement value for each relationship is introduced as a control variable. The
revised model looks as follows:
Yi = α + β1gvi + β2DEGi + β3∆DEG
2
i +
+δ1SMDi + δ2TPDi + i (8.2)
The regression results for this model are displayed in table 8.4. As expected,
the control variable turns out to be significantly different from zero. The
degree variable, however, does not loose its significance nor does it change its
sign. The variable DEGi still seems to have explanatory power, additionally
to the bilateral gross value. The variable representing the degree difference
as well as the two dummy variables neither change signs compared to the
first regression model. The dependencies do not point to the direction that
would be expected. The model still seems to be dominated by the size factor
and is not able to isolate the effect of connectivity. It becomes clear that
controlling for size by including the bilateral gross settlement position is not
sufficient. In a second step, the size effect is therefore controlled by the sum of
the aggregated gross settlement values of the involved parties. Additionally,
connectivity is examined on a relative basis. To implement these ideas, a
third regression model is introduced in the following section.
8.3.3 Relative Regression
The third regression model implements two improvements: (1) it adds an
additional control variable to get rid of the size effect that overlays the con-
nectivity effect and (2) it includes the degrees of a participant relative to its
aggregated gross settlement value. The new control variable is named GVi
and is defined as the sum of the overall gross values that the two involved
parties settled in the month of April 2006. In contrast to gvi which is the
bilateral gross settlement value of two parties on a specific day, GVi more ad-
equately reflects the actual size of the involved parties. The variable RDEGi
is now defined as the sum of the relative degrees of the two involved parties.
The term relative degree refers to the degree divided by the overall gross
settlement value of that particular participant. Or in other words, the total
gross value per link in April 2006. Correspondingly, ∆RDEG2i represents
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Regression II
BNSPW1 BNSPW2 BNSPW3 BNSPW4
IC -72.3*** -52.2*** -47.5*** -51.2***
(-16.6) (-12.3) (-10.6) (-11.4)
gv 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.4*** 0.4***
(289.1) (301.7) (299.6) (315.6)
DEG 0.5*** 0.4*** 0.3*** 0.4***
(27.4) (21.8) (19.5) (21.6)
∆DEG2 -732.9*** -700.4*** -605.1*** -723.6***
(-10.3) (-10.0) (-8.2) (-10.0)
SMD 25.4*** 23.2*** 25.0*** 13.1***
(23.2) (8.7) (8.8) (4.6)
TPD 9.0*** 7.3*** 6.5*** 2.4
(2.9) (2.3) (1.9) (0.7)
Adj.R2 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.74
t-statistics in parentheses.*** indicates statistical significance at a 1%
level based on a two-sided test. Coefficients for IC, DEG, SMD, TPD in
million. IC = intercept (in million USD). gv = bilateral gross settlement
value. BNSPWi = bilateral net sell position in week i of April 2006.
DEG = sum of counterparties’ degrees. ∆DEG2 = squared difference
of counterparties’ degrees. SMD = relation type dummy equaling 1 if
both counterparties are settlement members, zero otherwise. TPD =
relation type dummy equaling 1 if both counterparties are third parties,
zero otherwise.
Table 8.4: Controlled Regression.
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Regression III
BNSPW1 BNSPW2 BNSPW3 BNSPW4
IC 5.3*** 4.1** 7.1*** 13.2***
(2.8) (2.2) (3.6) (6.7)
GV 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0***
(20.1) (16.0) (13.9) (13.0)
gv 0.3*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4***
(283.5) (296.1) (293.1) (309.1)
RDEG -2’126.6*** -7’134.8*** -4’757.8*** -16’916.1***
(-2.4) (-3.5) (-3.2) (-4.6)
∆RDEG2 0.0*** 0.1*** 0.0*** 0.6***
(2.4) (3.0) (3.0) (3.3)
SMD 52.3*** 45.2*** 45.5*** 36.9***
(21.3) (19.1) (18.0) (14.5)
TPD 6.2** 6.5** 5.3* -1.2
(2.0) (2.1) (1.6) (-0.4)
Adj.R2 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.74
t-statistics in parentheses.***, **, * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%,
10% level based on a two-sided test. Coefficients for IC, SMD, TPD in million.
IC = intercept. GV = gross settlement value in April 2006. gv = bilateral gross
settlement value. BNSPWi = bilateral net sell position in week i of April 2006.
DEG = sum of counterparties’ degrees. ∆DEG2 = squared difference of counter-
parties’ degrees. SMD = relation type dummy equaling 1 if both counterparties
are settlement members, zero otherwise. TPD = relation type dummy equaling
1 if both counterparties are third parties, zero otherwise.
Table 8.5: Relative Regression.
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the squared difference of the two relative degrees. The bilateral gross value
variable gvi has been retained unchanged. The new model can be described
as:
Yi = α + β1GVi + β2gvi + β3RDEGi + β4∆RDEG
2
i +
+δ1SMDi + δ2TPDi + i (8.3)
Looking at table 8.5 shows that on a 99 percent confidence level, the relative
degree variable as well as the relative degree difference variable changed their
signs. The variable GVi differs significantly from zero and seems to effectively
control for size. The degree expressed on a relative basis is finally no longer
correlated to size in terms of gross value. The revised model mostly reflects
what was expected. The relative degree of the two involved parties has a
negative effect on the net sell position. This implies that the higher the con-
nectivity of the related parties in relation to their gross settlement values, the
lower their bilateral net sell positions. The reason for this dependency being
plausible was already explained in 8.3.1. Better connected participants have
more counterparties within CLS to trade with. They are less dependent on
trade partners outside CLS. The imbalance between inside and outside CLS
trades might thus be lower than for participants with low connectivity inside
CLS. The negative coefficient for the variable RDEGi describes this depen-
dency, though on a relative basis. The relative degree difference ∆RDEG2i
turns out to have a positive effect on the net sell position. This suggests that
the larger the difference of the relative degrees of the two involved parties,
the larger their bilateral net sell position. A relationship between two par-
ties with low relative degrees generates a lower net sell position than a mixed
relationship. The same is true for a relationship between two parties with
high relative degrees. The SMD variable did not change its sign. It sug-
gests that a sm-sm relationship generates larger net sell positions compared
to a mixed relationship. As this variable cannot be adjusted on a relative
basis as was done with the degree variables it should only be accepted with
reservation. It is likely that the variable is simply stamped by the size effect
explained earlier. Compared to the relationships between two third parties,
the relationships between two settlement members generally involve much
higher gross settlement values and with that, also much higher net sell posi-
tions. The same considerations are applicable for the TPD variable. On a
99 percent confidence level, TPD is not significantly different from zero. The
two dummy variables, therefore, might better be interpreted with caution.
Recalling the fact, that in average the bilateral net sell positions relative to
the gross settlement values did not change during the past years, suggests
that simply increasing the number of participants does not lower the bilateral
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net sell positions. This, combined with the regression results might indeed
indicate that there is a cross sectional relation between the level of bilateral
net sell positions and the structure of trade partners. In summary, the third
model might bring up the idea that there could be an optimal level of relative
connectivity that would minimize the net sell position, at least theoretically.
In practice, an optimal level of relative connectivity would be restricted by
the maximum number of participants. Large members might not be able to
reach this theoretically optimal level of relative connectivity. Furthermore,
it should be questioned whether such an optimal level is of interest at all. As
mentioned earlier, the net sell position does not represent the actual liquidity
needs. The use of its optimization is therefore unclear. Equally unclear is
the question whether a minimized bilateral net sell position would in fact
lead to lower liquidity needs.
8.4 Chapter Summary
The bilateral net sell position is defined as the net sell value of all trades
settled by a pair of settlement members and/or third parties on one day.
These positions vary significantly day by day without any obvious reasons.
This chapter looks for factors in the CLS participants’ connectivity structure
that may drive these positions. Using regression analysis, some dependen-
cies between the level of connectivity and the corresponding level of net sell
positions can be shown. Connectivity in relation to gross settlement value
has a negative effect on net sell positions, meaning that the better the con-
nectivity of a participant compared to its size in terms of gross settlement
value, the lower its net sell positions. Besides the relative connectivity of the
participants, also the difference in connectivity of the trade partners seems to
drive net sell positions. Regression results suggest, that trade relationships
involving two parties with a large difference in their connectivity, lead to
higher net sell positions. These interpretations are in line with what was ex-
pected. A highly connected CLS participant has more counterparties within
CLS that it can trade with and is assumed to be less dependent on counter-
parties outside CLS. The imbalance caused by the split between CLS trades
and non-CLS trades should be smaller for this particular participant. This,
in turn, is likely to result in lower levels of liquidity needs. In summary, the
analysis empirically shows that specific connectivity characteristics of trade
relationships have an effect on the level of bilateral net sell positions.

Chapter 9
Conclusion
Today, the so called Allsopp-Report (p. 42) is widely interpreted as a threat
from the Bank for International Settlements to the industry. It urged indus-
try players and regulatory authorities to reduce credit risk in foreign exchange
settlement. A group of key players, the G20, affiliated to take action. The
result was a complex IT project that was more than once at the verge of
capitulation in its childhood. Merely the scope of engagement did not allow
for failure. Remarkable efforts and painful trade-offs were necessary to bring
the system alive. Today, after five years of operation, the system can be con-
sidered as the settlement industry’s standard in foreign exchange. Though,
CLS is a success story, future projects may learn from its history. The com-
plexity of the project was crucial. With hindsight, the integration of existing
platforms would probably have proven to be more efficient than building a
new system from scratch. Staff changes complicated the project’s continuity
and aggravated the emotional relationships among the affected parties. In-
volvement of numerous central banks, different authorities, and legislations
turned the project into a sensitive and also political affair. At some points,
intervention by the Bank for International Settlements was vital. It is clear
that enormous risks are inherent to an IT project of this scale. Measuring and
controlling these risks is equally difficult and important. It may be assumed
that without the right dose of pressure from a powerful authority at the right
time, the project may have perished of its own complexity. Once running,
the system proved its resilience and was able to successfully penetrate the
market. Around 60 percent of global foreign exchange turnover is estimated
to be settled in CLS. If this equals a 60 percent credit risk reduction, the
urge of the Bank for International Settlements may be considered to be well
fulfilled. Though CLS’ market share is still increasing there will be a limit as
long as not the whole world of possible foreign exchange trade partners par-
ticipates in CLS. It is yet not clear, whether one day CLS participation will
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be crucial to find counterparties that are willing to enter a trade. So far, there
is no price segmentation (in terms of currency rates) depending on where the
trade gets settled and it is unlikely that this will happen in the future. Seg-
mentation is enforced by value and volume limits. Counterparties that do
not settle in CLS already experience unfavorable conditions regarding trade
limits. This effect may intensify in the future. CLS’s mechanism minimizes
liquidity needs for settling its transactions, but at the same time imposes new
restrictions on liquidity provisions. The exact timing of pay-ins is unique in
the settlement industry and bears new challenges. CLS was aware of the
arising difficulties and reacted with the introduction of the so called in-out
swaps (p. 91). Despite being planned as a temporary solution, in-out swaps
became an essential tool for liquidity management. It is unclear, whether it
is possible or even desirable to replace the in-out swap mechanism in future.
Ideas such as cross-boarder cash pools and the extension of CLS’ settlement
window are in the air and seem to offer promising improvements compared
to current liquidity management. Broad implementations, however, will take
time and presumably require financial and/or authoritative pressure just as
it was the case for CLS itself. The empirical part of the thesis offers insights
into the trading structure among CLS members. Substantial differences in
the structure of settlement member and third party relationships were found.
Settlement members are highly connected among each other and do not show
significant changes over time. The connectivity of third parties is much lower
and shows the development of power law characteristics. Statistics and visu-
alized network graphs suggest that new third parties tend to be smaller than
the existing ones. This means that a relatively small group of members gen-
erates an increasing part of the business. In terms of liquidity, the analysis
was based on the bilateral net sell position. The fact that these positions did
in average not lower during the past years, indicates that simply increasing
the number of members does not automatically lead to lower bilateral net
sell positions. In contrast, cross sectional regression suggests that there is a
certain dependency between the level of the bilateral net sell position and the
type of trade relation. It seems that trade relations between members with
high relative connectivity lead to lower bilateral net sell positions. If and
how these results may be implemented in a practical context is yet unclear.
9.1 Critique and Further Research
Liquidity is a key issue in settlement. Its management is complex, costly,
and vital for systemic stability. Academics, however, have just started to
focus on these topics. Lack of data might be an important reason for this
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research area to be underdeveloped. The acquisition of the data that was
presented in these chapters was a challenging task. Data protection and
editing do not allow for open access. Consequently, the research design of this
thesis was decisively stipulated by data availability which in general is not a
desirable starting point. Three main issues of serious criticism arise with this
dependency: (1) As the historical part of the thesis is based on original CLS
documents, it widely ignores the notions of individual banks and IT service
providers that were involved in the project. It documents CLS’s history
from a one-sided view. (2) The data set presented in chapter 7 is enclosed
in itself an cannot be related to the outside world of CLS. It frustrates a
comprehensive analysis of the CLS trade structure compared to the non-
CLS trade structure and does not even allow for insights into the structure
of third party service providers. It would have been interesting to explore
the structural development of inside- and outside CLS transactions and in
particular the development of third party service providers. As addressed
by industry professionals, a consolidation process is assumed to be going
on. Smaller institutions that are active in foreign exchange trading seem to
reduce their number of correspondent banking relations and concentrate on
a few ”one-stop” service providers. If this is true, CLS might be identified
as an important driver for such a development. The thesis on hand, due
to lacking data, is not able to provide such insights. (3) Chapter 8 suffers
from similar problems. Instead of analyzing the dependency between the
trade structure and actual liquidity needs, a proxy had to be employed.
Consequently, the interpretation of the results is not quite clear. Despite
of, or even because of the critique, this thesis intends to motivate further
research on the issues mentioned above. Altogether, the thesis contributes
to the academic literature in that it provides a sound and unique approach
to the world of Continuous Linked Settlement.
9.2 Food for Thought to Practitioners
Continuous Linked Settlement is a topic that is of interest particularly to
practitioners. As the setting of the empirical chapters 7 and 8 rather treats
theoretical aspects of CLS’ settlement member structure, this section intends
to provide food for thought to practitioners. In the wake of the network anal-
ysis in chapter 7, it appears that there is no distinct difference in the struc-
tural importance of settlement members and third parties. In other words,
some system participants with the status of third parties exhibit equal or
even larger trade values than some of the settlement members. Intuition
would suggest that the status of being a settlement member is reserved for
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large participants. Accordingly, a third party status would be appropriate
for smaller participants. Figure 7.8 does not support this intuition. There
is more than a dozen of third parties that seem to be at least equally large
in trade value than most settlement members. Two explanations are con-
ceivable: (1) compared to a settlement member status, a third party status
is more attractive in terms of cost. As a consequence, there might be third
parties that from a business point of view would better be classified as settle-
ment members. (2) The third parties in question do not meet certain criteria
requested by CLS to become settlement members. Both points might lead
to a bias in the participant structure. It is obvious that system stability re-
quires adequate risk profiles for settlement members. The second reason for
large participants not becoming settlement members might therefore be well
acceptable. But third parties that are prevented from applying for settle-
ment member status due to cost issues might scale down CLS’ business. In
that case, reconsidering CLS’ cost structure might be worthwhile. A starting
point for further investigations on this topic could be the idea of an optimal
classification scheme for third parties and settlement members, including the
relevant cost issues for both, CLS and its members. Results might help to
design a cost structure that would entice certain third parties to become set-
tlement members. Considering the difficulties arising with the split of CLS-
and non-CLS trades (chapter 8), it should not exclusively be the interest of
CLS Bank to increase the number of its members. It is likely that also the
industry could benefit from an increased number of participants, especially
in terms of liquidity management.
Appendix A
Keyword Index
Aggregate Short Position Limit (ASPL) CLS risk management rule that
places a cap on the sum of a settlement member’s short positions.
(p. 87)
Allsopp-Report Report published by the Bank for International Settle-
ments on ”Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions” in 1996.
Set the basis for the foundation of CLS. (p. 42)
Bilateral Net Sell Position (BNSP) Net sell value of all trades settled
by a pair of settlement members and/or third parties on one day.
(p. 132)
BOJ-NET Real-time gross settlement system of Japan. (p. 21)
BOK-Wire Bank of Korea Financial Wire Network. Real-time gross set-
tlement system of Korea. (p. 22)
CCP Central counterparty. Settlement institution that provides clearing
and guarantees the execution of transactions. (p. 6)
CFD Contract for differences. Derivative products that allow traders to set-
tle foreign exchange transactions without principal payments. (p. 14)
CHAPS Clearing House Automated Payment Service. Real-time gross set-
tlement system of the United Kingdom. (p. 18)
CHATS Clearing House Automated Transfer System. Real-time gross set-
tlement system of Hong Kong. (p. 21)
CHIPS Clearing House Interbank Payment System. US net settlement sys-
tem. (p. 17)
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Connectivity Network Analysis. Number of links of a node in relation
to the number of possible links that node could have in the network.
(p. 108)
Cumulative Distribution Function P (k) Network Analysis. Represents
the probability that the degree of a node is greater or equal to k.
Degree data is best presented by a plot of the cumulative Distribution
Function. (p. 109)
Degree ki Network Analysis. The degree of a node is the number of links
connected to that particular node. Links may be directed or undirected.
(p. 108)
Degree Distribution p(k) Network Analysis. Probability distribution that
a particular node has exactly degree k. It is a function describing the
total number of nodes with a given degree. (p. 108)
ESAS Exchange Settlement Account System. Real-time gross settlement
system of New Zealand. (p. 22)
Fedwire US real-time gross settlement system. (p. 17)
G20 Group of 20. Group of senior bankers from large international financial
institutions with common interest regarding large value cross-border
payments. (p. 47)
Herstatt Risk Synonym for credit risk in settlement. Referring to the col-
lapse of Bankhaus Herstatt. (p. 33)
In-Out Swap CLS liquidity management tool. Combination of two foreign
exchange swaps in opposite directions. One trade is settled in CLS.
With that trade, settlement members sell long positions and buy short
positions. The second trade is an exact mirror image of the first trade
but settles outside CLS. (p. 91)
KRONOS Real-time gross settlement system of Denmark. (p. 21)
Liquidity Provider CLS risk management facility. Liquidity providers
are settlement members that commit to provide liquidity in a certain
currency in case other members fail to meet their pay-in obligations.
(p. 88)
LVTS Large Value Transfer System. Real-time gross settlement system of
Canada. (p. 20)
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MEPS+ Monetary Authority of Singapore Electronic Payment System.
Real-time gross settlement system of Singapore. (p. 23)
NBO Norges Bank’s Settlement System. Real-time gross settlement system
of Norway. (p. 22)
Net Positive Overall Value (NPOV) CLS risk management rule ensur-
ing self collateralization. It is met when the mark-to-market value
of a settlement member’s aggregated long currency position is more
than the aggregate of the mark-to-market values of its short positions.
(p. 85)
Net Settlement Settlement of a number of obligations or transfers between
or among counterparties on a net basis. (p. 9)
Netting Process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming
payment orders or security transfer instructions prior to settlement,
possibly including the netting of instructions and the establishment of
final positions for settlement. (p. 5)
Network Set of items (nodes) with connections between them (links). Net-
works that can be observed in the real world are often called real world
networks. (p. 107)
Nostro Agent Are connected to their local real-time gross settlement sys-
tem and transfer pay-ins to CLS in lieu of settlement members. A
nostro agent is not a participant of CLS. (p. 76)
Pay-Ins Funds transferred by settlement members to CLS according to a
pre-defined schedule during the morning hours of Central European
Time. (p. 81)
Pay-Outs Funds transferred from CLS to its settlement members. Within
the constraint of certain risk parameters, pay-outs are made throughout
the settlement process. CLS pays out any long balances whenever
settlement is successfully completed. (p. 84)
PvP Payment versus payment. funds of two counterparties are transferred
simultaneously and are only considered final if the counter-transfer is
final as well. (p. 6)
RITS Reserve Bank Information and Transfer System. Real-time gross set-
tlement system of Australia. (p. 19)
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RIX Real-time gross settlement system of Sweden. (p. 23)
RTGS Real-time gross settlement. Continuous settlement of funds or secu-
rities transfers individually on an order by order basis without netting.
(p. 8)
SAMOS South African Multiple Option Settlement System. Real-time
gross settlement system of South Africa. (p. 23)
Settlement Discharge of obligations of buyer and seller through the transfer
of funds and/or securities. (p. 5)
Settlement Finality Assurance that at some point transfer of payments is
complete, irrevocable and unconditional. (p. 6)
Settlement Member (SM) CLS participant with direct access to the sys-
tem. (p. 74)
Settlement Risk Risk stemming from payment system participants’ failure
to fulfill their obligations on time. May be split in credit risk, liquidity
risk, market risk, operational risks and legal risks. (p. 31)
Short Position Limit (SPL) CLS risk management rule ensuring a maxi-
mum short position for all settlement members in a particular currency.
(p. 86)
SIC Swiss Interbank Clearing. Real-time gross settlement system of Switzer-
land. (p. 19)
Strength si Network Analysis. The strength of a node is the sum of all
weighted links that are connected to that particular node. (p. 108)
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. Ser-
vice provider who supplies standardized messaging services. (p. 24)
TARGET Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express
Transfer. Real-time gross settlement system for the central banks of
the European Union. (p. 18)
Third Party (TP) CLS participant that has no direct access to the system.
Submission of instructions and settlement is managed by a settlement
member on behalf of the third party. (p. 76)
Undirected Network Network with links that do not show a particular
direction between two nodes. (p. 108)
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User Member CLS participant that directly sends instructions to the sys-
tem but settles via the account of a settlement member. Today, CLS
has only one user member. (p. 75)
Weighted Network Network with links that have weights wij (e.g. trans-
action values) attached to themselves. In an unweighted network, links
are either existent or non-existent. (p. 108)

Appendix B
CLS Key Figures
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
Total assets 104.3 100.8 96.1 96.1 100.3
Total equity 33.5 28.0 30.1 44.2 72.2
Net income -2.2 -2.1 -19.4 -35.1 -57.8
in million GBP, source: www.bankscope.com.
Shareholders 68 68 68 69 69
Employees 166 155 154 141 n/a
SM 54 57 54 53 n/a
TP 391 257 118 36 n/a
source: www.bankscope.com and CLS.
Settlement value 2’700 2’099 1’460 850 n/a
Instructions 250’000 180’000 135’000 70’000 n/a
average daily numbers, two-sided, source: CLS and own estimates.
Table B.1: CLS Key Figures.
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